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Does	   it	   make	   sense	   to	   run	   a	   university	   like	   a	   firm?	   Are	   there	   alternative,	   private-­‐sector	  
models	  of	  management	  and	  governance	  more	  appropriate	  and	  effective	   for	   the	  university	  
context	  than	  the	  corporate	  model?	  The	  chief	  aim	  of	  the	  dissertation	  is	  a	  plea	  for	  reformers	  
from	   the	   policy	   and	   scientific	   communities	   to	   think	   beyond	   the	   corporate	   model	   in	  
considering	  alternative	  private	  sector	  models	  of	  management	  and	  governance	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  the	  university	  reform	  debate.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  dissertation	  raises	  a	  number	  of	  additional	  
questions,	   including:	   	  Why	   are	   so	  many	   knowledge-­‐based	   firms	   organized	   as	   professional	  
partnerships?	  Can	   transaction	  cost	   theory	  shed	  some	   light	  on	   this	  choice	  of	  organizational	  
form?	  	  Can	  agency	  theory	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  most	  appropriate	  mode	  of	  organizational	  
management	  and	  governance?	  
	  
In	   seeking	   to	   provide	   answers	   to	   these	   questions,	   an	   interdisciplinary	   approach	   is	   taken.	  
Namely,	   arguments	   are	   formulated	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   transaction	   cost	   theory,	   agency	   theory	  
and	  institutional	  theory,	  thereby	  drawing	  from	  the	  fields	  of	  economics,	  organization	  studies,	  
sociology	   and	   psychology.	   To	   further	   underscore	   the	   significance	   and	   timelines	   of	   the	  
questions	  addressed	  in	  the	  subsequent	  chapters,	  the	  author	  would	  like	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  
this	   work	   was	   funded	   by	   a	   grant	   from	   the	   German	   Federal	   Ministry	   of	   Education	   and	  
Research	   (BMBF,	   grant	   number	   01PW11015),	   with	   the	   explicit	   aim	   of	   providing	   some	  
normative	  answers	  to	  the	  questions	  of	  higher	  education	  finance	  and	  governance	  reform.	  In	  
the	   following	   paragraphs,	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   some	   key	   historical	   developments	   in	   the	  
German	   public	   university	   landscape	   is	   offered	   in	   order	   to	   place	   the	   current	   work	   in	   its	  
historical	   context.	   After	   that,	   the	   contributions	   of	   the	   constituent	   chapters	   of	   the	  
dissertation	  are	  summarized.	  
	  
1.2 Historical	  Background	  
	  
While	   we	   tend	   to	   take	   the	   notion	   of	   corporate	   governance	   as	   a	   given,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
remember	  that	  it	   is	  a	  relatively	  recent	  concept	  and	  topic	  of	  interest	  among	  practitioners	  in	  
the	   financial	   sector,	   in	   policy	   circles	   and	   among	   academics.	   The	   seeds	   of	   what	   we	   know	  
today	   as	   corporate	   governance	  were	   sown	   as	   recently	   as	   the	   early	   1980s	   and	   even	   then,	  
limited	   primarily	   to	   discussion	   in	   the	  United	   States.	   It	   is	   telling	   that	   the	   first	   international	  
code	  of	  good	  governance	  was	  published	  by	  the	  OECD	  19991.	  In	  the	  public	  sector,	  the	  topic	  is	  
even	   newer	   and	   less	  well	   defined,	   given	   that	   it	   has	   become	   a	   part	   of	   the	   discourse	   even	  
more	  recently	  and	  that	  what	  constitutes	  public	  governance	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  pin	  down.	  The	  
goals	  of	  public	  organizations	  are	  	  more	  numerous	  and	  ambiguous	  than	  those	  of	  their	  private	  
sector	   counterparts,	   stakeholders	   often	   have	   competing	   and	   conflicting	   interests,	  
organizational	  outputs	  and	  outcomes	  do	  not	  lend	  themselves	  readily	  to	  measurement,	  and,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  It	  was	  revised	  in	  2004.	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typically	   clear-­‐cut	   agency	   relationships	   do	   not	   exist,	   complicating	   the	   application	   of	  
corporate	   governance	   practices.	   And	   the	   list	   goes	   on.	   Despite	   the	   difficulties	   of	   adopting	  
corporate	   models	   of	   management	   and	   governance	   in	   public	   sector	   organization,	   the	  
tendency	   to	   do	   so	   has	   only	   increased	   over	   the	   last	   three	   decades,	   led	   by	   the	  New	   Public	  
Management	  (“NPM”)	  reformers.	  	  
	  
In	   Germany,	   NPM-­‐style	   reform	   in	   the	   higher	   education	   sector	   gained	   traction	   in	   the	   late	  
1990s	   when	   Hochschulreform	   was	   made	   a	   high-­‐profile	   political	   issue	   in	   the	   campaign	   of	  
then-­‐Chancellor	  Gerhard	  Schroeder	  in	  the	  1998	  federal	  elections.	  As	  described	  by	  Schimank,	  
“at	   the	   core	   of	   NPM	   lies	   the	   principle	   of	   increased	   competition	   among	   and	   within	  
universities	   –	   competition	   for	   resources,	   students	   and	   national	   as	   well	   as	   international	  
standing”	  (2005:	  365).	  Attempts	  to	  stimulate	  such	  competition	  have	  led	  to	  the	  introduction	  
of	   tuition	   fees	   for	   students	  and	  a	  new	  salary	   structure	   for	  professors,	   external	  monitoring	  
and	  control	  by	  newly	  founded	  accreditation	  bodies	  based	  on	  output-­‐oriented	  indicators,	  and	  
the	   allocation	   of	   public	   finance	   based	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   institutional	   performance	   indicators	  
(Huefner,	  2003).	  
	  
Some	   might	   consider	   higher	   education	   reform	   in	   Germany	   long	   overdue.	   For	   example,	  
student	  enrollment	  more	  than	  doubled	  twice	  in	  the	  fifty	  years:	  first,	  between	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  
and	  mid-­‐1970s,	  and	  again	  between	  1970	  and	  1990.	  During	   the	   first	  phase	  of	  high	  growth,	  
state	   governments	   expanded	   institutional	   funding,	   enabling	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	  
professorships	   and	   scientific	   staff	   that	   kept	   pace	  with	   the	   increase	   in	   student	   enrollment.	  
However,	  limited	  state	  resources	  meant	  that	  the	  100	  percent	  increase	  in	  student	  enrollment	  
during	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  high	  growth	  could	  only	  be	  matched	  with	  a	  16	  percent	  increase	  in	  
the	  number	  of	  academic	  staff	  (Huefner,	  2003:	  147).	  	  
	  
Since	  the	  sudden	  increase	   in	  demand	  for	  highly	  qualified	  professors	  was	  not	  matched	  by	  a	  
corresponding	   increase	   in	   supply,	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   high	   growth	   was	   associated	   with	   a	  
general	  decline	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  academic	  staff	  (Schimank,	  2005:	  371).	  The	  second	  phase	  
of	  high	  growth	  was	  associated	  with	  an	  overall	  decline	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  teaching	  and	  scientific	  
performance,	  which	  could	  be	  explained	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   ratio	  of	   students	   to	  academic	  
staff	  increased	  from	  13:1	  to	  24:1,	  with	  some	  mandatory	  lectures	  being	  visited	  by	  as	  many	  as	  
1,000	  students	  at	  any	  given	  time	  (Huefner,	  2003;	  Kuepper,	  2003).	  Tight	  state	  budgets	  over	  
the	   years	   have	   also	   resulted	   in	   the	   deterioration	   of	   university	   buildings	   and	   equipment2,	  
which	  has	  contributed	  to	  a	  further	   lag	   in	   international	  competitiveness.	  More	  recently,	  the	  
Bologna	   process,	   which	   aims	   to	   harmonize	   higher	   education	   within	   Europe,	   has	   created	  
external	  pressure	  on	  German	  universities	  to	  make	  reforms.	  	  For	  example,	  degree	  programs	  
have	  had	  to	  be	  revised	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  comparable	  with	  degrees	  awarded	  by	  foreign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Die	  Welt.	  2013.	  Deutsche	  Unis	  sind	  überlastete	  Milliardengräber.	  
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article122683396/Deutsche-­‐Unis-­‐sind-­‐
ueberlastete-­‐Milliardengraeber.html	  	  accessed	  on	  December	  8,	  2013.	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universities.	   In	  addition,	   the	  goal	  of	  promoting	  quality	  and	   transparency	  within	  and	  across	  
institutions	   offering	   the	   same	   or	   similar	   degrees	   has	   led	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	  
independent	  accreditation	  bodies.	  Consequently,	  certain	  features	  of	  the	  corporate	  model	  of	  
organizational	  management	  and	  governance	  are	  being	   introduced	   into	  the	  German	  system	  
of	  higher	  education	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  expedite	  the	  reform	  process.	  
	  
1.3 Thinking	  “Outside	  the	  Box”	  	  
	  
In	   Chapters	   2	   and	   3	   of	   the	   dissertation,	   a	   theoretical	   foundation	   for	   the	   formal	  
professionalization	   of	   more	   types	   of	   knowledge	   work	   and	   for	   the	   partnership	   as	   an	  
organizational	   form	   and	   as	   alternative	   governance	   structures	   for	   knowledge-­‐intensive	  
organizations	   and	   transactions	   in	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   services	   is	   developed.	   In	   the	  
academic	   context,	   these	   complementary	   approaches	   to	   governance	   are	   proposed	   to	   be	  
superior	  to	  both	  the	  traditional	  public	  bureaucratic	  model	  of	  university	  administration	  and	  
the	   corporate	   style	   of	   management	   and	   governance.	   In	   particular,	   the	   professional	  
partnership	   is	   argued	   to	   optimize	   the	   governance	   of	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   service	  
transactions,	   such	   as	   education,	   in	   a	   cost	   minimizing	   way.	   Arguments	   are	   grounded	   in	  
agency	   theory,	   institutional	   theory,	   and	   transaction	   cost	   theory.	   Importantly,	   such	   an	  
approach	   to	   university	   governance	   is	   also	   consistent	   with	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   German	  
Hochschulgesetz,	   referenced	   above,	   as	   well	   as	   several	   recent	   reports	   published	   by	   the	  
Wissenschaftsrat,	  which	  plead	  for	   fundamental	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  reforms	   in	  German	  higher	  
education,	  including	  the	  professionalization	  of	  academia.	  
	  
At	   first	   glance,	   the	   ideas	   proposed	   in	   this	   dissertation	  may	   appear	   quite	   radical	   to	  many,	  
while	   careful	   consideration	   will	   reveal	   that	   far	   from	   being	   a	   radical	   departure	   from	   the	  
norm,	   they	   are	   much	  more	   consistent	   with	   the	   way	   academics	   view	   themselves	   and	   are	  
viewed	  by	  the	  broader	  society	  –	  as	  a	  community	  of	  highly	  educated	  professionals	  dedicated	  
to	   the	   advancement	   of	   scholarship,	   science	   and	   knowledge.	   In	   line	  with	   Binderkrantz	   and	  
Christensen,	  the	  dissertation	  takes	  the	  position	  that	  a	  transfer	  of	  ‘lessons	  learned’	  from	  the	  
private	   sector	   to	   the	  public	   sector	   is	  possible	   in	   the	  domain	  of	  organizational	   governance;	  
however,	  as	  stated	  by	  those	  authors,	  “it	  presumes	  careful	  analysis	  of	  when	   it	   is	  defensible	  
and	  what	   the	   lesson	   is”	   (2012:	  46).	   The	  goal	  of	   the	  dissertation,	   therefore,	   is	   to	   stimulate	  
reformers	   to	   think	   outside	   of	   the	   corporate	   governance	   box	   and	   to	   take	   a	  more	   nuanced	  
approach	   in	   their	   selection	   of	   private	   sector	   models	   of	   management	   and	   governance.	  
Specifically,	  this	  work	  offers	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  corporate	  model	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  argued,	  more	  
appropriate,	   in	   that	   it	   is	   much	   more	   consistent	   with	   the	   nature	   of	   academic	   work	   –	  
knowledge	  work	  -­‐	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  academics	  as	  knowledge	  workers.	  In	  particular,	  
the	   dissertation	  makes	   the	   case	   for	   the	   professional	   partnership	   as	   an	   exemplary	   private	  
sector	  model	   of	   management	   and	   governance	   that	   is	   uniquely	   well-­‐suited	   to	   knowledge-­‐
intensive	  work	  and	  knowledge	  workers.	  Starting	  from	  the	  anecdotal	  observation	  that	  in	  the	  
private	   sector,	   the	  professional	  partnership	  has	  historically	  been	   the	  most	  widely	  adopted	  
organizational	  form	  in	  many	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy,	  a	  theoretical	  case	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is	   made	   for	   the	   broader	   professionalization	   of	   knowledge	   workers	   and	   for	   the	   wider	  
adoption	   of	   the	   partnership	   as	   an	   organizational	   form	   best-­‐suited	   for	   managing	   and	  
governing	   knowledge	   workers	   and	   transactions	   in	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   services.	   The	  
dissertation	   then	   takes	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   case	   of	   the	   public	   university	   in	   Germany,	  
evaluating	   opportunities	   for	   reform	   following	   the	   professional	   partnership	   model	   and	  
recommending	  the	  professionalization	  of	  academia,	  along	  with	  two	  different	  approaches	  for	  
the	   practical	   implementation	   of	   the	   partnership	   concept.	   In	   developing	   these	   ideas	   and	  
arguments,	  the	  dissertation	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  	  
	  
Chapter	   2	   opens	   with	   a	   general	   examination	   of	   optimal	   modes	   of	   governance	   for	  
transactions	  in	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services.	  Given	  that	  its	  primary	  goal	   is	  the	  matching	  of	  
matching	   discrete	   economic	   transactions	   with	   appropriate	   governance	   structures,	   a	  
transaction	   cost	   theoretic	   approach	   is	   taken.	   However,	   it	   is	   quickly	   recognized	   that	  
transaction	   cost	   theory	   falls	   notably	   short	  where	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   service	   transactions	  
are	   concerned.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   entirely	   surprising,	   since	   Williamson	   himself	   did	   not	  
consider	   his	   theory	   particularly	   relevant	   in	   this	   context.3	  Consequently,	   the	   chapter	   seeks	  
both	  to	  elaborate	  this	  gap	  in	  transaction	  cost	  theory	  and	  to	  fill	  it	  by	  extending	  and	  improving	  
its	  prescriptive	  power	  when	  applied	  to	  transactions	  involving	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services.	  
To	   this	   end,	   the	   chapter	   has	   two	   aims.	   Firstly,	   transaction	   cost	   theory	   is	   extended	   to	  
explicitly	   account	   for	   the	   knowledge	   dimension	   of	   human	   assets	   by	   elaborating	   on	   the	  
unique	   attributes	   of	   knowledge	   and	   knowledge-­‐based	   services	   as	   economic	   commodities,	  
developing	  a	  typology	  of	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services	  that	   is	   linked	  to	  the	  asset	  specificity	  
of	   transactions	   and,	   by	   describing	   the	   unique	   characteristics	   of	   knowledge	   workers	   that	  
differentiate	   them	   from	   the	   standard	   assumptions	   about	   human	   nature	   that	   underlie	  
transaction	   cost	   theory.	   Secondly,	   two	   separate	   yet	   complementary	  modes	  of	   governance	  
for	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  service	  transactions	  are	  proposed:	  the	  broader	  professionalization	  
of	  knowledge	  workers	  -­‐	  an	  approach	  grounded	  in	  institutional	  theory	  and	  sociology	  -­‐	  and	  the	  
advancement	  of	  the	  partnership	  as	  an	  alternative	  mode	  of	  governance	  to	  both	  market	  and	  
hierarchy	   -­‐	  an	  approach	  grounded	   in	  organization	   theory.	  Specifically,	   it	   is	  argued	   that	   the	  
unique	   governance	   attributes	   of	   the	   profession	   as	   institution,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	  
partnership	   as	   an	   organizational	   form,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   (particularly	   when	   combined)	  
maximize	   the	   governance	   benefits	   associated	   with	   both	   market	   and	   hierarchy,	   while	  
minimizing	  the	  transaction	  costs	  associated	  with	  each.	  
	  
In	   view	   of	   the	   adaptation	   of	   the	   corporate	   model	   of	   organizational	   governance	   in	   the	  
German	   public	   university	   system	   as	   an	   effort	   to	   expedite	   the	   reform	   process,	   Chapter	   3	  
takes	  a	  critical	   look	  at	  the	  primary	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  agency-­‐based	  corporate	  governance	  
model	   and	   evaluates	   their	   relative	  merits	   in	   the	  higher	   education	   context.	   After	   assessing	  
the	  extent	   to	  which	   the	  agency	   theoretic	  assumptions	   that	  underlie	  corporate	  governance	  
apply	   in	   the	  public	   university	   context,	   an	   alternative	   approach	   to	  university	   governance	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  skills	  of	  professionals	  “do	  not	  by	  themselves	  pose	  a	  governance	  issue”	  (Williamson,	  1981:	  563)	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then	  offered;	  one	  that	  is	  modeled	  after	  the	  professional	  service	  firm	  and,	  specifically,	  after	  
the	   professional	   partnership.	   Building	   on	   the	   insights	   gleaned	   from	   Chapter	   2,	   Chapter	   3	  
argues	  that	  the	  professional	  partnership	  model	  of	  governance	  is	  not	  only	  theoretically	  more	  
sound	  than	  either	  the	  corporate	  of	  the	  public	  bureaucratic	  models,	  but	  that	  it	   is	  also	  more	  
consistent	  with	  the	  unique	  characteristics	  of	  the	  German	  higher	  education	  context.	  	  
	  
Extending	   the	   theoretical	   foundation	   for	   the	   formal	   professionalization	   of	   more	   types	   of	  
knowledge	  work	  and	  for	  the	  partnership	  as	  an	  organizational	  form	  as	  alternative	  governance	  
structures	   for	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   organizations	   and	   transactions	   in	   knowledge-­‐intensive	  
services	  that	  was	  developed	  in	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3,	  Chapter	  4	  applies	  it	  to	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  
public	   university	   governance	   reform	   in	   Germany.	   Bozeman’s	   (1987)	   framework	   of	  
ownership,	   funding	   and	   control	   is	   utilized	   in	   structuring	   the	   elaboration	   of	   two	   different	  
approaches	   to	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   partnership	   concept;	   namely,	   a	   market-­‐based	  
model	  and	  a	  hybrid	  organizational	  model,	  the	  latter	  reflecting	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  system	  
of	   co-­‐determination	   that	   uniquely	   characterizes	   corporate	   governance	   in	   Germany.	  While	  
each	   model	   represents	   a	   stand-­‐alone	   solution	   to	   the	   governance	   reform	   question,	   both	  
would	  be	  strengthened	  by	  the	  formal	  professionalization	  of	  academia,	  the	  details	  of	  which	  
are	  also	  discussed.	  Additional	  consideration	  is	  given	  to	  university	  strategy,	  higher	  education	  
finance	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  and	  research	  service	  performance,	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	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While	   transaction	   cost	   economics	   generally	   achieves	   its	   primary	   goal	   of	  matching	  discrete	  
economic	   transactions	   with	   appropriate	   governance	   structures	   in	   many	   contexts,	   it	   falls	  
notably	   short	  where	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   service	   transactions	   are	   concerned.	   The	   current	  
paper	  seeks	  both	  to	  elaborate	  this	  gap	  in	  transaction	  cost	  theory	  and	  to	  fill	   it	  by	  extending	  
and	   improving	   its	   prescriptive	   power	   when	   applied	   to	   transactions	   involving	   knowledge-­‐
intensive	  services.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  paper’s	  chief	  contribution	   is	   twofold.	  Firstly,	  we	  extend	  
transaction	  cost	  theory	  to	  explicitly	  account	  for	  the	  knowledge	  dimension	  of	  human	  assets	  
by:	   discussing	   the	   unique	   attributes	   of	   knowledge	   and	   knowledge-­‐based	   services	   as	  
economic	   commodities;	   by	   developing	   a	   typology	   of	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   services	   that	   is	  
linked	  to	  the	  asset	  specificity	  of	  transactions;	  and,	  by	  describing	  the	  unique	  characteristics	  of	  
knowledge	  workers	   that	   differentiate	   them	   from	   the	   standard	   assumptions	   about	   human	  
nature	  that	  underlie	  transaction	  cost	  theory.	  Secondly,	  we	  propose	  the	  advancement	  of	  two	  
separate	   yet	   complementary	   modes	   of	   governance	   for	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   service	  
transactions:	  the	  broader	  professionalization	  of	  knowledge	  workers	  -­‐	  an	  approach	  grounded	  
in	   institutional	   theory	   and	   sociology	   -­‐	   and	   the	   advancement	   of	   the	   partnership	   as	   an	  
alternative	  mode	  of	   governance	   to	  both	  market	   and	  hierarchy	   -­‐	   an	   approach	   grounded	   in	  
organization	   theory.	   Specifically,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	  unique	   governance	   attributes	  of	   the	  
profession	  as	  institution,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  partnership	  as	  an	  organizational	  form,	  on	  
the	  other	  hand,	  (particularly	  when	  combined)	  maximize	  the	  governance	  benefits	  associated	  
with	   both	   market	   and	   hierarchy,	   while	   minimizing	   the	   transaction	   costs	   associated	   with	  
each.	  
	  
2.2 A	  Brief	  Review	  of	  Transaction	  Cost	  Theory	  
	  
The	   straightforward	   simplicity	  of	   transaction	   cost	  economics	   (hereafter,	   “TCE”)	   is	   certainly	  
one	  of	  its	  strengths	  and	  likely	  goes	  a	  long	  way	  in	  explaining	  its	  enduring	  appeal.	  Premised	  on	  
a	  few	  basic	  assumptions	  about	  human	  nature	  (i.e.,	  the	  condition	  of	  bounded	  rationality	  and	  
a	  tendency	  toward	  opportunistic	  behavior)	  and	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  economic	  transactions	  
(i.e.,	   frequency,	   uncertainty	   and	   asset	   specificity),	   transaction	   cost	   theory	   has	   been	  highly	  
successful	   in	   achieving	   its	   primary	   goal:	   the	   optimal	   matching	   of	   a	   discrete	   economic	  
transaction	   with	   an	   ideal	   governance	   structure	   in	   a	   cost-­‐economizing	   way	   (Williamson	  
1979).	  	  
	  
Concerning	  the	  latter,	  transaction	  cost	  theory	  is	  based	  on	  three	  main	  governance	  structures:	  
market;	   hierarchy	   (i.e.,	   bureaucratically	   organized	   firms	   or	   public	   organizations);	   and,	   an	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intermediate	   hybrid	   form	   (Williamson,	   1999)4.	   The	   three	   differ,	   respectively,	   in	   terms	   of	  
their	  strength	  of	   incentive	  mechanisms,	  the	  nature	  of	  monitoring	  and	  control	  mechanisms,	  
and,	  where	  private	  sector	  organizations	  are	  concerned,	  the	  contract	   law	  regime.	  According	  
to	  Williamson,	  markets	  are	  characterized	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  “high-­‐powered	  incentives	  with	  
little	   administrative	   control	   and	   a	   legalistic	   dispute	   settling	  mechanism”,	   while	   “hierarchy	  
supports	   (internal)	   cooperation	   by	   combining	   low-­‐powered	   incentives,	   extensive	  
administrative	  control,	  and	  resolving	  most	  disputes	  within	  the	  firm—where	  the	  firm	  serves	  
as	   its	   own	   court	   of	   ultimate	   appeal”	   (1999:	   33).	   Lastly,	   Hybrid	   contracting	   represents	   an	  
intermediate	   form	   of	   governance	   “located	   between	   market	   and	   hierarchy	   in	   all	   three	  
respects”	  (1999:	  33).	  
	  
Perhaps	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   period	   in	  which	  Williamson	   developed	   the	   theory,	   its	   greatest	  
strength	   lies	   in	   its	   application	   to	   the	  governance	  of	   transactions	   involving	   the	  purchase	  or	  
construction	   physical	   goods	   (Richter	   &	   Niewiem,	   2006),	   as	   evidenced,	   for	   example,	   by	  
recourse	   to	   the	   classic	   “make-­‐or-­‐buy”	   decision	   (Williamson,	   1979;	   1981).	   This	   can	   be	  
attributed	   to	   the	   emphasis	   that	   the	   theory	   places	   on	   the	   asset	   specificity	   of	   transaction-­‐
specific	   investments	   (i.e.,	   investment	   idiosyncrasy)	   and	   the	   resulting	   bilateral	   dependence	  
between	  buyer	   and	   supplier	   (Riordan	  &	  Williamson,	  1985;	   Simerly	  &	   Li,	   2000;	  Williamson,	  
1991).	  To	  this	  end,	  much	  of	  the	  empirical	  work	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  asset	  specificity	  
as	  is	  relates	  to	  transactions	  involving	  tangible	  products,	  while	  few	  studies	  have	  applied	  TCE	  
to	  transactions	   involving	  the	  provision	  of	   intangible	  goods	  or	  services,	  such	  as	  professional	  
services	  (Richter	  &	  Niewiem,	  2006;	  Riordan	  &	  Williamson,	  1985).	  
	  
The	  five	  key	  characteristics	  with	  which	  	  Williamson	  defines	  asset	  specificity	  are	  telling	  in	  this	  
regard;	  namely,	   they	  are:	  “(1)	  site	  specificity,	  as	  where	  successive	  stations	  are	   located	   in	  a	  
cheek-­‐by-­‐jowl	   relation	   to	   each	   other	   so	   as	   to	   economize	   on	   inventory	   and	   transportation	  
expenses;	  (2)	  physical	  asset	  specificity,	  such	  as	  specialized	  dies	  that	  are	  required	  to	  produce	  
a	   component;	   (3)	   human	   asset	   specificity	   that	   arises	   in	   a	   learning-­‐by-­‐doing	   fashion;	   (4)	  
dedicated	  assets,	  which	  are	  discrete	  investments	  in	  general	  purpose	  plant	  that	  are	  made	  at	  
the	  behest	  of	  a	  particular	  customer;	  and	  (5)	  brand	  name	  capital”	   (1989:	  143).	  The	  concept	  
has	  been	  further	  elaborated	  by	  Simerly	  and	  Li	   (2000),	  who	  explain	   it	   in	  terms	  of	  an	  asset’s	  
redeployability.	  That	  is,	  “the	  higher	  the	  redeployability	  of	  the	  asset,	  the	  lower	  the	  specificity.	  
That	  is,	  assets	  such	  as	  bricks	  and	  mortar	  can	  be	  redeployed	  to	  a	  number	  of	  tasks	  and	  do	  not	  
necessarily	   lose	   their	   intrinsic	   value	   once	   their	   original	   purpose	   has	   been	   fulfilled.	  On	   the	  
other	  hand,	  assets	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  specificity	  cannot	  be	  easily	   redeployed.	  Examples	  
would	   include	   Titan	   rockets,	   80	   ×	   88	   microprocessors,	   and	   highly	   specialized	   human	  
knowledge	  (e.g.,	  aerospace	  engineers)”	  (Simerly	  &	  Li,	  2000:	  36).	  Of	  particular	  interest	  here	  is	  
the	   latter	   (i.e.,	   specialized	   knowledge)	   and,	   specifically,	  Williamson’s	   treatment	   of	   human	  
assets	  in	  the	  development	  of	  transaction	  cost	  theory.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  To	  a	  great	  extent,	  the	  theory,	  and	  subsequent	  empirical	  work,	  has	  been	  limited	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  
the	  market-­‐hierarchy	  dichotomy	  (e.g.,	  Riordan	  &	  Williamson,	  1985).	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Williamson	  describes	  human	  assets	   formally	   in	   terms	  of	  “(1)	   the	  degree	   to	  which	   they	  are	  
firm-­‐specific	   and	   (2)	   the	   ease	   with	   which	   productivity	   can	   be	   metered”	   (1981:	   564).	   In	  
general,	  the	  degree	  of	  firm-­‐specificity	  is	  emphasized,	  such	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
mode	   of	   labor	   provision	   (i.e.,	  market	   versus	   hierarchy)	   and	   a	   given	   transaction	   is	   directly	  
correlated	  with	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  human	  assets	  exhibit	  firm-­‐specific	  adaptations,	  resulting	  
in	  an	  escalation	  of	  bilateral	  dependence	  between	  the	  supplier	  and	   the	  buyer	  of	   that	   labor	  
(Williamson,	  1979:	  255-­‐57).	  Similarly,	  the	  relative	  ease	  or	  difficulty	  of	  monitoring	  is	  related	  
to	   the	   strengths	   and	   limitations	   of	   markets	   versus	   hierarchies	   in	   mitigating	   opportunistic	  
behavior	  by	  the	  supplier	  of	   labor.	   In	  the	  organizational	  context	  (i.e.,	  when	  hierarchy	  as	  the	  
mode	  of	   labor	   governance	  prevails),	   he	   further	  differentiates	   labor	  within	   a	   firm	  as	  either	  
“staff”	  or	  “production”	  (1981:	  562).	  
	  
Although	   the	   firm-­‐specificity	   of	   human	   assets	   receives	   the	   greatest	   attention	   in	   the	   TCE	  
literature,	  Williamson	  does	  mention	  that	  “human-­‐capital	   investments	   that	  are	   transaction-­‐
specific	   commonly	   occur	   as	   well.	   Specialized	   training	   and	   learning-­‐by-­‐doing	   economies	   in	  
production	   operations	   are	   illustrations”	   (1979:	   240).	   This	   statement	   is	   telling,	   in	   that	   it	  
illustrates	   two	   points	   made	   above.	   Firstly,	   it	   reflects	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   TCE	   is	   largely	  
concerned	  with	  explaining	  observed	  characteristics	  of	  production-­‐oriented	  transactions	  (and	  
firms).	   Secondly,	   it	   reveals	   the	   implicit	   assumption	   underlying	   TCE	   that	   human	   assets	   are	  
simply	  complements	  to	  physical	  assets	  in	  production-­‐related	  transactions.	  
	  
The	   examples	   that	  Williamson	   offers	   to	   illustrate	   his	   various	   depictions	   of	   human	   capital	  
provide	   further	   evidence	   that	   his	   theory	   development	   generally	   neglects	   the	   significance	  
and	  complexity	  of	  human	  assets	  in	  general	  and	  the	  knowledge	  dimension	  of	  human	  assets	  in	  
particular.	  For	  example,	  he	  states	  that	  “although	  there	  are	  many	  uniquely	  skilled	  individuals	  
(artists,	   athletes,	   researchers,	   administrators),	   unique	   skills	   are	   rarely	   of	   a	   transaction-­‐
specific	  kind.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  most	  of	  these	  individuals	  could	  move	  to	  another	  organization	  
without	   significant	  productivity	   losses”	   (Williamson,	  1979:	  257).	  He	  even	  goes	   so	   far	   as	   to	  
expressly	  excluded	  professionals	  such	  as	  doctors	  and	  lawyers	  from	  consideration,	  since	  their	  
“skills	  do	  not	  by	   themselves	  pose	  a	  governance	   issue”	   (1981:	  563).	  We	  argue	  here	   that	   in	  
fact	  TCE	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  transactions	  in	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services;	  however,	  in	  order	  to	  
do	  so,	   it	  must	  be	  extended	  in	  several	   important	  ways	  that:	  recognize	  the	  unique	  attributes	  
of	   knowledge	   as	   a	   commodity;	   explicitly	   account	   for	   the	   knowledge	   dimension	   of	   human	  
assets;	  account	   for	   the	  unique	  characteristics	  of	  knowledge	  workers;	  and,	   taking	  all	  of	   this	  
into	   account,	   extends	   the	   scope	   of	   viable	   governance	   structures	   to	   include	   the	   broader	  
professionalization	  of	  knowledge	  works	  and	  the	  partnership	  as	  an	  organizational	   form	  and	  
governance	  structure.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  optimizes	  the	  governance	  of	  
transactions	   involving	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   services	   in	   a	   transaction	   cost-­‐minimizing	   way.	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2.3 The	  Knowledge	  Dimension	  of	  Economic	  Transactions	  and	  Human	  Assets	  
2.3.1 Unique	  Attributes	  of	  Knowledge	  as	  a	  Commodity	  
	  
Philosophers	  and	  scholars	  have	  grappled	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  knowledge	  for	  centuries.	  The	  
current	   paper	   does	   not	   attempt	   to	   enter	   this	   arena	   of	   debate;	   rather,	   we	   simply	   follow	  
Grant’s	  modest	   approach	   and	   start	   with	   the	   premise	   that	   knowledge	   encompasses	   “’that	  
which	  is	  known’”	  (1996b:	  110).	  Of	  central	  concern	  here,	  however,	  is	  the	  commoditization	  of	  
knowledge	  and	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  economic	  value	  of	  that	  knowledge	  (Bell,	  1973).	  	  
	  
In	  basic	  economic	  terms,	  knowledge,	  as	  a	  commodity,	  has	  certain	  characteristics	  that	  affect	  
how	  it	   is	  exchanged,	  as	  well	  as	   its	  market	  value.	  Firstly,	  knowledge	  can	  be	  described	  as	  an	  
intangible	   good,	   which	   is	   both	   non-­‐rival	   and	   non-­‐excludable	   in	   consumption.	   Similarly	   to	  
public	   goods,	   which	   share	   these	   characteristics,	   knowledge	   is	   susceptible	   to	   the	   same	  
market	   failures	   that	  are	  generally	  associated	  with	   the	  provision	  of	  public	   goods.	   Secondly,	  
knowledge	  differs	  fundamentally	  from	  most	  other	  productive	  assets	  -­‐	  which	  typically	  decline	  
in	   value	   with	   use	   –in	   that	   knowledge	   may	   actually	   increase	   in	   value	   over	   time	   as,	   for	  
example,	   its	   applications	   in	   new	   contexts	   are	   discovered.	   Finally,	   the	   stock	   of	   knowledge	  
may	  also	  grow	  in	  size	  as	  new	  contributions	  are	  made.	  	  
	  
Knowledge	  can	  be	  differentiated	  into	  numerous	  discreet	  groupings,	  which	  include	  practical	  
knowledge,	   intellectual	  knowledge,	  pastime	  knowledge,	  spiritual	  knowledge	  and	  unwanted	  
knowledge	  (Grant,	  1996b:	  110;	  Machlup,	  1980).	  Broader	  distinctions	  can	  be	  made	  between	  
that	   which	   is	   considered	   common	   knowledge	   and	   what	   may	   be	   considered	   proprietary	  
knowledge.	  The	  former	  includes,	  for	  example,	  philosophical	  or	  scientific	  discoveries,	  such	  as	  
laws	  of	  nature	  or	  facts	  of	  reality,	  to	  which	  the	  discoverer	  may	  not	  claim	  any	  ownership	  rights	  
and	   may,	   therefore,	   be	   described	   as	   public	   goods	   (Rand,	   1964).	   The	   latter	   may	   include	  
intellectual	   property,	   such	   as	   inventions,	   original	   literary	   and	   artistic	   works,	   over	   which	  
ownership	   rights	   may	   be	   claimed	   and	   enforced,	   as	   well	   as	   information	   about	   internal	  
organizational	  processes	  and	  procedures.	  It	  is	  the	  existence	  and	  enforcement	  of	  intellectual	  
property	  rights	  protection	  that,	   to	  some	  extent,	  overcomes	  the	  market	   failures	  that	  would	  
otherwise	  result	  in	  disincentives	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  new,	  proprietary	  knowledge.	  
	  
Placing	   a	   value	   on	   knowledge	   as	   an	   economic	   commodity	   is	   fraught	   with	   difficulties.	   As	  
noted	   by	   Starbuck	   (1992:	   716),	   “since	   much	   knowledge	   has	   disparate	   values	   in	   different	  
situations,	   monetary	   measures	   of	   knowledge	   are	   elusive	   and	   undependable”	   and	  market	  
prices	   obscure	   the	   value	   of	   knowledge	   to	   “intrafirm	   activities	   or	   for	   activities	   that	   are	  
idiosyncratic	   to	  a	   single	   firm.”	  Machlup	   further	  elaborates	  on	   this	  point,	  by	  explaining	   the	  
unique	  problems	  related	  to	  the	  economic	  valuation	  of	  knowledge	  as	  follows:	  
	  
The	   value	   to	   an	   individual	   of	   any	   quantity	   or	   any	   tangible	   or	   intangible	   good	   is	  
measured	  by	  what	  he	  or	  she	  would	  give	   in	  exchange	  for	   it	   -­‐	  what	  he	  or	  she	  would	  
pay	  for	  it	  -­‐	  if	  he	  or	  she	  did	  not	  have	  it.	  This	  is	  quite	  simple	  -­‐	  indeed	  too	  simple,	  in	  that	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it	  assumes	  that	  the	  individual	  is	  aware	  of	  what	  that	  good	  or	  that	  additional	  quantity	  
of	  it	  would	  do	  for	  him	  or	  her.	  For	  most	  things	  this	  assumption	  is	  acceptable:	  people	  
usually	   have	   a	   pretty	   good	   idea	   of	   how	  much	   an	   extra	   cup	   of	   coffee	   or	   ounce	   of	  
meat	  per	  day	  would	  contribute	  to	  their	  happiness,	  but	  can	  they	  know	  this	  also	  about	  
an	  extra	  piece	  of	  knowledge	  which	  they	  neither	  possess	  nor	  ever	  have	  possessed?	  
They	  cannot	  know	  how	  important	  it	  might	  be	  for	  them,	  because	  if	  they	  knew	  it	  they	  
would	  possess	   it.	  We	  cannot	  know	  what	  a	  piece	  of	  knowledge	  may	  be	  worth	  to	  us	  
before	   we	   know	   what	   it	   is.	   Is	   this	   a	   logical	   trap	   from	   which	   we	   cannot	   extricate	  
ourselves?	  It	  is	  not	  a	  serious	  one	  and	  does	  not	  cause	  much	  trouble	  -­‐	  at	  least	  not	  with	  
regard	   to	   most	   types	   of	   knowledge.	   After	   all,	   knowledge	   is	   not	   a	   homogeneous	  
good,	   and	   the	   problem	   of	   its	   valuation	   is	   quite	   different	   for	   different	   kinds	   of	  
knowledge	  (Machlup,	  1993:	  452).	  
	  
Such	   problems	   are	   further	   exacerbated	   where	   so-­‐called	   credence	   goods	   are	   concerned.	  
Problems	  concerning	  credence	  goods	  arise	  when	  an	  expert	  provider	  of	  services,	  who	  is	  more	  
knowledgeable	  about	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  consumer	  than	  the	  consumer	  himself	  is,	  determines	  
the	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	   service	   that	   is	  provided	   (Dulleck	  &	  Kerschbamer,	  2006;	  Emons,	  
1997).	   As	   noted	   by	   Emons	   (1997:	   107;	   emphasis	   in	   the	   original),	   “aggravating	   this	   special	  
feature	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   even	   ex	   post,	   consumers	   can	   hardly	   determine	   the	   extent	   of	   the	  
service	  that	  was	  required	  ex	  ante.	  It	  is	  often	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  find	  out	  whether	  
repairs	  were	   really	   needed	  or	  whether	   necessary	   treatments	  were	   not	   performed.”	  Many	  
knowledge-­‐intensive	   services	   may	   be	   characterized	   as	   credence	   goods	   and	   are	   therefore	  
difficult	   to	   value	   as	   economic	   commodities.	   The	   case	   of	   credence	   goods	   casts	   doubt	   on	  
Williamson’s	   (1981:	   563)	   assertion	   that	   the	   skills	   of	   professionals	   “do	   not	   by	   themselves	  
pose	   a	   governance	   issue”	   and	   is	   indicative	   of	   TCE’s	   insufficiency	   in	   elaborating	   the	  
governance	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services.	  
	  
Given	   that	   the	   economic	   value	   of	   knowledge	   is	   of	   primary	   concern	   here,	   a	   definition	   of	  
commoditized	   knowledge	   is	   required.	   Starbuck	   defines	   knowledge	   simply	   as	   “a	   stock	   of	  
expertise”	   (1992:	   716).	   Developed	   to	   deal	   specifically	   with	   the	   case	   of	   the	   professional	  
service	   firm.	   Morris	   and	   Empson	   define	   knowledge	   as,	   “information	   which	   professionals	  
acquire	   through	   experience	   and	   training,	   together	  with	   the	   judgment	  which	   they	   develop	  
over	   time	   which	   enables	   them	   to	   deploy	   that	   information	   effectively	   in	   order	   to	   deliver	  
client	   service”	   (1998:	   613).	   We	   combine	   these	   two	   definitions	   in	   our	   concept	   of	  
commoditized	  knowledge,	  given	  that	  the	  aim	  of	   the	  current	  paper	   is	   to	  develop	  a	  case	   for	  
the	  partnership	  as	  an	  underexplored	  mode	  of	   governance	   for	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   service	  
transactions	   and	   bearing	   in	  mind	   that	   the	   partnership	   has	   historically	   been	   the	   preferred	  
organizational	   form	   for	   the	   professional	   service	   firm,	   as	   an	   archetypal	   knowledge-­‐based	  
organization.	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2.3.2 The	  Knowledge	  Dimension	  of	  Human	  Assets	  
	  
What	   makes	   human	   capital	   most	   distinctive	   as	   an	   economic	   commodity	   is,	   perhaps,	   its	  
multidimensionality.	  Individuals	  possess	  physical	  and	  intellectual	  attributes	  that	  are	  more	  or	  
less	   suited	   for	   different	   purposes	   and	   which	   therefore	   determine	   their	   value	   in	   different	  
contexts5.	   While	   the	   importance	   of	   people	   –and	   managers,	   in	   particular	   –	   as	   a	   critical	  
resource	   for	   organizations	   is	   well-­‐established	   (Finkelstein	   &	   Hambrick,	   1996;	   Hambrick	   &	  
Mason,	  1984),	  the	  significance	  and	  complexity	  of	  human	  assets	  have	  only	  increased	  with	  the	  
transition	   away	   from	   industrial	   production	   toward	   a	   knowledge-­‐intensive,	   largely	   service-­‐
based	   economy,	   as	   has	   been	   observed	   in	  many	   advanced	   economies	   over	   the	   past	   three	  
decades	  (Empson,	  2001;	  Grant,	  1996b;	  Hitt,	  Bierman,	  Shimizu,	  &	  Kochhar,	  2001).	  In	  contrast	  
to	   standard	   economic	   theory,	   which	   describes	   firms	   and	   transactions	   in	   terms	   of	   their	  
capital-­‐	  and	  labor-­‐intensity,	  the	  rise	  of	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  firms	  requires	  a	  more	  nuanced	  
view	  of	  human	  capital	  that	  distinguishes	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  (physical)	  labor	  value	  and	  intellectual,	  
or,	   knowledge	   value.	   Indeed,	   the	   central	   role	   played	   by	   human	   capital	   in	   achieving	   and	  
sustaining	   competitive	   advantage	   is	   a	   key	   premise	   underlying	   the	   resource-­‐based	   view	   of	  
the	   firm	   (Barney,	   1991;	   Grant,	   1996a;	   Hitt	   et	   al.,	   2001)	   and	   is	   absolutely	   paramount	   for	  
knowledge-­‐based	   firms,	   which	   trade	   solely	   in	   the	   knowledge	   and	   expertise	   of	   their	   staff	  
(Blackler,	  1995:	  1022;	  Starbuck,	  1992).	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  transaction	  cost	  theory	  chiefly	  
treats	   human	   assets	   as	   a	   secondary	   element	   of	   asset-­‐specificity	   that	   complements	  
transactions	   that	   are	   characterized	   by	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   physical	   asset	   intensity	   (i.e.,	  
manufacturing	  and	  production).	  Consequently,	  the	  knowledge	  dimension	  of	  human	  capital	  is	  
largely	  neglected	  in	  the	  TCE	  literature.	  
	  
Given	   the	   concept	   of	   knowledge	   we	   utilize	   here	   as	   a	   starting	   point,	   we	   argue	   that	  
Williamson’s	  definition	  of	  human	  asset-­‐specificity	  can	  be	  extended	  in	  two	  important	  ways	  in	  
order	  to	  more	  fully	   take	   into	  account	  the	  knowledge	  dimension	  of	  human	  assets.	  Firstly,	  a	  
dimension	   of	   specificity	   can	   be	   added	   that	   describes	   the	   degree	   of	   domain-­‐specific	  
knowledge,	   or	   domain-­‐specificity.	   Secondly,	   knowledge	   can	   be	   described	   in	   terms	   of	   its	  
organization-­‐specificity,	   but	   in	   a	   broader	   sense	   than	   Williamson’s	   definition,	   to	   include	  
knowledge	  not	  only	  of	  the	  employer	  organization	  (as	  Williamson’s	  definition	  specifies),	  but	  
also	  of	  the	  client	  organization.	  	  
	  
To	   illustrate	  the	  first	  point,	  we	  adapt	  Parsons’	   (1939:	  460)	  “specificity	  of	   function”	   in	  what	  
we	   describe	   as	   the	   “domain-­‐specificity”	   of	   knowledge.	   Following	   Parsons,	   we	   describe	  
knowledge	   as	   being	   either	   high	   or	   low	   in	   domain-­‐specificity	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   its	  
technically	  defined	  sphere.	  If	  we	  translate	  this	   into	  the	  TCE	  concept	  of	  asset	  specificity,	  we	  
can	  describe	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  readily	  it	  is	  deployable	  across	  a	  range	  of	  technically	  defined	  
disciplines	   (Simerly	   &	   Li,	   2000).	   We	   argue,	   therefore,	   that	   professions	   such	   as	   law,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  An	  individual	  may	  possess	  physical	  attributes	  that	  confer	  a	  high	  value	  on	  his	  labor	  as	  an	  athlete	  or	  a	  
musician	  but	  may	  have	  weak	  intellectual	  attributes	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  much	  lower	  value	  of	  his	  labor	  
as	  a	  teacher	  or	  a	  doctor,	  and	  vice	  versa.	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accountancy	  and	  medicine	  may	  be	  characterized	  as	  having	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  domain-­‐specific	  
knowledge,	  since	  such	  knowledge	  is	  not	  generally	  deployable	  across	  different	  disciplines	  or	  
types	   of	   economic	   transactions.	   Parsons’	   uses	   the	   concept	   of	   functional	   specificity	   to	  
underpin	   his	   concept	   of	   “professional	   authority”	   and	   offers	   the	   following	   illustrative	  
example:	   “it	   is	   obvious	   that	  one	  does	  not	   call	   on	   the	   services	  of	   an	  engineer	   to	  deal	  with	  
persistent	  epigastric	  pain,	  nor	  on	  a	  professor	  of	  Semitic	  languages	  to	  clarify	  a	  question	  about	  
the	   kinship	   system	   of	   a	   tribe	   of	   Australian	   natives.	   A	   professional	   man	   is	   held	   to	   be	   ‘an	  
authority’	  only	  in	  his	  own	  field”	  (1939:	  460).	  
	  
This	   is	  complementary,	  though	  not	  equivalent,	  to	  Morris	  and	  Empson’s	  concept	  of	  codified	  
knowledge,	  which	  they	  describe	  as	  being	  “based	  in	  well	  documented	  and	  organized	  systems	  
of	  information	  with	  a	  set	  of	  generalizable	  principles”	  (1998:	  614)	  and	  that	  is	  not	  owned	  by	  a	  
particular	   firm	  but	   is	   rather	   “codified	   and	   regulated	  by	   the	   institutions	  of	   an	  occupational	  
group”	   (1998:	  613).	  Management	  consultancy,	   in	  contrast,	  “cannot	  claim	  a	  particular	  body	  
of	  knowledge	  as	  its	  own”	  (Gross	  &	  Kieser,	  2006	  cited	  in	  Richter	  &	  Niewiem,	  2009:	  275),	  and	  
may	   therefore	   be	   characterized	   by	   a	   low	   degree	   of	   domain-­‐specific	   knowledge	   and,	  
therefore,	   a	   low	   degree	   of	   asset	   specificity	   of	   human	   assets. 6 	  While	   attempts	   at	   the	  
codification	   of	   knowledge	   have	   been	  made	   by	   such	   organizations,	   including	   branding	   and	  
copyright	   protection	   of	   service	   concepts	   developed	   by	   the	   firm	   (Morris	   &	   Empson,	   1998:	  
615),	   they	   are	   nevertheless	   not	   comparable	   to	   domain-­‐specific	   knowledge	   codified	   at	   the	  
profession-­‐	   or	   occupation-­‐level.	   Domain	   specificity	   also	   applies	   to	   non-­‐professional	  
occupational	  fields,	  such	  as	  higher	  education.	  For	  example,	  a	  professor	  who	  is	  an	  expert	  in	  a	  
particular	   subject	   must	   demonstrate	   a	   mastery	   of	   his	   field	   comparable	   to	   that	   of	   a	  
professional,	   although	   the	   knowledge	   related	   to	   the	   subject	   in	   question	   (e.g.,	   economics,	  
biological	   sciences,	   etc.)	   is	   not	   codified	   in	   any	   formal,	   legal	   sense.	   This	   is	   consistent	   with	  
Starbuck’s	  definition	  of	  an	  expert	  as	  someone	  who	  has	  a	   formal	  education	  and	  experience	  
equivalent	  to	  a	  doctoral	  degree	  (1992:	  719).	   In	  summary,	  knowledge	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  
domain-­‐specificity	  is	  correlated	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  asset	  specificity.	  
	  
Much	  domain-­‐specific	  knowledge	   is	   -­‐	  at	   least	  hypothetically	   -­‐	  accessible	  to	  all.	  This	   is	  even	  
the	  case	  with	  professional	  or	  otherwise	  codified	  knowledge.	  For	  example,	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
law	   is	  not	   limited	   to	  qualified	   individuals	  who	  work	   in	   the	   legal	  professions;	   knowledge	  of	  
the	   law	   is	   a	   public	   good	   to	  which	   every	   citizen	   and	   resident	   has	   a	   right	   to	   access	   and	   an	  
obligation	  to	  obey.	  However,	   in	  practice,	  much	  time	  and	  effort	   (e.g.,	   invested	   in	  education	  
and/or	   apprenticeships)	   is	   required	   to	   master	   such	   knowledge,	   and,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   most	  
professional	   knowledge,	   strict	   regulations	   circumscribe	   its	   use,	   such	   that	   this	   effectively	  
limits	  the	  use	  of	  domain-­‐specific	  knowledge	  (Reed,	  1996;	  Starbuck,	  1992).	  But	  while	  domain-­‐
specific	   knowledge	   can	   be	   accessed	   and	   utilized,	   to	   a	   certain	   extent,	   by	   non-­‐experts,	   the	  
maximum	   economic	   value	   and	   benefit	   of	   that	   knowledge	   can	   only	   be	   gained	   when	   it	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Management	  consulting	  deals	  with	  generally	  deployable	  business	   techniques,	  as	   suggested	  by	   the	  
definition	   offered	   by	   Kubr,	   as	   „the	   process	   of	   advice	   and	   assistance	   …	   on	   matters	   of	   business	  
administration”	  (Kubr,	  2002	  cited	  in	  Richter	  &	  Niewiem,	  2006:	  1).	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applied	  by	   a	   qualified	   professional	   or	   expert	   to	   the	   specific	   facts	   and	   circumstances	   of	   an	  
individual	   client	   or	   client-­‐organization.	   This	   distinguishes	   it	   in	   an	   important	   way	   from	  
common	  knowledge,	   like	   laws	  of	  nature:	  gravity	  affects	  us	  all	   in	  exactly	   the	  same	  way;	   tax	  
laws	  do	  not.	  This	  also	   leads	  to	  the	  observation	  that	  there	  may	  be	  significant	  differences	   in	  
the	  value	  of	  knowledge	  per	  se	  and	  knowledge-­‐in-­‐use;	  or,	  the	  application	  of	  knowledge	  in	  a	  
specific	  context.	  The	  economic	  value	  of	  knowledge-­‐in-­‐use	   is,	   therefore,	  highly	  variable	  and	  
subjective,	   depending	   on	   its	   applicability	   to	   a	   particular	   person	   or	   organization	   and	   can	  
therefore	  be	  said	  to	  have	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  organization-­‐specificity7.	  
	  
This	   leads	   to	   the	   second	   point,	   the	   organization-­‐specificity	   of	   knowledge.	   As	   discussed	  
above,	   organization-­‐specificity	   can	   refer	   either	   to	   specific	   knowledge	   of	   an	   employee’s	  
employer-­‐organization	  or	  specific	  knowledge	  of	  a	  client	  organization.	  The	  former	   is	  central	  
to	   TCE’s	   treatment	   of	   human	   assets.	   Williamson’s	   definition	   of	   human	   assets	   indicates	   a	  
firm-­‐specificity	  of	  knowledge	  that	  reflects	   learning-­‐by-­‐doing,	  specialized	  training,	  as	  well	  as	  
an	   employee’s	   embeddedness	   in	   the	   socio-­‐organizational	   hierarchy	   (Granovetter,	   1985;	  
Williamson,	   1979),	   which	   in	   turn	   results	   in	   encultured	   knowledge	   that	   is	   shared	   by	   all	  
members	  of	  the	  organization	  (Blackler,	  1995).	  This	  conceptualization	  is	  echoed	  in	  Morris	  and	  
Empson’s	   (1998)	   collective	   tacit	   knowledge,	   which	   results	   from	   the	   routines	   and	  
relationships	   that	   characterize	   a	   particular	   organizational	   culture.	   The	   application	   of	  
professional	   knowledge	   to	   the	   unique	   facts	   and	   circumstances	   of	   an	   individual	   employer-­‐
firm	  or	  client	  transform	  it	  from	  having	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  domain-­‐specificity	  and	  a	  low	  degree	  
of	  organization-­‐specificity	  to	  having	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  both.	  This	  description	  characterizes	  the	  
classic	  professions	  (i.e.,	  law,	  accountancy	  and	  medicine).	  
	  
The	  limited	  scope	  of	  the	  organization-­‐specificity	  of	  human	  assets	  offered	  by	  transaction	  cost	  
theory	   can	   thus	   be	   extended	   to	   encompass	   the	   extent	   of	   client-­‐specific	   knowledge.	  Here,	  
the	  range	  of	  variables	  may	   include	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  knowledge,	   including	  everything	   from	  
organizational	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	   “corporate	   culture”,	   to	   internal	   business	   processes,	  
trade	   secrets	   and	  proprietary	   intellectual	   property.	  Greenwood,	   Li,	   Prakash,	  &	  Deephouse	  
(2005:	  16)	  describe	   the	   relationship	  with	  a	   specific	   client	  as	  a	   “complementary	   specialized	  
asset”,	   which	   complements	   the	   domain-­‐specific	   knowledge	   associated	   with	   professional	  
services.	  To	  provide	  an	  illustrative	  example,	  Richter	  and	  Niewiem	  (2009)	  cite	  their	  own	  and	  
prior	  research	  by	  other	  authors,	  which	  found	  that	  a	  client	  firm	  is	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  engage	  a	  
management	  consultancy	  that	  has	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  client-­‐specific	  organizational	  knowledge	  
gained	   from	   prior	   consulting	   work	   done	   for	   the	   client	   firm	   than	   they	   are	   to	   engage	   a	  
consultancy	  with	  which	  they	  have	  not	  done	  any	  previous	  business.	  	  Furthermore,	  client	  firms	  
are	   more	   likely	   to	   engage	   management	   consultancies	   in	   solving	   internal	   organizational	  
problems	   that	   are	   “brief,	   specialized	   and	   non-­‐recurring”	   (Richter	   &	   Niewiem,	   2009:	   276),	  
than	   to	   develop	   the	   required	   knowledge	   in-­‐house,	   since	   consultancies	   can	   exploit	  
economies	  of	  scale	  by	  pooling	  generalizable	  functional	  and	  industry	  knowledge	  that	  may	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  This	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   observations	  made	   by	   Starbuck	   (1992)	   and	  Machlup	   (1980)	   about	   the	  
valuation	  of	  knowledge	  as	  a	  commodity,	  as	  discussed	  in	  a	  preceding	  section	  of	  the	  paper.	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deployed	  across	  numerous	  transactions	  with	  many	  different	  client	  firms.	  This	  observation	  is	  
consistent	   with	   standard	   make-­‐or-­‐buy	   decision	   predictions	   of	   transaction	   cost	   theory,	  
reflecting	  the	  relevance	  of	  both	  transaction	  frequency	  and	  transaction	  idiosyncrasy.	  
	  
























Art	  &	  Antiques	  dealers	  
	  
	  
In	  Figure	  1,	  a	  typology	  of	  the	  knowledge	  dimension	  of	  human	  asset	  specificity	  is	  presented.	  
The	   typology	   reflects	   the	   foregoing	  discussion	  and	  provides	  examples	  of	   knowledge-­‐based	  
services	   to	   illustrate.	   The	   classic	   professions	   have	   been	   placed	   in	   the	   upper	   right-­‐hand	  
quadrant,	   given	   that	   these	   professionals	   must	   combine	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   domain-­‐specific	  
knowledge	   with	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   client-­‐specific	   knowledge	   in	   order	   to	   maximize	   the	  
economic	   value	   of	   the	   knowledge-­‐based	   services	   that	   they	   provide.	   To	   illustrate,	   it	   is	  
difficult,	   if	   not	   impossible,	   to	   imagine	   a	   physician	   providing	   adequate	  medical	   advice	   to	   a	  
patient	   without	   a	   sufficient	   knowledge	   of	   medicine	   and	   a	   good	   overview	   of	   a	   patient’s	  
medical	  history	  and	  current	  health	  status.	  Similarly,	  an	  accountant	  cannot	  provide	  superior	  
tax	  advice	  if	  lacking	  in	  a	  sound	  understanding	  of	  tax	  accounting	  and	  of	  each	  client’s	  unique	  
financial	   circumstances.	   Management	   consultancies	   have	   been	   placed	   in	   the	   lower	   right-­‐
hand	  quadrant	  based	  on	  the	  observation	  that	  consultants’	  utilize	  a	  broad-­‐based	  toolbox	  of	  
knowledge,	  spanning	  numerous	  domains	  (i.e.,	  low	  domain-­‐specificity),	  and	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  
make	   an	   appropriate	   selection	   of	   relevant	   knowledge	   and	   combine	   it	   with	   a	   deeper	  
understanding	  of	  the	  client	  organization	  is	  required	  of	  them	  in	  order	  to	  successfully	  apply	  it	  
in	   an	   economic	   value-­‐adding	   way.	   Moving	   to	   the	   upper	   right-­‐hand	   quadrant,	   the	  
combination	   of	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   domain-­‐specific	   knowledge	   and	   low	   client-­‐specific	  
knowledge	   characterizes,	   for	   example,	   academics.	   Here,	   professors	   are	   expected	   to	   be	  
experts	  in	  their	  fields	  yet	  do	  not	  require	  specific	  knowledge	  of	  students	  qua	  clients	  in	  order	  
to	   provide	   high-­‐quality	   educational	   services.	   Some	   might	   take	   issue	   with	   this	   line	   of	  
reasoning,	   arguing	   that	   the	   university	   should	   be	   viewed	   as	   the	   client,	   since	   it	   acts	   as	   an	  
intermediary	  –	  purchasing	  educational	  services	  from	  professors	  and	  reselling	  them	  to	  their	  
students.	  Even	  taking	  this	  approach,	  the	  argument	  still	  holds.	  A	  professor	  does	  not	  require	  
specific	  knowledge	  of	  a	  university	  (as	  either	  an	  employer	  or	  as	  a	  client)	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  
	   18	  
high-­‐quality	  educational	  services	  to	  any	  and	  all	  clients.	  Here,	  clients	  can	  be	  generally	  viewed	  
as	   more	   or	   less	   homogeneous	   consumers	   of	   domain-­‐specific	   knowledge	   rather	   than	   as	  
services	  resulting	   from	  the	  application	  of	   that	  knowledge.	  We	  do,	  however,	   recognize	  that	  
specialization	   may	   occur	   but	   still	   in	   a	   relatively	   aggregated	   way	   (e.g.,	   management	   and	  
economics	  courses	  tailored	  to	  specific	  degree	  programs,	  like	  media	  management	  or	  tourism	  
management).	   The	   main	   requirement,	   however,	   is	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   domain-­‐specific	  
knowledge.	  Lastly,	  we	  place	  services	  with	  a	  low	  degree	  of	  both	  domain-­‐and	  client-­‐specificity	  
of	   knowledge	   in	   the	   lower	   left-­‐hand	   quadrant.	   We	   use	   the	   example	   of	   the	   temporary	  
staffing	   agency,	   which	   acts	   as	   intermediaries	   in	   the	   labor	  market,	  matching	  workers	  with	  
general	  skills	  (e.g.,	  secretarial	  skills)	  to	  vacancies	  at	  firms	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  sectors.	  
	  
Based	  on	  the	  foregoing	  discussion,	  we	  argue	  that	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  domain-­‐specificity	  results	  
in	  governance	  problems	  like	  those	  associated	  with	  credence	  goods	  (discussed	  above),	  which	  
require	   contemplation	   of	   alternative	   governance	   structures	   beyond	   the	   market	   versus	  
hierarchy	   dichotomy	  offered	   by	   TCE.	   Further	   exacerbating	   this	   consideration	   is	   the	   sliding	  
scale	  of	  client-­‐specificity	  and	  client-­‐coproduction	  of	  transactions	  that	  are	  often	  characteristic	  
of	  many	  important	  knowledge-­‐based	  services.	  This	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  escalating	  the	  bilateral	  
dependency	  between	   the	   knowledge	   service	   provider	   and	   the	   client	   firm;	   a	   further	   factor	  
that	  has	  important	  consequences	  for	  transaction	  governance.	  
	  
In	  summary,	  the	  limited	  scope	  of	  consideration	  given	  to	  human	  assets	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  
a	  weakness	  of	   transaction	  cost	  economic	   theory.	  Here,	   salient	  dimensions	  of	  human	  asset	  
specificity	  –	  namely,	  the	  domain-­‐specificity	  and	  organization-­‐specificity	  of	  knowledge–	  have	  
been	  identified	  as	  lacking.	  These	  dimensions	  have	  been	  elaborated	  and	  a	  resulting	  typology	  
of	  knowledge	  has	  been	  offered.	  This	  extension	  of	  the	  transaction	  cost	  theory	  broadens	  the	  
scope	  of	   its	  applicability	   to	   include	   the	  provision	  of	  knowledge-­‐intensive	   services;	  a	   sector	  
that	  represents	  a	  significant,	  and	  growing,	  part	  of	  most	  advanced	  economies.	  Furthermore,	  
such	   an	   extension	   lays	   the	   groundwork	   for	   forging	   a	   stronger	   link	   between	  Williamson’s	  
concept	   of	   asset	   specificity	   and	   his	   concept	   of	   transaction	   idiosyncrasy	   for	   transactions	   in	  
knowledge-­‐intensive	  services.	  Before	  we	  proceed	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  governance	  structures	  
appropriate	  to	  transactions	  involving	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services,	  a	  final	  variable	  must	  first	  
be	  discussed;	  namely,	  the	  unique	  attributes	  of	  knowledge	  workers.	  
2.3.3 Unique	  Characteristics	  of	  Knowledge	  Workers	  	  
	  
Starbuck	   sites	   his	   case	   study	   of	   the	  manufacturer,	   “Garden	   Company”	   (a	   pseudonym),	   in	  
which	   he	   identifies	   the	   technical	   and	   strategic	   expertise	   of	   the	   firm’s	   engineers	   and	  
managers	   as	   being	   responsible	   for	   generating	   “remarkable	   profits”	   by	   exploiting	  
monopolistic	  opportunities	  resulting	  from	  the	  development	  of	  innovative	  products,	  and	  not	  
attributable	   to	   the	   labor	   of	   the	   firm’s	   production	   workers	   (1992:	   715).	   This	   provides	   a	  
contrast	  to	  much	  of	  the	  important	  TCE	  literature,	  which	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  latter.	  	  
	  
	   19	  
As	  discussed	  above,	  much	  of	  the	  TCE	  literature	  has	  treated	  human	  assets	  as	  (physical)	  labor	  
in	  the	  standard	  production	  function	  that	  complements	  the	  use	  of	  physical	  assets	  (i.e.,	  plant	  
and	  equipment).	  The	  value	  of	  that	  labor	  is	  largely	  determined	  by	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  has	  
been	  adapted	  either	  to	  a	  specific	  employer	  firm,	  to	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  transaction,	  or	  to	  both.	  
In	  taking	  a	  more	  nuanced	  approach	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  labor	  –	  specifically,	  one	  that	  deals	  with	  
the	  knowledge	  dimension	  of	  human	  assets	  –	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  generic	  treatment	  of	  
labor	   and	   human	   assets	   by	   TCE	   is	   neither	   sufficient	   nor	   appropriate	   for	   dealing	   with	  
knowledge	  workers.	  
	  
Starbuck	  defines	  knowledge	  as	  a	  stock	  of	  expertise	  and	  a	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  firm	  as	  one	  in	  
which	  exceptional	  and	  valuable	  expertise	  predominates	  over	  commonplace	  knowledge	  and	  
at	  least	  one	  third	  of	  the	  workforce	  is	  made	  up	  of	  experts	  (1992:	  76).	  He	  defines	  an	  expert	  as	  
someone	  who	  has	  a	  formal	  education	  and	  experience	  equivalent	  to	  a	  doctoral	  degree	  (1992:	  
719).	   Using	   our	   terminology,	   experts	   can	   be	   further	   characterized	   as	   people	   who	   have	  
specialized	  in	  a	  sub-­‐domain	  of	  domain-­‐specific	  knowledge,	  reflecting	  years	  of	  education	  and	  
training,	   which	   results	   in	   a	   niche	   of	   knowledge	   specialization.	   Given	   the	   barriers	   to	   entry	  
represented	   by	   the	   extensive	   education	   and	   training,	   as	  well	   as,	   in	   some	   cases,	   regulated	  
entrance	   or	   licensing	   exams,	   a	   niche	   of	   domain-­‐specific	   knowledge	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	  
monopoly	   (May,	   Korczynski,	  &	   Frenkel,	   2002;	   Reed,	   1996;	   Starbuck,	   1992)8.	  We	   assume	   a	  
definition	   of	   knowledge	   workers	   as	   experts	   in	   a	   domain	   who	   possess	   a	   high	   degree	   of	  
domain-­‐specific	  knowledge.	  This	  definition	  consequently	  includes	  the	  traditional	  professions	  
(i.e.,	   law,	  accountancy,	  medicine,	  etc.)	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐professional	  occupations	  that	  require	  
expert-­‐level	   knowledge	   (e.g.,	   management	   consultancy,	   academia,	   etc.),	   reflecting	   the	  
convergence	   in	   characteristics	   ascribed	   to	   both	   professional	   and	   non-­‐professional	  
knowledge	  workers	  (Alvesson,	  1993:	  998).	  We	  further	  assume	  that	  the	  services	  rendered	  by	  
experts	   can	   be	   considered	   credence	   goods,	   given	   the	   salient	   characteristics	   of	   expert	  
knowledge.	  
	  
The	  key	  question	  to	  be	  answered	  now	  is,	  what	  differentiates	  knowledge	  workers	  from	  other	  
categories	   of	   workers?	   As	   Foss	   (2007)	   argues,	   assumptions	   about	   the	   knowledge	   and	  
motivation	   of	   economic	   actors	   are	   crucial	   for	   any	   informed	   discussion	   of	   governance	   and	  
organization,	   yet	   have	   not	   been	   addressed	   in	   a	   systematic	  way	   in	   the	   case	   of	   knowledge	  
workers.	   In	   reviewing	   the	   literature	  on	   knowledge	  workers,	   three	   key	   characteristics	   have	  
been	   identified:	   a	   preference	   for	   collegiality	   in	   decision	  making;	   the	   performance	  of	  work	  
that	   is	   non-­‐routine	   and	   non-­‐standardized;	   and,	   a	   preference	   for	   autonomy	   and	   freedom	  
from	  external	  constraint	   in	   the	  work	  environment	   (Greenwood	  &	  Empson	  2003:	  916;	  Moe	  
1995;	  von	  Nordenflycht	  2010).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 	  According	   to	   May	   et	   al.,	   “unlike	   traditional	   professionals,	   knowledge	   workers	   do	   not	   rely	   on	  
conventional	   occupational	   or	   organizational	   credential	   systems	   to	   establish	   and	   gain	   economic	   and	  
political	  advantages	  for	  their	  expertise.	  Instead,	  they	  make	  use	  of	  the	  esoteric	  and	  intangible	  nature	  
of	  their	  knowledge	  to	  create	  market	  niches	  for	  themselves”	  (2002:	  778).	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2.3.3.1 Collegiality,	  Nature	  of	  Work	  and	  Preference	  for	  Autonomy	  
	  
Collegiality	   in	  decision-­‐making	  reflects	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  decisions	   in	  an	  organization	  are	  
based	   on	   a	   flat	   hierarchy	   in	   which	   workers	   are	   active	   participants	   in	   key	   managerial	  
decisions.	  Several	  authors	  confirm	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  authority	  in	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  
firms	   reflects	   an	   emphasis	   on	   collegiality,	   peer	   evaluation,	   autonomy,	   informality	   and	  
flexibility	   (Greenwood,	  Hinings,	  &	  Brown	  1990:	   733;	   Starbuck,	   1992:	   718).	   Lending	   further	  
support,	   empirical	   research	   conducted	   by	   Sveiby	   and	   Simons	   (2002)	   found	   that	   a	  
collaborative	   atmosphere	   even	   enhances	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   knowledge	   work.	   In	   the	  
context	   of	   professional	   service	   firms,	   collegiality	   is	   reflected	   in	   members’	   “broad	  
participation	   in	   strategic	   decisions,	   rotating	   executive	   positions	   and	   high	   individual	  
autonomy	  in	  the	  production	  process”	  (von	  Nordenflycht	  2007:	  431).	  	  
	  
According	   to	   Reed,	   knowledge	   workers,	   “specialize	   in	   complex	   task	   domains	   which	   are	  
inherently	  resistant	  to	  incursions	  by	  the	  carriers	  of	  bureaucratic	  rationalization	  and	  control”	  
(1996:	   585).	   This	   relates	   not	   only	   to	   the	   belief	   in	   self-­‐regulation	   (i.e.,	   that	   only	   other	  
qualified	   experts	   are	   able	   to	   evaluate	   their	   work	   and,	   consequently,	   a	   preference	   for	  
collegiality	  in	  decision	  making	  and	  control),	  but	  also	  to	  the	  desire	  for	  autonomy	  in	  organizing	  
and	  conducting	  their	  work	  (Hall,	  1968).	  As	  explained	  by	  Hall,	  autonomy	  “involves	  the	  feeling	  
that	  the	  practitioner	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  his	  own	  decisions	  without	  external	  pressures	  
from	   clients,	   those	   who	   are	   not	   members	   of	   his	   profession,	   or	   from	   his	   employing	  
organization”	  (1968:	  93).	  
	  
Finally,	  knowledge	  workers	  “rely	  on	  a	  sophisticated	  combination	  of	   theoretical	  knowledge,	  
analytical	   tools	   and	   tacit	  or	   judgmental	   skills	   that	   are	   very	  difficult,	   but	  not	   impossible,	   to	  
standardize,	   replicate	   and	   incorporate	   within	   formalized	   organizational	   routines”	   (Reed,	  
1996:	   585).	   They	   are	   typically	   engaged	   in	  work	   that	   involves	   solving	   complex	   and	   unique	  
problems	  -­‐	  often	  for	  individual	  clients	  -­‐	  by	  offering	  creative	  and	  innovative	  solutions,	  which	  
makes	   bureaucratic	   approaches	   to	  monitoring	   and	   control	   difficult	   (Alvesson,	   1993:	   1000;	  
Greenwood,	  Hinings,	  &	  Brown,	  1990).	  Clients	  are	  also	  frequently	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  
the	  services	  that	  they	  receive,	   leading	  to	  a	  coproduction	  of	  services	  that	  generally	  requires	  
high	  investments	  from	  both	  parties	   in	  acquiring	  information	  about	  each	  other	  and	  building	  
trust,	  both	  of	  which	  increase	  transaction	  costs	  (Richter	  &	  Niewiem,	  2006;	  2009).	  Richter	  and	  
Niewiem	  describe	  this	  as	  closeness,	  which	  underscores	   the	  personal,	   relationship-­‐intensive	  
and	  idiosyncratic	  nature	  of	  consulting	  services	  (2006:	  5;	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  
In	   summary,	   salient	   distinguishing	   characteristics	   have	   been	   identified	   that	   differentiate	  
knowledge	  work	  and	  knowledge	  workers	  from	  other	  categories	  of	  work	  and	  workers.	  These	  
unique	   qualities	   have	   important	   implications	   for	   transaction	   governance,	   which	   will	   be	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2.4 Governance	  of	  Knowledge-­‐Intensive	  Service	  Transactions	  
	  
As	   the	   foregoing	   discussion	   indicates,	   many,	   if	   not	   most,	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   services	  
involve	   the	   use	   of	   expert	   knowledge	   applied	   in	   non-­‐routine	   ways	   to	   non-­‐standardized	  
transactions	  that	  are	  often	  –	  but,	  to	  be	  sure,	  not	  always	  -­‐	  tailored	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  particular	  
clients,	   and	   extremely	   difficult	   for	   non-­‐experts	   to	   govern.	   In	   addition,	   the	   nature	   of	  
knowledge	   work	   and	   the	   defining	   characteristics	   of	   knowledge	   workers	   have	   important	  
implications	   for	   the	   governance	   of	   transactions	   involving	   knowledge	   and	   knowledge-­‐
intensive	   services.	   Relatedly,	   the	   nature	   of	   knowledge	   in	   general	   and,	   specifically,	  
commoditized	   knowledge	   makes	   it	   extremely	   difficult	   for	   non-­‐experts	   to	   value	   ex	   ante	  
knowledge	   (particularly	   in	   the	   form	   of	   knowledge-­‐based	   services)	   and	   to	   determine	   the	  
nature	  and	  extent	  of	  knowledge	  they	  may	  require.	  Consequently,	  highly	  efficient	  markets	  in	  
knowledge	   and	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   services	   do	   not	   exist	   in	   a	   way	   comparable	   to	   other	  
commodity	  markets.	  Market	  efficiency	   is	  hampered	  by	  the	  costly	   information	  asymmetries	  
that	   separate	   suppliers	   and	   buyers.	   Yet	   despite	   this	   fact,	   for	   many	   knowledge	   intensive	  
services,	   in-­‐house	   provision	   does	   not	   pose	   a	   superior	   alternative	   to	   market	   transacting,	  
largely	  due	  to	  the	  costs	  and	  (in)frequency	  of	  the	  related	  transactions	  (e.g.,	  of	  maintaining	  a	  
legal	  department	  versus	  hiring	  an	  independent	  law	  firm	  when	  legal	  services	  are	  required).	  In	  
such	   situations,	   a	   transaction	   cost	   approach,	   which	   utilizes	   transaction	   frequency,	  
uncertainty	   and	   asset	   specificity	   in	   its	   calculus,	   cannot	   provide	   a	   clear	   answer.	   Thus,	   the	  
door	   is	   open	   for	   an	   exploration	   of	   alternative	  modes	   of	   governance	   that	   deliver	   superior	  
transaction	   governance	   in	   a	   cost-­‐efficient	   way.	   As	   an	   important	   category	   of	   knowledge	  
workers,	   professionals	   have	   a	   long	   and	   stable	   history	   of	   distinctive	   governance.	   They	  
therefore	  offer	  insights	  to	  highly	  developed	  governance	  structures	  –	  both	  organizational	  and	  
institutional	   -­‐	   that	   have	   proven	   to	   function	   well	   in	   a	   knowledge-­‐based	   organizational	  
context.	  
2.4.1 Professionalization	  and	  Transaction	  Governance	  
	  
The	  literature	  on	  the	  professions,	  particularly	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  sociology	  and	  institutionalism,	  
has	   provided	   important	   insights	   into	   the	   unique	   attributes	   of	   professionals	   and	   the	  
distinctive	   characteristics	   of	   professions	   as	   institutions	   (Alvesson,	   1993,	   2000;	   Bucher	   and	  
Strauss,	   1961;	   DiMaggio	   and	   Powell,	   1983;	   Goode,	   1957;	   Hall,	   1968;	   Meyer	   and	   Rowan,	  
1977;	  Parsons,	  1939;	  Scott,	  1965;	  Starbuck,	  1992;	  von	  Nordenflycht,	  2007,	  2010;	  Wilensky,	  
1964).	   Since	   our	   perspective	   focuses	   specifically	   on	   the	   governance	   functions	   of	  
professionalization,	   we	   summarize	   these	   key	   insights	   and	   discuss	   their	   implications	   for	  
transaction	  governance.	  
2.4.1.1 Characteristics	  of	  Professionals	  and	  Transaction	  Governance	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  discuss	  professionals	  as	  being	  a	  distinctive	  group	  apart	  from	  other	  (knowledge)	  
workers,	  a	  definition	  of	  the	  professions	  must	  be	  established	  on	  which	  further	  distinguishing	  
characteristics	  can	  be	  elaborated.	  Wilensky	  (1964)	  defines	  professions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  nature	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of	   the	  work	  performed	  and	   the	  nature	  of	  professional	  workers,	  according	   to	   the	   following	  
two	  criteria.	  Firstly,	  “the	  job	  of	  the	  professional	  is	  technical	  -­‐	  based	  on	  systematic	  knowledge	  
or	  doctrine	  acquired	  only	   through	   long	  prescribed	   training	   (138;	  emphasis	   in	   the	  original).	  
Secondly,	  professionals	  adhere	  to	  a	  set	  of	  professional	  norms;	  i.e.,	  standards	  of	  conduct	  that	  
inform	  their	  behavior	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  clients	  and	  their	  colleagues.	  While	  the	  first	  characteristic	  
overlaps	  with	  our	  broader	  definition	  of	  knowledge	  workers,	  the	  second	  characteristic	  can	  be	  
viewed	  as	  distinguishing	  professionals	   from	  other	  knowledge	  workers.	  Thus,	   in	  addition	   to	  
the	   characteristics	   common	   to	   knowledge	   workers	   discussed	   above	   (i.e.,	   collegiality	   in	  
decision-­‐making,	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  work,	  and	  preference	  for	  autonomy)	  members	  of	  
recognized	   professions	   exhibit	   additional,	   unique	   characteristics	   that	   have	   important	  
governance	  implications;	  namely,	  self-­‐regulation	  and	  social	  control.	  These	  are	  manifested	  in	  
the	  establishment	  and	  enforcement	  of	  strict	  requirements	  for	  entry	  into	  the	  profession	  (i.e.,	  
educational	   standards),	   the	   selection,	   training,	   promotion	   and	   socialization	   of	   aspiring	  
entrants,	  resulting	  in	  a	  strong	  allegiance	  to	  the	  profession,	  the	  strict	  adherence	  to	  a	  code	  of	  
ethics,	  and	  the	  trusteeship	  norm	  (Goode,	  1957;	  Greenwood,	  Hinings,	  and	  Brown,	  1990;	  Hall,	  
1968;	  Parsons,	  1939;	  Scott,	  1965;	  Starbuck,	  1992;	  von	  Nordenflycht,	  2007,	  2010;	  Wilensky,	  
1964).	  
2.4.1.2 Professional	  Codes	  of	  Ethics	  
	  
Underpinning	   the	   self-­‐regulation	  and	  social	   control	  among	  members	  of	  a	  profession	   is	   the	  
adherence	   to	   strict	   codes	   of	   professional	   ethics.	   According	   to	   Starbuck	   (1992:	   717)	  
“professionals’	  ethical	  codes	  require	  them	  to	  serve	  clients	  unemotionally	  and	  impersonally,	  
without	  self-­‐interest.”	  This	  echoes	  Wilensky’s	  (1964)	  discussion	  of	  professional	  norms,	  which	  
dictate	  that	  professionals	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  perform	  technically	  competent,	  high-­‐quality	  
work	  while	  adhering	  to	  a	  service	  ideal,	  stipulate	  that,	  when	  the	  two	  are	  at	  odds,	  “devotion	  
to	   the	   client's	   interests	  more	   than	   personal	   or	   commercial	   profit	   should	   guide	   decisions”	  
(Wilensky,	   1964:	   140).	   In	   addition,	   Starbuck	   (1992)	   notes	   that	   “professionals	   identify	  
strongly	   with	   their	   professions,	   more	   strongly	   than	   with	   their	   clients	   or	   their	   employers.	  
They	   not	   only	   observe	   professional	   standards,	   they	   believe	   that	   only	   members	   of	   their	  
professions	  have	  the	  competence	  and	  ethics	  to	  enforce	  these	  standards”	  (717).	  
	  
Professional	  codes	  of	  ethics	  are	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  more	  severe	  than	  the	   laws	  and	  
regulations	  with	  which	  professionals	  must	  comply,	  thus	  bestowing	  upon	  them	  a	  high	  status	  
within	   the	   larger	   society.	   However,	   maintenance	   of	   this	   social	   standing	   requires	   credible	  
enforcement	   of	   codes	   of	   ethics	   in	   order	   to	   sustain	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   self-­‐regulation	   and	  
shield	   professionals	   from	   the	   scrutiny	   of	   laymen9	  (Goode,	   1957;	   Hall,	   1968).	   According	   to	  
Starbuck	   (1992:	   717-­‐18)	   “Professionals	   …	   not	   only	   observe	   professional	   standards,	   they	  
believe	  that	  only	  members	  of	  their	  professions	  have	  the	  competence	  and	  ethics	  to	  enforce	  
these	  standards.	  Similarly,	  professionals	  insist	  that	  outsiders	  cannot	  properly	  supervise	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  As	  explained	  by	  Goode	   (1957:	  198),	   “in	  exchange	   for	  protection	  against	   the	   larger	   lay	   society,	   the	  
professional	  accepts	  the	  social	  control	  of	  the	  professional	  community.”	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activities.”	   Given	   the	   preference	   for	   autonomy	   and	   this	   belief	   that	   only	   other	   expert-­‐
professionals	  are	  competent	  to	  evaluate	  their	  work,	   it	   is	   in	   the	   interest	  of	  professionals	   to	  
comply	  with	  and	  mutually	  enforce	  their	  codes	  of	  ethics.	  
2.4.1.3 The	  Trusteeship	  Norm	  
	  
Related	  to	  their	  adherence	  to	  a	  strong	  code	  of	  ethics	  and	  professional	  norms,	  professionals	  
possess	   an	   attitudinal	   trait	   that	   further	   distinguishes	   professionals	   from	   other	   knowledge	  
workers	  is	  their	  public	  service	  ethos	  (Hall,	  1968),	  also	  referred	  to	  by	  von	  Nordenflycht	  (2010)	  
as	  the	  trusteeship	  norm.	  The	  trusteeship	  norm	  encompasses	  the	  notion	  that	  “professionals	  
have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  clients	  and/or	  society	  in	  general,”	  which	  lies	  
“at	  the	  core	  of	  professional	  codes	  of	  ethics	  and	  is	  often	  contrasted	  against	  a	  “commercial”	  
or	   “economic”	   ethos	   that	   allows	   unfettered	   pursuit	   of	   self-­‐interest”	   (von	   Nordenflycht,	  
2010:	  163).	  This	  echoes	  early	  work	  by	  Parsons,	  who	  contrasted	  the	  archetypal	  professional	  
with	   the	   stereotypical	   businessman;	   the	   former	   as	   a	   person	   who	   is	   “not	   thought	   of	   as	  
engaged	   in	   the	  pursuit	  of	  his	  personal	  profit,	   but	   in	  performing	   services	   to	  his	  patients	  or	  
clients,	   or	   to	   impersonal	   values	   like	   the	   advancement	   of	   science”	   (1939:	   458).	   The	  
characterization	  of	  the	  businessman	  or	  homo	  economicus,	  who	  are	  assumed	  by	  transaction	  
cost	   theory	   (and	  economic	   theory	  generally)	   to	  be	  driven	  by	  self-­‐interest	   that	  may	   lead	   to	  
opportunistic	   behavior	   provides	   a	   stark	   contrast	   with	   the	   public	   services	   ethos	   and	  
trusteeship	   norm	   motivating	   the	   behavior	   of	   the	   professional.	   The	   former	   represents	   a	  
fundamental	   assumption	   about	   human	   behavior	   in	   the	   economic	   sphere,	  which	   serves	   as	  
basis	   for	   rationale	   in	  hierarchically	   structuring	  organizations	  –	  both	  private	  and	  public	  –	   in	  
order	   to	  minimize	  the	  costs	  of	  monitoring	  and	  controlling	  opportunistic	  behavior.	  Parsons’	  
argued	  that	  “the	  dominance	  of	  a	  business	  economy	  has	  seemed	  to	  justify	  the	  view	  that	  ours	  
was	  an	  ‘acquisitive	  society’	   in	  which	  every	  one	  was	  an	  ‘economic	  man’	  who	  cared	  little	  for	  
the	   interests	   of	   others.	   Professional	   men,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   have	   been	   thought	   of	   as	  
standing	  above	   these	   sordid	   considerations,	  devoting	   their	   lives	   to	   ‘service’	  of	   their	   fellow	  
men”	  (1939:	  463).	  Goode	  makes	  a	  similar	  argument,	  suggesting	  that,	  “…the	  highest	  rewards	  
of	  prestige	  and	  money	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  granted	  to	  the	  practitioners	  who	  actually	  live	  up	  
to	   the	   professional	   role	   obligations.	   The	   practitioner	   who	   tried	   to	   live	   by	   the	   doctrine	   of	  
caveat	   emptor	  might,	   unlike	   the	  business	  man,	   find	  himself	   expelled	   from	  his	   community,	  
either	  informally	  or	  formally”	  (1957:	  196).	  
	  
Returning	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   transaction	   governance,	   codes	   of	   ethics	   and	   professional	   norms	  
explicitly	   recognize	   and	   control	   for	   the	   information	   asymmetries	   inherent	   in	   most	  
knowledge-­‐intensive	  service	  transactions.	  Alluding	  to	  the	  specific	  credence	  goods	  nature	  of	  
professional	   services,	   Goode	   explains	   that,	   “socialization	   and	   social	   control	   in	   the	  
professions	  are	  made	  important	  by	  the	  peculiarly	  exploitative	  opportunities	  the	  professions	  
enjoy.	  The	  problems	  brought	   to	   the	  professional	  are	  usually	   those	   the	  client	  cannot	  solve,	  
and	  only	  the	  professional	  can	  solve.	  The	  client	  does	  not	  usually	  choose	  his	  professional	  by	  a	  
measurable	   criterion	   of	   competence,	   and	   after	   the	  work	   is	   done,	   the	   client	   is	   not	   usually	  
competent	  to	  judge	  if	  it	  was	  properly	  done”	  (1957:	  196).	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Wilensky	  explains	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that,	  “the	  client	   is	  peculiarly	  vulnerable;	  he	   is	  both	   in	   trouble	  and	   ignorant	  of	  how	  to	  help	  
himself	  out	  of	   it.	   If	  he	  did	  not	  believe	   that	   the	   service	   ideal	  were	  operative,	   if	  he	   thought	  
that	   the	   income	   of	   the	   professional	   were	   a	   commanding	   motive,	   he	   would	   be	   forced	   to	  
approach	  the	  professional	  as	  he	  does	  a	  car	  dealer-­‐	  demanding	  a	  specific	  result	  in	  a	  specific	  
time	  and	  a	  guaranty	  of	   restitution	  should	  mistakes	  be	  made.	  He	  would	  also	   refuse	   to	  give	  
confidences	  or	   reveal	   potentially	   embarrassing	   facts.	   The	   service	   ideal	   is	   the	  pivot	   around	  
which	  the	  moral	  claim	  to	  professional	  status	  revolves”	  (1964:	  140).	  
This	   proposed	   disinterest	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   (financial)	   self-­‐interest	   that	   sets	   professionals	  
apart	   from	   other	   economic	   actors	   has	   been	   largely	   ignored	   in	   the	   intervening	   eighty-­‐four	  
years	   of	   research	   and	  writing	  on	  organizational	   governance.	   Yet,	   if	   accepted,	   this	   premise	  
has	   obvious	   and	   significant	   governance	   implications	   for	   transactions	   involving	   knowledge-­‐
intensive	  services,	  in	  general,	  and	  credence	  goods,	  in	  particular.	  
2.4.1.4 Selection,	  Admission	  and	  Socialization	  within	  the	  Professions	  
	  
Finally,	   self-­‐regulation	   and	   social	   control	   are	   anchored	   in	   the	   socialization	   process	   that	  
aspiring	   entrants	   to	   a	   profession	  must	   undergo.	   Those	   aiming	   to	   enter	   a	   profession	  must	  
meet	  the	  high	  educational	  requirements,	  as	  well	  as	  undergo	  extensive	  training	  during	  which	  
intensive	  socialization	  occurs	  (Goode,	  1957:	  196).	  All	  of	  this	  culminates	  in	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  
allegiance	  to	  the	  profession.	  Members	  of	  professions	  have	  been	  described	  as	  exhibiting	  an	  
esprit	  de	  corps	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  “being	  in	  the	  same	  boat”,	  which	  are	  said	  to	  be	  “fostered	  by	  
such	  things	  as	  control	  of	  entry	  to	  the	  occupation,	  development	  of	  a	  unique	  mission,	  shared	  
attitudes	  toward	  clients	  and	  society,	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  informal	  and	  formal	  associations”	  
(Bucher	  and	  Strauss,	  1961:	  330).	  According	  to	  Starbuck,	  professionals	  identify	  more	  strongly	  
with	  their	  profession	  than	  with	  either	  their	  clients	  or	  their	  employers	  (1992:	  717),	  which	  Hall	  
(1968:	  93)	  refers	  to	  as	  “a	  sense	  of	  calling	  to	  the	  field.”	  As	  described	  by	  Goode,	  “typically	  a	  
profession,	   through	   its	   association	   and	   its	   members,	   controls	   admission	   to	   training	   and	  
requires	   far	   more	   education	   from	   its	   trainees	   than	   the	   containing	   community	   demands.	  
Although	   the	   occupational	   behavior	   of	   members	   is	   regulated	   by	   law,	   the	   professional	  
community	  exacts	  a	  higher	   standard	  of	  behavior	   than	  does	   the	   law.	  Both	  of	   the	   foregoing	  
characteristics	  allow	  the	  professions	  to	  enjoy	  more	  prestige	  from	  the	  containing	  community	  
than	   can	   other	   occupations.	   Thus,	   professionals	   stand	   at	   the	   apex	   of	   prestige	   in	   the	  
occupational	  system”	  (1957:	  195;	  emphasis	  added).	  	  
2.4.1.5 Professionalization	  as	  an	  Institution	  and	  Governance	  Structure	  
	  
Thus	   far	   we	   have	   identified	   and	   discussed	   the	   unique	   attributes	   of	   professionals	   –	   both	  
attitudinal	   and	   behavioral	   –	   that	   differentiate	   them	   from	  other	   labor	  market	   participants.	  
Based	  on	  the	  foregoing	  discussion,	  we	  conclude	  that	  these	  attributes	  are	  clearly	  inconsistent	  
with	   the	   assumptions	   about	   human	   behavior	   that	   underlie	   transaction	   cost	   theory	   -­‐	  
specifically,	  self-­‐interested	  opportunism.	  Nevertheless,	  our	  critics	  may	  question	  the	  strength	  
of	  our	  arguments	  and	  claims,	  despite	  their	  basis	   in	  prior	  research.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  offer	  an	  
additional	   argument:	   these	   attitudes	   and	   behaviors	   can	   be	   relied	   upon	   to	   consistently	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differentiate	   professionals	   from	   the	   archetypal	   homo	   economicus	   because	   they	   have	  
become	  institutionalized.	  
	  
As	  with	  many	   social	   science	   theories	   and	   constructs,	   there	   lacks	   a	   clear	   and	   uncontested	  
definition	   of	   what	   constitutes	   an	   institution.	   	   A	   key	   figure	   in	   the	   field	   of	   sociology	   and	  
institutional	   theory,	   Scott	   defines	   institutions	   as	   being	   composed	   of	   “cultural-­‐cognitive,	  
normative,	   and	   regulative	  elements	   that	  provide	   stability	   and	  meaning	   to	   social	  behavior”	  
and	  have	  attained	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  resilience	  and	  legitimacy	  (1995:	  33).	   Important	  work	   in	  
sociology	   (see	   for	   example,	  Alvesson,	   1993,	   2000;	  DiMaggio	   and	  Powell,	   1983;	  Meyer	   and	  
Rowan,	   1977)	   has	   discussed	   professions	   as	   institutions.	   This	   interest	   in	   professions	   as	  
institutions	  has	  stemmed	  in	  large	  part	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  “many	  of	  the	  traits	  that	  make	  the	  
professions	  sociologically	  interesting	  grow	  from	  the	  dimension	  of	  community”	  (Goode,	  1957:	  
195;	  emphasis	  added).	  	  
	  
Characteristic	  of	  each	  of	  the	  established	  professions,	  and	  a	  goal	  of	  each	  aspiring	  occupation,	  
is	  the	  ‘community	  of	  profession.’	  Each	  profession	  is	  a	  community	  without	  physical	  locus	  and,	  
like	  other	  communities	  with	  heavy	  in-­‐migration,	  one	  whose	  founding	  fathers	  are	  linked	  only	  
rarely	  by	  blood	  with	  the	  present	  generation.	  It	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  called	  a	  community	  by	  
virtue	  of	  these	  characteristics:	  (1)	  Its	  members	  are	  bound	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  identity.	  (2)	  Once	  in	  
it,	  few	  leave,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  a	  terminal	  or	  continuing	  status	  for	  the	  most	  part.	  (3)	  Its	  members	  
share	  values	   in	   common.	   (4)	   Its	   role	  definitions	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  both	  members	  and	  non-­‐members	  
are	  agreed	  upon	  and	  are	  the	  same	  for	  all	  members.	  (5)	  Within	  the	  areas	  of	  communal	  action	  
there	   is	   a	   common	   language,	   which	   is	   understood	   only	   partially	   by	   outsiders.	   (6)	   The	  
Community	  has	  power	  over	  its	  members.	  (7)	  Its	  limits	  are	  reasonably	  clear,	  though	  they	  are	  
not	   physical	   and	   geographical,	   but	   social.	   (8)	   Though	   it	   does	   not	   produce	   the	   next	  
generation	   biologically,	   it	   does	   so	   socially	   through	   its	   control	   over	   the	   selection	   of	  
professional	   trainees,	  and	  through	   its	   training	  processes	   it	  sends	  these	  recruits	   through	  an	  
adult	  socialization	  process	  (Goode,	  1957:	  194).	  
	  
From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  a	  professional	  community	  has	  its	  own	  symbolic	  systems,	  relational	  
systems,	  routines,	  and	  artifacts,	  which	  support	  the	  three	  pillars	  -­‐	  regulative,	  normative,	  and	  
cultural/cognitive	  -­‐	  of	  the	  ‘profession	  as	  institution’	  (Scott,	  1995).	  Powell	  explains	  the	  three	  
pillars	   as	   follows:	   “regulative	   elements	   emphasize	   rule	   setting	   and	   sanctioning,	   normative	  
elements	   contain	   an	   evaluative	   and	   obligatory	   dimension,	   while	   cultural/cognitive	   factors	  
involve	   shared	   conceptions	   and	   frames	   through	  which	  meaning	   is	   understood”	   (2007:	   2).	  
According	   to	   Powell,	   “each	   of	   Scott’s	   pillars	   offered	   a	   different	   rationale	   for	   legitimacy,	  
either	   by	   virtue	   of	   being	   legally	   sanctioned,	   morally	   authorized,	   or	   culturally	   supported.	  
These	   two	   key	   treatments	   of	   institutional	   mechanisms	   underscore	   that	   it	   is	   critical	   to	  
distinguish	  whether	  an	  organization	  complies	  out	  of	  expedience,	  from	  a	  moral	  obligation,	  or	  
because	  its	  members	  cannot	  conceive	  of	  alternative	  ways	  of	  acting”	  (2007:	  2).	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Table	  1.	  A	  Tabular	  	  Summary	  	  of	  	  Scott’s	  	  “Three	  	  Pillars	  	  of	  	  Institutions”	  
	  
	   Regulative	   Normative	   Cultural-­‐cognitive	  
Basis	  of	  compliance	   Expedience	   Social	  obligation	   Taken	  for	  grantedness	  
Shared	  understanding	  
Basis	  of	  order	   Regulative	  rules	   Binding	  expectations	   Constitutive	  schema	  
Mechanisms	   Coercive	   Normative	   Mimetic	  
Logic	   Instrumentality	   Appropriateness	   Orthodoxy	  





Common	  beliefs	  	  
Shared	  logics	  of	  action	  
Basis	  of	  legitimacy	   Legally	  sanctioned	   Morally	  governed	   Comprehensible	  	  
Recognisable	  	  
Culturally	  supported	  
Source:	  Adapted	  from	  Scott	  (2014:	  60)	  
	  
	  
The	   institutional	   effects	   of	   professionalization	   on	   professionals	   differentiate	   them	   in	  
important	  ways	   from	  non-­‐professional	  knowledge	  workers.	  As	  explained	  by	  Wilensky,	  “the	  
degree	  of	  professionalization	   is	  measured	  not	   just	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  success	   in	  the	  claim	  to	  
exclusive	  technical	  competence,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  adherence	  to	  the	  service	  ideal	  and	  
its	   supporting	  norms	  of	   professional	   conduct”	   (1964:	   141).	   Earlier	  work	  by	  Parsons	   (1939)	  
provides	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion.	  “The	  professional	  type	  is	  the	  institutional	  framework	  in	  
which	  many	   of	   our	  most	   important	   social	   functions	   are	   carried	   on,	   notably	   the	   pursuit	   of	  
science	   and	   liberal	   learning	   and	   its	   practical	   application	   in	  medicine,	   technology,	   law	   and	  
teaching”	   (Parsons,	   1939:	   467).	   He	   elaborates	   further	   on	   this	   point	   as	   follows.	   “The	  
institutional	   pattern	   governing	   professional	   activity	   does	   not,	   in	   the	   same	   sense,	   sanction	  
the	  pursuit	  of	  self-­‐interest	  as	  the	  corresponding	  one	  does	  in	  the	  case	  of	  business…	  Business	  
men	  are,	  for	  instance,	  expected	  to	  push	  their	  financial	  interests	  by	  such	  aggressive	  measures	  
as	   advertising.	   They	  are	  not	   expected	   to	   sell	   to	   customers	   regardless	  of	   the	  probability	  of	  
their	  being	  paid,	  as	  doctors	  are	  expected	  to	  treat	  patients”	  (Parsons,	  1939:	  463).	  In	  Parsons’	  
view,	   “success”	   and	   “achievement”	   are	   institutionally	   defined	   and	   differ	   fundamentally	  
between	   business	   and	   the	   professions.	   These	   differences	   also	   form	   the	   institutional	  
constraints	   on	   socially	   accepted	   and	   expected	   behavior	   for	   the	   members	   of	   these	   two	  
distinct	   groups	   (i.e.,	   businessmen	   and	   professionals)	   (Parsons,	   1939:	   465).	   As	   noted	   by	  
Goode,	   “the	   advantages	   enjoyed	   by	   professionals	   thus	   rest	   on	   evaluations	   made	   by	   the	  
larger	   society,	   for	   the	   professional	   community	   could	   not	   grant	   these	   advantages	   to	   itself.	  
That	  is,	  they	  represent	  structured	  relations	  between	  the	  larger	  society	  and	  the	  professional	  
community”	   (1957:	   196).	   The	   fundamental	   conclusion	   that	   can	   be	   drawn	   is	   the	   following:	  	  
transaction	  cost	  theory’s	  self-­‐interested	  and	  opportunistic	  homo	  economicus	  appears	  to	  be	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subject	   only	   to	   external	   regulative	   constraint	   on	   his	   behavior,	   whereas	   professionals	   are	  
subject	  to	  both	  external	  and	  internal	  regulative,	  normative	  and	  cognitive	  constraints.	  
	  
According	   to	  Meyer	   and	   Rowan,	   “	  …institutional	   rules	  may	   have	   effects	   on	   organizational	  
structures	  and	  their	   implementation	  in	  actual	  technical	  work	  which	  are	  very	  different	  from	  
the	  effects	  generated	  by	  the	  networks	  of	  social	  behavior	  and	  relationships	  which	  compose	  
and	   surround	   a	   given	   organization”	   (1977:	   341).	   This	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   findings	   of	   an	  
earlier	  empirical	  study	  of	  professional	  occupational	  groups	  and	  bureaucratic	  organization	  by	  
Hall	   (1968).	  Hall	   found	  that	  certain	  characteristics	  of	  professionals	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  
on	   the	   organizations	   in	   which	   they	   work;	   particularly	   concerning	   the	   structure	   and	  
governance	  of	  the	  organizational	  form.	  His	  work	  suggests	  that	  autonomous,	  self-­‐regulating	  
groups	  of	  professionals	   (e.g.,	   lawyers	  and	  accountants,	  doctors	  and	  advertising	  executives)	  
tend	   to	   utilize	   less	   bureaucratic	   organizational	   structures	   to	   organize	   themselves	   than	  
groups	  of	  professionals	  working	   in	  either	  heteronomous10	  organizations	  or	  departments	  of	  
larger,	  non-­‐professional	  organizations.	  	  
	  
We	  agree	  with	   the	  assertion	   that	   institutional	   rules,	   such	  as	   those	  associated	  with	  specific	  
professions,	  affect	  organizational	  structures.	  We	  also	  acknowledge	  that,	  despite	  acceptance	  
of	   this	   assertion,	   numerous	   variations	   of	   professional	   organization	   may	   be	   observed	   in	  
practice	   (e.g.,	   as	   proposed	   by	   Scott7).	   However,	   by	   taking	   a	   transaction	   cost	   theoretic	  
approach,	  we	  suggest	  that	  a	  cost-­‐minimizing	  and	  governance-­‐optimizing	  organizational	  form	  
ought	  to	  be	  selected	  for	  governance	  of	  transactions	  involving	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services.	  
On	   that	   basis,	   we	   make	   a	   case	   for	   the	   partnership	   as	   the	   ideal	   organizational	   structure,	  
arguing	  that	  it	  maximizes	  the	  governance	  effects	  related	  to	  the	  professions	  as	  well	  as	  those	  
associated	  with	  the	  organizational	  structure	  as	  such.	  
	  
2.5 The	  Partnership	  as	  an	  Organizational	  Form	  
	  
In	   the	   management	   and	   organization	   studies	   literature,	   the	   corporation,	   as	   both	   an	  
institution	  and	  an	  organizational	  form,	  has	  by	  now	  been	  thoroughly	  studied.	  Indeed,	  in	  much	  
of	  the	  literature	  on	  public	  sector	  management	  reform,	  the	  corporation	  and	  corporate-­‐style	  
management	   and	  governance	  practices	   are	   the	  default	  models	   to	  which	   reformers	   aspire.	  
Despite	   the	   recognized	   weaknesses	   in	   the	   corporate	   model,	   and	   the	   difficulties	   with	  
applying	   this	   model	   in	   other	   institutional	   environments	   (e.g.,	   in	   the	   public	   sector),	   this	  
tendency	  persists.	  Remarkably	  neglected	  in	  all	  of	  these	  literatures	  is	  a	  serious	  consideration	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 	  Hall	   (1968)	   utilizes	   Scott's	   (1965)	   typology	   of	   three	   professional	   organizational	   structures:	  
autonomous;	   heteronomous;	   and,	   departmental.	   An	   autonomous	   organization	   of	   professionals	   is	  
characterized	  by	  self-­‐regulation	  and	  collegiality.	  It	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  external	  or	  administrative	  control	  
and	   the	   professionals	   in	   the	   organization	   determine	   the	   organizational	   structure	   themselves.	   In	  
heteronomous	   organizations,	   professional	   employees	   are	   subject	   to	   external	   regulation	   and	   the	  
organizational	   form	   is	   usually	   prescribed	   –	   often	   by	   law-­‐	   by	   external	   forces.	   In	   the	   third	   case,	  
professionals	   work	   in	   a	   department	   that	   is	   part	   of	   a	   larger,	   typically	   hierarchically	   structured	  
organization,	  such	  as	  legal	  or	  research	  departments	  (Hall,	  1968:	  104).	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of	   the	   partnership	   as	   a	   unique	   organizational	   form	   with	   distinctive	   managerial	   and	  
governance	  attributes	  that	  distinguish	  it	  –	  favorably	  –	  from	  the	  corporation.	  	  
	  
In	  its	  most	  basic	  construction,	  a	  partnership	  is	  created	  by	  a	  contractual	  agreement	  between	  
two	  or	  more	  individuals	  who	  enter	  into	  a	  business	  arrangement	  whereby	  each	  party	  agrees	  
to	  contribute	  some	  amount	  of	  capital	  and	  labor,	  while	  sharing	  proportionately	  in	  the	  profits	  
and	   losses	   resulting	   from	   the	  operation	  of	   the	  business.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   limited	   liability	  
enjoyed	  by	  shareholders,	  owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  corporation	  is	  a	   legally	  separate	  entity	  
from	   its	   owners,	   the	   partnership	   is	   not	   a	   legal	   entity	   separate	   from	   its	   partner-­‐owners.	  
Consequently,	   each	   partner	   bears	   unlimited	   personal	   liability	   for	   the	   debts	   of	   the	  
partnership,	  even	  if	  they	  were	  incurred	  by	  another	  partner	  (on	  behalf	  of	  the	  partnership).11	  
Furthermore,	  “a	  partner	  is	  an	  owner	  of	  a	  firm,	  is	  involved	  in	  its	  overall	  management,	  and	  is	  a	  
key	  production	  worker”	   (Greenwood,	  Hinings,	   and	  Brown,	  1990:	  730).	   Thus,	   a	  partnership	  
unifies	   ownership,	   management	   and	   operations	   (Greenwood,	   Hinings,	   and	   Brown	   1990;	  
Ribstein	  2009;	  von	  Nordenflycht	  2007).	  This	  distinguishes	  it	  markedly	  from	  the	  corporation,	  
which	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  clear	  separation	  of	  ownership,	  management	  and	  operations.	  This	  
has	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  governance	  of	  transactions	  both	  within	  the	  organization	  
as	  well	  as	  between	  the	  organization	  and	  third	  parties,	  particularly	  customers.	  
	  
The	  partnership	   form	   is	   also	   strongly	   linked	   to	   the	  professions,	  which	  may	   account	   for	   its	  
historical	   prevalence	   among	   professional	   services,	   such	   as	   law	   and	   accountancy	   firms	  
(Ribstein,	   2009;	   von	   Nordenflycht,	   2007).	   In	   many	   respects,	   it	   reflects	   the	   defining	  
institutional	   features	   of	   the	   professions.	   Firstly,	   it	   reflects	   the	   belief	   held	   by	   most	  
professionals	   that	   non-­‐professionals	   are	   not	   fit	   to	   monitor	   and	   control	   the	   work	   of	  
professionals,	   therefore	   resulting	   in	   a	   preference	   for	   mutual	   peer	   monitoring	   of	  
professionals	   by	   professionals.	   Secondly,	   it	   reflects	   the	   preference	   for	   autonomy	   in	  
conducting	  work	   and	   the	   preference	   for	   collegiality	   in	   decision-­‐making	   at	   the	  managerial-­‐
level,	  given	  the	  relative	  equality	  and	  status	  of	  the	  partners.	  Thirdly,	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  
trusteeship	  norm.	  That	   is,	   the	  view	  held	  by	  professionals	   that	  commercial	   interests	  –	  both	  
own	  and	  those	  of	  clients	  –	  should	  be	  secondary	  to	  compliance	  with	  professional	  standards	  
and	   codes	   of	   ethics.12	  This	   is	   an	   important	   contrast	   to	   the	   corporate	   form,	   in	   which	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The	   laws	   of	  most	   jurisdictions	   do	   allow	   some	   relief	   from	   full	   personal	   liability	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  
“limited	  liability	  partnership.”	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  exempted	  from	  full	  liability,	  a	  partner	  must	  be	  
able	  to	  prove	  that	  she	  was	  unaware	  of	  and	  not	  involved	  in	  any	  wrongdoing	  or	  negligence	  perpetrated	  
by	  the	  other	  partner(s)	  (Greenwood	  &	  Empson	  2003:	  915).	  
	  
12	  According	  to	  von	  Nordenflycht,“one	  managerial	  implication	  of	  this	  trusteeship	  norm	  is	  the	  existence	  
of	   normative	   and	   coercive	  prohibitions	   against	   organizational	   forms	   that	   are	  perceived	   to	   threaten	  
trusteeship	   behavior.	   A	   primary	   example	   is	   a	   resistance	   to	   having	   nonprofessionals,	   especially	  
commercially	   oriented	   nonprofessionals	   (such	   as	   investors),	   involved	   in	   the	   ownership	   and	  
governance	   of	   professional	   firms	   (von	   Nordenflycht,	   2008).	   This	   is	   intended	   to	   prevent	   the	  
introduction	   of	   pressures	   that	   might	   compromise	   the	   interests	   of	   clients.	   In	   some	   cases	   the	  
professional	  code	  expressly	  prohibits	  nonprofessionals	  from	  sharing	  ownership	  in	  professional	  firms.	  
In	  other	  cases,	  such	  as	  hospitals,	  organizing	  as	  a	  nonprofit	   is	  another	  way	  to	  minimize	  commercially	  
oriented	  governance	  (Hansmann,	  1996)”	  (2010:	  163).	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separation	  of	  ownership	  control	  has	  led	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  shareholder	  value	  maximization	  and	  
performance-­‐based	  financial	   incentives	  for	  employees	  to	  narrowly	  pursue	  that	  goal.	  Lastly,	  
and	  relatedly,	  the	  tournament	  system	  of	  promotion	  to	  partner	  that	  is	  frequently	  utilized	  by	  
professional	  partnerships	  provides	  incentives	  for	  professional	  staff	  who	  aspire	  to	  become	  a	  
partner	  to	  work	  towards	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  partnership,	  rather	  than	  pursuing	  their	  own	  
individual	  financial	  interests.	  
2.5.1 The	  Partnership	  as	  a	  Mode	  of	  Transaction	  Governance	  
	  
The	  partnership,	  as	  an	  organizational	  form,	  possesses	  a	  number	  of	  governance	  features	  that	  
distinguish	   it	   favorably	   from	  both	  market	   and	   hierarchy	   for	   the	   governance	   of	   knowledge	  
workers	   and	   professionals	   and	   knowledge	  workers	   and	  make	   it	   particularly	   suited	   for	   the	  
governance	   of	   	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   service	   transactions	   that	   are	   rendered	   to	   non-­‐expert	  
clients.	  
	  
Firstly,	  the	  unlimited	  personal	  liability	  to	  which	  partners	  are	  exposed	  reinforces	  mutual	  peer	  
monitoring	   and	   militates	   against	   self-­‐interested	   opportunistic	   behavior.	   This	   is	   consistent	  
with	  the	  preference	  for	  collegiality	  and	  the	  belief	  that	  only	  other	  experts	  or	  professionals	  are	  
able	   to	  accurately	  and	  critically	  evaluate	   the	  non-­‐routine,	  non-­‐standardized	  work	   in	  which	  
knowledge	   workers	   are	   engaged.	   It	   is	   also	   consistent	   with	   the	   self-­‐regulation	   of	   the	  
professions,	  which	  depend	  on	  strict	  compliance	  with	  own	  codes	  of	  ethics	  and	  professional	  
norms	  for	  sustaining	  their	  elevated	  social	  status	  and	  maintaining	  their	  reputational	  capital.	  	  
	  
From	   the	  perspective	  of	  non-­‐expert	   third	  parties	  –	  most	  notably	   clients	  –	   this	   goes	  a	   long	  
way	  toward	  reducing	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  information	  asymmetries	  that	  complicate	  
market	  contracting	  and	  lead	  to	  high	  transaction	  costs.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  partnership	  optimizes	  
transaction	   governance	   while	   significantly	   reducing	   transaction	   costs.	   Where	   credence	  
goods	  transactions	  are	  concerned,	  we	  expect	  the	  differential	  to	  be	  even	  greater.	  
	  
Secondly,	   the	   unification	   of	   ownership,	   management	   and	   control,	   combined	   with	   the	  
tournament	   system	   of	   promotion	   to	   partner	   create	   incentives	   that	   promote	   knowledge	  
creation	  and	  knowledge	  sharing	  by	  all	  members	  of	  a	  partnership	  –both	  among	  partners	  and	  
non-­‐partner	  professional	  staff.	  Both	  Foss	  (2007)	  and	  Hackett	  (2000)	  discuss	  the	  problems	  of	  
encountered	   by	   many	   knowledge-­‐based	   organizations	   and	   identify	   a	   tendency	   among	  
knowledge	   workers	   in	   traditional	   private	   and	   public	   bureaucratic	   organizations	   to	   hoard	  
knowledge,	   which	   typically	   results	   from	   corporate-­‐style	   performance-­‐based	   incentives,	   as	  
one	   of	   the	   most	   serious	   obstacles	   that	   such	   organizations	   must	   overcome.	   Sharing	   of	  
knowledge	  and	  other	   resources	   (especially	   those	   that	   contribute	   to	   fixed	  costs),	   can	  allow	  
knowledge	   workers	   who	   work	   together	   in	   a	   partnership	   context	   to	   realize	   economies	   of	  
scale	   and	   scope	   in	   the	   services	   they	   offer,	   which	   leads	   to	   both	   lower	   production	   and	  
transaction	   costs	   than	   would	   be	   realizable	   via	   either	   hierarchy	   (which	   discourages	  
knowledge	  sharing)	  or	  market-­‐based	  transactions	  between	  individual	  self-­‐employed	  experts	  
working	  by	  themselves	  (where	  knowledge-­‐sharing	  is	  precluded	  due	  to	  competition).	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Finally,	  the	  partnership	  is	  highly	  consistent	  with	  the	  professional	  allegiance	  to	  a	  profession.	  
It	  is	  also	  more	  consistent	  with	  related	  professional	  norms	  -­‐	  such	  as	  the	  trusteeship	  norm	  and	  
the	  service	  ideal	  -­‐	  than	  either	  market	  contracting	  or	  hierarchical	  organization.	  	  As	  noted	  by	  
Goode	   (1957:	   197),	   “the	   professional	   who	   is	   also	   a	   bureaucrat	   becomes	   less	   directly	  
dependent	  on	  the	  professional	  community	  for	  his	  career	  advancement,	  so	  that	  the	  ordinary	  
sanctions	  of	  that	  community	  may	  have	  less	  impact.”	  Subsequent	  empirical	  research	  by	  Hall	  
(1968)	   lends	   further	  support	   to	   the	  claim	  that	  a	  bureaucratic	  organizational	   structure	   (i.e.,	  
akin	   to	  Williamson’s	  “hierarchy”)	   is	   incompatible	  with	  a	  professionalized	  workforce.	  This	   is	  
echoed	   by	   von	   Nordenflycht	   (2007),	   who	   observes	   that	   “both	   economic	   and	   sociological	  
theorists	   argue	   that	   a	   strong	   culture	   that	   fosters	   cooperation	  and	   intrinsic	  motivation	   is	   a	  
key	   source	   of	   advantage	   for	   PSFs	   [professional	   service	   firms],	   because	   professionals’	  
portable	   skills	   render	   formal	   authority	   and	   traditional	   incentive	   systems	   less	   effective”	   (p.	  
431-­‐432).	   The	   formal	   processes	   and	   hierarchical	   control	   structures	   associated	   with	  
corporate	   governance	   and	   traditional	   public	   administration	   are	   therefore	   likely	   to	   conflict	  
with	  informal	  processes	  and	  ‘collegial	  controls’	  that	  underlie	  the	  governance	  of	  professional	  
partnerships	   (Moe	   1995;	   von	   Nordenflycht	   2007:	   432).	   Taken	   together	   with	   the	   unique	  
attributes	   of	   knowledge	  workers	   and	   professionals	   –	   i.e.,	   a	   preference	   for	   self-­‐regulation,	  
autonomy	  in	  conducting	  work,	  the	  non-­‐routine,	  non-­‐standardized	  nature	  of	  work	  performed	  
(and	   the	   difficulty	   faced	   by	   non-­‐experts	   in	   monitoring	   and	   controlling	   work),	   and	   the	  
preference	  for	  collegiality	  in	  decision-­‐making,	  a	  hierarchically	  structured	  organization,	  like	  a	  
traditional	  bureaucracy,	  may	  well	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  undermining	  the	  desirable	  governance	  
features	  associated	  with	  the	  institutional	  aspects	  of	  professionalization.	  	  
	  
2.6 Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  
	  
Based	   on	   the	   foregoing	   discussion,	   we	   argue	   that	   partnerships	   contribute	   to	   lower	  
transaction	  costs	  than	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  either	  markets	  or	  hierarchies	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  
knowledge-­‐intensive	  service	  transactions	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  lower	  information	  
asymmetries	   between	   expert-­‐partners	   reduce	   the	   probability	   that	   opportunistic	   behavior	  
can	   be	   successfully	   pursued.	   Secondly,	   shared	   liability,	   profit	   participation,	   and	   the	  
preference	   for	   collegiality	   in	  decision-­‐making	   result	   in	  a	  highly	  effective	   system	  of	   internal	  
mutual	  peer	  monitoring.	  This	  results	  in	  lower	  transaction	  costs	  than	  the	  more	  costly	  and	  less	  
effective	   option	   of	  market-­‐based	   contracting,	   due	   to	   the	   inherent	   difficulty	   faced	   by	   non-­‐
experts	   in	  monitoring	  and	  controlling	   transactions	   in	  knowledge-­‐intensive,	  expert	   services.	  
Internal	  governance	  of	  experts	  by	  experts	  should	  also	  be	  less	  costly	  and	  more	  effective	  than	  
traditional,	   hierarchical	   internal	   firm	   governance	   by	   non-­‐expert	   “professional”	   managers,	  
particularly	  where	  operations	  are	  characterized	  by	  the	  provision	  of	  non-­‐standardized,	  non-­‐
routine	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   services.	   In	   summary,	   we	   argue	   that	   the	   partnership	   is	   an	  
organizational	   form	   that	   is	   more	   consistent	   with	   institutional	   features	   and	   governance	  
mechanisms	   of	   professionalization.	   When	   combined,	   the	   complementarities	   in	   the	   two	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modes	  of	  governance	  are	  expected	  to	  create	  synergies	  that	  optimize	  the	  governance	  effects	  
of	  each	  and	  minimize	  total	  transaction	  (and	  production)	  costs.	  
	  
For	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services	  having	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  domain-­‐specificity	  combined	  with	  
a	  low	  degree	  of	  client-­‐specificity	  of	  knowledge,	  the	  governance	  features	  of	  the	  partnership	  
should	  provide	  superior	  monitoring	  and	  control	  functions	  while	  minimizing	  transaction	  costs	  
to	   clients.	   Furthermore,	   as	   the	   degree	   of	   client-­‐specificity	   increases	   and	   bilateral	  
dependence	   escalates,	   the	   need	   for	   professionalization	   increases.	   For	   such	   transactions	  
(e.g.,	   those	   involving	   credence	   goods),	   partnership	   coupled	   with	   professionalization	   is	  
expected	  to	  optimize	  transaction	  governance	  while	  minimizing	  transaction	  costs.	  
	  
No	   added	   benefit	   accruing	   from	   professionalization	   are	   expected	   for	   knowledge-­‐intensive	  
services	  having	  a	  low	  degree	  of	  domain-­‐specificity.	  The	  resulting	  services	  suffer	  less	  from	  the	  
opportunism	  posed	   by	   credence	   goods	   and	   are	   therefore	   easier	   for	   non-­‐expert	   clients	   (in	  
the	   case	   of	  market-­‐based	   transactions)	   and	  non-­‐expert	  managers	   (in	   the	   case	   of	   in-­‐house	  
provision)	  to	  monitor	  and	  control.	  However,	  for	  transactions	  characterized	  by	  a	  high	  degree	  
of	   client-­‐specificity	   (i.e.,	   management	   consulting),	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	   partnership	   offers	  
better	  and	  cheaper	  governance	  when	  compared	  with	  either	  the	  market	  or	  hierarchy,	  given	  
the	  benefits	  conveyed	  to	  clients	  (i.e.,	   lower	  contacting	  costs)	  resulting	  from	  the	  benefits	  of	  
mutual	  peer	  monitoring	  within	  the	  partnership.	  
	  
The	  aim	  of	  the	  current	  paper	  was	  to	  extend	  transaction	  cost	  theory	  to	  make	  it	  more	  readily	  
applicable	  to	  transactions	  involving	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services.	  To	  this	  end,	  some	  gaps	  in	  
the	   theory	   concerning	   human	   assets	   and,	   specifically,	   the	   unique	   characteristics	   of	  
knowledge	  and	  knowledge	  workers	   in	  the	  modern	  economy	  were	   identified.	  On	  this	  basis,	  
two	   alternative,	   yet	   complementary,	   governance	   structures	   for	   the	   governance	   of	  
transactions	   involving	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   services	   are	   offered:	   the	   professionalization	   of	  
certain	  knowledge	  workers	   (based	  on	  our	   typology	  of	   the	  knowledge	  dimension	  of	  human	  
assets)	   and	   the	   partnership	   as	   an	   organizational	   form.	   When	   combined,	   autonomous	  
knowledge	  workers	  organized	  as	  a	  professional	  partnership	  offer	  an	  institutionally	  coherent	  
solution	   to	   the	   governance	   problems	   unique	   to	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   services.	   It	   has	   been	  
argued	   that	   these	   combined	   modes	   of	   governance	   can	   improve	   the	   governance	   of	  
transactions	  in	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services	  while	  minimizing	  the	  related	  transaction	  costs.	  
To	   be	   sure,	   the	   current	   text	   is	   theoretical	   and	   represents	   a	   first	   step,	   albeit	   one	   that	   is	  
intended	   to	   stimulate	   further	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	   work	   on	   this	   topic.	   Lastly,	   this	  
chapter	  seeks	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  dialogue	  on	  public-­‐sector	  reform,	  which	  has	  traditionally	  
centered	   on	   the	   adoption	   of	   corporate-­‐style	  management	   and	   governance	   practices,	  with	  
limited	  success.	  To	  this	  end,	  opportunities	  are	  foreseen	  to	  apply	  the	  approach	  offered	  here	  
in	   the	   context	   of	   higher	   education	   reform	   and	   the	   reform	   of	   public	   research	   institutions,	  
where	  public	  sector	  reformers	  are	  looking	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  for	  models	  of	  management	  
and	  governance.	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In	  an	  effort	  to	  expedite	  the	  process	  of	  reforming	  university	  funding	  and	  governance,	  certain	  
features	  of	  the	  corporate	  model	  of	  organizational	  governance	  are	  being	  introduced	  into	  the	  
German	  public	  university	  system.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  transition	  -­‐	  away	  from	  the	  traditional	  public	  
administration	  model	  and	  toward	  the	  corporate	  model	  of	  governance	  -­‐	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	  
the	  corporate	  model	  are	  critically	  discussed	  in	  the	  higher	  education	  context.	  An	  alternative	  
approach	   to	   university	   governance	   is	   then	   offered;	   one	   that	   is	   modeled	   after	   the	  
professional	   service	   firm	   and,	   specifically,	   after	   the	   professional	   partnership.	   The	   chief	  
contribution	   of	   the	   paper	   is	   the	   proposal	   of	   a	   novel	  model	   of	   university	   governance	   that	  
combines	   the	   most	   promising	   governance	   features	   of	   the	   professional	   partnership	   and	  
professional	  service	  firm	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  reflecting	  the	  unique	  characteristics	  of	  the	  
German	   higher	   education	   context.	   In	   line	   with	   Binderkrantz	   and	   Christensen,	   the	   current	  
paper	   takes	   the	  position	   that	  a	   transfer	  of	   ‘lessons	   learned’	   from	  the	  private	  sector	   to	   the	  
public	  sector	  is	  possible	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  organizational	  governance;	  however,	  as	  stated	  by	  
those	  authors,	  “it	  presumes	  careful	  analysis	  of	  when	  it	  is	  defensible	  and	  what	  the	  lesson	  is”	  
(2012:	  46).	  
	  
3.2 New	  Public	  Management	  and	  its	  Impact	  on	  German	  Higher	  Education	  
	  
According	   to	   Pollitt	   and	   Bouckaert,	   “public	   management	   reform	   consists	   of	   deliberate	  
changes	  to	  the	  structures	  and	  processes	  of	  public	  sector	  organizations	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  
getting	  them	  (in	  some	  sense)	   to	  run	  better”	   (2005:	  8).More	  specifically,	  proponents	  of	   the	  
‘New	   Public	   Management’	   (hereafter,	   NPM)	   approach	   to	   reform	   have	   advocated	   the	  
adoption	  of	  private	  sector	  management	  techniques	  by	  public	  sector	  organizations	   in	  order	  
to	   improve	   operational	   efficiency	   and	   organizational	   effectiveness.	   In	   broad	   terms,	  
proponents	  of	  NPM	  advocate	  the	  use	  of	  private	  sector	  management	  techniques	  as	  a	  way	  to	  
change	  the	  bureaucratic	  culture	  of	  public	  sector	  organizations	  by	  stimulating	  public	  servants	  
to	  think	  and	  act	  more	  like	  their	  peers	  working	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  Although	  the	  details	  of	  
specific	  policies	  may	  differ	  between	  countries,	  some	  general	  characteristics	  of	  NPM	  can	  be	  
identified	  (Hood,	  1991;	  Kaboolian,	  1998).	  	  
	  
Firstly,	  there	  can	  be	  observed	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  away	  from	  traditional	  ‘public	  administration’,	  
which	  emphasizes	  inputs	  and	  bureaucratic	  processes,	  toward	  an	  output	  and	  outcome	  based	  
management	  approach	  (Dunleavy	  &	  Hood,	  1994;	  Mathiasen,	  1999:	  102;	  Pollitt,	  2001:	  474).	  
Parallel	  to	  this	  process,	  NPM	  advocates	  for	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  users	  of	  public	  services	  as	  
customers	  and	  calls	   for	  a	  greater	  responsiveness	  to	  their	  needs	  (Bovaird	  &	  Loeffler,	  2009).	  
Secondly,	   a	   performance-­‐oriented	   approach	   to	   public	  management	   (as	   opposed	   to	   public	  
administration)	  is	  preferred	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  clearer	  link	  between	  resources	  and	  results	  
(Holmes	   &	   Shand,	   1995:	   560).	   Complementary	   to	   this	   approach	   is	   the	   increasing	   use	   of	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performance	   indicators,	   coupled	   with	   performance-­‐based	   incentive	   schemes,	   to	   motivate	  
public	  managers	   (Bovaird	  &	  Loeffler,	  2009).	  Thirdly,	   there	  has	  been	  an	  effort	   to	   transform	  
organizational	  structures	  from	  large,	  hierarchical	  bureaucracies	  toward	  leaner,	  flatter	  forms	  
(Pollitt,	   2001;	   Pollitt	  &	  Bouckaert,	   2005).	   This	   is	   in	   line	  with	   a	   general	   trend	   toward	  more	  
flexible	   and	   devolved	   financial	   and	   personnel	   management,	   characterized	   by	   “greater	  
decentralization	  of	  authority	  and	  responsibility	  from	  central	  to	  lower	  levels	  of	  government”	  
(Bovaird	   &	   Loeffler,	   2009:	   19).	   In	   addition,	   an	   attempt	   has	   been	   made	   to	   mimic	   market	  
forces	   within	   and	   between	   public	   organizations	   (Pettersen,	   1999).	   Fourthly,	   more	   use	   is	  
being	  made	  of	  contracting	  with	  private	  sector	  firms,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  initiation	  of	  public-­‐private	  
partnerships	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   services.	   Finally,	   some	   government	   services	   have	  
been	  fully	  privatized.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   context	   of	   German	   higher	   education,	   the	   NPM	  movement	   began	   in	   earnest	   in	   the	  
mid-­‐1990s	  (Huefner,	  2003;	  Kuepper,	  2003;	  Schimank,	  2005).	  According	  to	  Schimank,	  “at	  the	  
core	   of	   NPM	   lies	   the	   principle	   of	   increased	   competition	   among	   and	   within	   universities	   –	  
competition	   for	   resources,	   students	   and	  national	   as	  well	   as	   international	   standing”	   (2005:	  
365).	   In	   order	   to	   stimulate	   competition,	   reformers	   have	   attempted	   to	   introduce	   market	  
mechanisms	   (such	   as	   tuition	   fees	   and	   a	   new	   salary	   structure	   for	   professors),	   external	  
monitoring	  and	  control	  based	  on	  output-­‐oriented	  indicators,	  such	  as	  quality	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  
new	   accreditation	   bodies)	   and	   the	   number	   of	   graduates	   from	   a	   given	   institution,	   and	   the	  
allocation	   of	   public	   finance	   based	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   institutional	   performance	   indicators	  
(Huefner,	   2003).	   While	   decision	   making	   remains	   largely	   centralized	   at	   the	   level	   of	   state	  
government13,	  greater	  formal	  authority	  is	  slowly	  being	  devolved	  to	  the	  university-­‐level	  and,	  
specifically,	  delegated	  to	  university	  presidents	  and	  faculty	  deans.	  	  
	  
This	  movement	   toward	  decentralization	   should,	   however,	   not	   be	  mistaken	   for	   progress	   in	  
the	   reform	  process.	   In	   the	  past,	   and	   informed	  by	   the	  Humboldtian	   tradition	  of	   “academic	  
freedom”,	   decision	  making	   authority	  was	   even	   further	   devolved	   and	   decentralized	   to	   the	  
level	   of	   the	   individual	   professors	   (Huefner,	   2003;	   Schimank,	   2005).	   The	   process	   of	   ‘re-­‐
decentralization’	   has,	   ironically	   perhaps,	   faced	   the	   greatest	   opposition	   from	   academics.	  
Specifically,	   the	   lack	   of	   institutional	   legitimacy	   of	   market-­‐oriented	   reforms	   within	   the	  
academic	  community,	  coupled	  with	  the	  job	  security	  enjoyed	  by	  professors14,	  both	  imply	  that	  
the	  process	   of	   reform	  has	   been	   slow	  and	   very	   few	   significant	   changes	   have	   actually	   been	  
achieved	   thus	   far.	   Thus,	   the	   coupling	   of	   a	  market-­‐orientation	  with	   the	   decentralization	   of	  
power,	  both	  to	  and	  within	  the	  university,	  has	  impeded	  the	  progress	  of	  reform.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   legal	  and	  regulatory	  authority	  over	  higher	  education	  policy	  and	   finance	   in	  
Germany	   lies	  with	   individual	  states	  and	  not	  with	  the	  federal	  government.	  Therefore,	  a	  considerable	  
variation	   in	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   reforms	   implemented	   can	   be	   observed	   between	   states,	   despite	   a	  
historically	   high	   degree	   of	   policy	   coordination	   among	   states	   via	   bodies	   such	   as	   the	   Standing	  
Conference	  of	  Ministers	  of	  Higher	  Education	  (KMK)	  and	  the	  Rectors’	  Conference	  (HRK).	  
14	  In	  Germany,	   professors	   are	   not	   only	   protected	  by	   tenure	  but	   also	   enjoy	   civil	   servant	   status.	   This	  
implies	   that,	   short	  of	   committing	  a	   serious	   criminal	  offence,	   they	   cannot	  be	   fired	   (Schimank,	  2005:	  
373).	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While	  it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  the	  NPM	  movement	  began	  in	  most	  industrialized	  countries	  
in	   the	  early	  1980s,	  one	  might	  wonder	  why	   it	  was	   introduced	  relatively	   late	   in	   the	  German	  
higher	   education	   sector.	   Perhaps	   the	   German	   academic	   community	   was	   shielded	   from	  
reform	  pressures	  longer	  than	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  thanks	  to	  the	  high	  social	  status	  
accorded	  to	  academics	  and	  the	  public	  trust	  they	  historically	  enjoyed.	  However,	  as	  discussed	  
below,	  the	  tremendous	  growth	  in	  student	  numbers	  during	  the	  postwar	  period,	  coupled	  with	  
state	   budgetary	   constraints,	   meant	   that	   the	   academic	   community	   eventually	   found	   itself	  
under	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  public	  sector	  reformers.	  
	  
Initially,	  high	  growth	  in	  student	  enrollment	  in	  higher	  education	  was	  matched	  by	  an	  increase	  
in	   the	   number	   of	   academic	   staff.	   For	   example,	   when	   the	   number	   of	   students	  more	   than	  
doubled	  between	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  and	  mid-­‐1970s,	  state	  governments	  expanded	  institutional	  
funding,	  enabling	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  professorships	  and	  scientific	  staff	  that	  kept	  
pace	  with	   the	   increase	   in	   student	   numbers.	  When	   the	   number	   of	   students	   again	   doubled	  
between	  1970	  and	  1990,	  limited	  financial	  and	  other	  resources	  provided	  by	  the	  states	  meant	  
that	   the	   100	   percent	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   students	  was	   accompanied	   by	   a	  mere	   16	  
percent	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   academic	   staff	   (Huefner,	   2003:	   147).	   According	   to	  
Schimank	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  high	  growth	  was	  associated	  with	  a	  general	  decline	  in	  the	  quality	  
of	   the	  academic	   staff,	   since	   the	  sudden	   increase	   in	  demand	   for	  highly	  qualified	  professors	  
was	  not	  matched	  by	  a	  corresponding	  increase	  in	  supply	  (2005:	  371)15.	  The	  second	  phase	  of	  
high	  growth	  was	  associated	  with	  an	  overall	  decline	   in	  the	  quality	  of	  teaching	  and	  scientific	  
performance,	  which	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  dramatically	   increased	  workload.	  The	  ratio	  of	  
students	  to	  academic	  staff	  increased	  from	  13:1	  to	  24:1,	  with	  some	  mandatory	  lectures	  being	  
visited	   by	   as	   many	   as	   1,000	   students	   at	   any	   given	   time	   (Huefner,	   2003;	   Kuepper,	   2003).	  
While	   some	  might	   have	   viewed	   this	   as	   economically	   efficient,	   it	   was	   generally	   concluded	  
that	  the	  large-­‐scale	  lecture	  format	  and	  the	  relative	  quality	  of	  teaching	  were	  not	  suitable	  to	  
ensure	   high-­‐level,	   internationally	   competitive	   educational	   outcomes	   (Kuepper,	   2003:	   78).	  
Furthermore,	  insufficient	  public	  funds	  resulted	  in	  a	  deterioration	  of	  university	  buildings	  and	  
equipment,	  which	  has	  contributed	  to	  a	   further	   lag	   in	   international	  competitiveness.	  Lastly,	  
the	  Bologna	  process,	  which	  aims	  to	  harmonize	  higher	  education	  within	  Europe,	  has	  created	  
external	  pressure	  on	  German	  universities	  to	  make	  reforms.	  	  For	  example,	  degree	  programs	  
have	  had	  to	  be	  revised	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  comparable	  with	  degrees	  awarded	  by	  foreign	  
universities	   (i.e.,	   a	   transformation	   of	   the	   single	   German	   Diplom	   degree	   into	   separate	  
Bachelor	   and	  Master	   degrees),	   as	  well	   as	   shortening	   the	   time	   it	   takes	   to	   earn	   a	   degree	   –	  
from	   seven	   years	   to	   earn	   a	  Diplom	   to	   three	   years	   for	   a	   Bachelor	   degree	   (Huefner,	   2003:	  
145).	  There	  is	  also	  further	  pressure	  to	  establish	  independent	  accreditation	  bodies,	  with	  the	  
goal	  of	  promoting	  quality	  and	  transparency	  within	  and	  across	  institutions	  offering	  the	  same	  
or	  similar	  degrees.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Recruitment	  of	  professors	  was	  largely	  limited	  to	  the	  domestic	  labor	  market.	  Today,	  recruitment	  of	  
foreign	  staff	  is	  more	  common	  in	  German	  higher	  education.	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In	   an	   effort	   to	   expedite	   the	   reform	   process,	   certain	   features	   of	   the	   corporate	   model	   of	  
organizational	  governance	  are	  being	   introduced	  to	   the	  German	  university	  system,	  which	   is	  
viewed	   as	   consistent	   with	   the	   NPM	   reform	   movement.	   A	   brief	   review	   of	   the	   literature	  
follows,	   which	   assesses	   the	   relative	   strengths	   and	  weaknesses	   of	   the	   corporate	  model	   of	  
governance	   in	   general	   terms,	   and,	  more	   specifically,	   evaluates	   the	  appropriateness	  of	   this	  
model	  for	  use	  in	  the	  context	  of	  public	  university	  reform	  in	  Germany.	  	  
	  
3.3 Making	  Sense	  of	  Organizational	  Governance:	  The	  Agency	  Approach	  
3.3.1 Agency	  Theory	  and	  the	  Modern	  Corporation	  
	  
While	  agency	  theory	  is	  applicable	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  contexts	  (Harris	  &	  Raviv,	  1978),	  it	  has	  made	  
important	  contributions	  to	  the	  field	  of	  organization	  studies.	  In	  particular,	  agency	  theory	  has	  
been	  applied	  to	  the	  problems	  inherent	  in	  the	  separation	  of	  ownership	  and	  control	  of	  large,	  
publicly	  traded	  firms	  that	  are	  characterized	  by	  diffuse	  and	  widely	  dispersed	  ownership	  (Berle	  
&	  Means,	   1932;	   Eisenhardt,	   1989;	   Fama,	   1980;	   Fama	  &	   Jensen,	   1983;	   Jensen	  &	  Meckling,	  
1976;	   Schleifer	  &	  Vishny,	  1997).	  An	  agency	   relationship	  arises	  when	  one	  party	   (the	  agent)	  
enters	  into	  an	  agreement	  with	  another	  party	  (the	  principal)	  to	  act	  on	  the	  principal’s	  behalf.	  
Agency	   problems	   in	   organizations	   may	   arise	   when	   agents	   are	   assigned	   decision-­‐making	  
rights	   on	   behalf	   of	   principals	   but	   neither	   bear	   the	   residual	   risks	   nor	   enjoy	   the	   residual	  
benefits	  of	  their	  decisions	  (Fama	  &	  Jensen,	  1983:	  304).	  According	  Eisenhardt,	  agency	  theory	  
is	  concerned	  with	  resolving	  the	  agency	  problems	  that	  arise	  when	  „the	  desires	  or	  goals	  of	  the	  
principal	  and	  agent	  conflict“	  and	  when	  „it	  is	  difficult	  or	  expensive	  for	  the	  principal	  to	  verify	  
what	  the	  agent	  is	  actually	  doing“	  (1989:	  58).	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  firm,	  managers	  (agents)	  are	  employed	  to	  operate	  the	  firm	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  
shareholders	   (principals).	   The	   separation	   of	   decision	  management	   and	   decision	   control	   is	  
assumed	   to	   aggravate	   conflicts	   of	   interest	   between	   agents	   and	   the	   principals.	   In	   an	  
influential	   article,	   Jensen	   and	   Meckling	   state	   that,	   “since	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  
stockholders	  and	  manager	  of	  a	  corporation	  fit	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  pure	  agency	  relationship	  it	  
should	   be	   no	   surprise	   to	   discover	   that	   the	   issues	   associated	   with	   the	   ‘separation	   of	  
ownership	   and	   control’	   in	   the	   modern	   diffuse	   ownership	   corporation	   are	   intimately	  
associated	   with	   the	   general	   problem	   of	   agency”	   (1976:	   309).	   Agency	   problems,	   in	   this	  
context,	   may	   manifest	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   ways	   but	   generally	   result	   from	   information	  
asymmetries	  that	  can	  be	  exploited	  by	  management.	  16	  For	  example,	  managers	  may	  seek	  to	  
increase	   their	   own	   power,	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   “empire	   building”,	   by	   expanding	   the	   scale	  
and	  scope	  of	  the	  firm	  in	  an	  inefficient	  way	  that	  is	  detrimental	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  owners	  
(Hart	   &	  Moore,	   1995;	  Moerland,	   1995;	   Schleifer	   &	   Vishny,	   1989,	   1997).	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	  
managers	  may	   be	   reluctant	   to	   distribute	   excess	   cash	   to	   owners	   in	   the	   form	   of	   dividends,	  
preferring	   to	  either	   spend	   the	  cash	  on	  expanding	   the	   firm	  or	   simply	  enjoying	  control	  over	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Expressed	   in	  formal	  terms,	  the	  two	  most-­‐studied	  agency	  problems	  are	  those	  of	  moral	  hazard	  and	  
adverse	  selection.	  A	  detailed	  discussion	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Eisenhardt	  (1989:	  61).	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the	  excess	  liquidity	  (Jensen,	  1986;	  Schleifer	  &	  Vishny,	  1989,	  1997).17	  Indeed,	  Kochhar	  (1996)	  
views	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  conflict	  between	  owners	  and	  management	  as	  one	  over	  control	  of	  free	  
cash	   flow,	   as	   was	   first	   proposed	   by	   Jensen	   (1986).18	  	   Principals	   enter	   into	   contracts	   with	  
agents	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  minimizing	  the	  agency	  costs	  associated	  with	  these	  potential	  conflicts	  
of	  interests.	  Agency	  costs	  include	  “the	  costs	  of	  structuring,	  monitoring	  and	  bonding	  a	  set	  of	  
contracts	   among	   agents	   with	   conflicting	   interests”	   as	   well	   as	   “the	   value	   of	   output	   lost	  
because	  the	  costs	  of	  full	  enforcement	  of	  contracts	  exceed	  the	  benefits”	  (Jensen	  &	  Meckling,	  
1979;	  Fama	  &	  Jensen,	  1983:	  304).	  Principals	  seek	  to	  monitor	  and	  control	  either	  an	  agents’	  
actual	  behavior	  or	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  behavior	  by	  employing	  different	  types	  of	  governance	  
mechanisms	   (Eisenhardt,	   1989).	   Consequently,	   the	   link	   between	   equity	   finance	   and	   firm	  
strategy	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  agency	  problem	  between	  shareholders	  and	  managers,	  which	  
can	  be	  resolved	  by	  the	  use	  of	  appropriate	  governance	  structures	  and	  instruments.	  
3.3.2 Agency	  Theory	  and	  Public	  Governance	  
	  
The	  design	  of	  governance	  structures	  and	  instruments	  in	  the	  corporate	  model	  of	  governance	  
is	   premised	  on	   the	   identification	  of	   a	   clear	   agency	   relationship	  between	   shareholders	   and	  
managers.	   The	   application	   of	   agency	   theory	   to	   the	   public	   sector	   context	   is	   less	  
straightforward	  than	  in	  the	  corporate	  context	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  Firstly,	   it	   is	  difficult	  
to	   define	   a	   clear	   and	   uncontestable	   principal-­‐agent	   relationship.	   Secondly,	   and	   relatedly,	  
responsibilities	   for	   decision	   management	   and	   decision	   control	   are	   often	   spread	   diffusely	  
over	  multiple	  political	  and	  administrative	  hierarchies.	  This	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
decision	  making	  on	  any	  given	  policy	  issue	  is	  often	  spread	  over	  different	  branches	  and	  levels	  
of	  government,	  while	  execution	  of	  policy	  may	  spread	  over	  one	  or	  more	  public	  agencies	  and	  
organizations.	  As	  argued	  by	  Moe,	  governance	  of	  public	  sector	  agencies	  and	  organizations	  is	  
characterized	  as	  having	  a	  two-­‐tiered	  structure,	  where	  “one	  tier	   is	   the	   internal	  hierarchy	  of	  
the	  agency,	  the	  other	   is	  the	  political	  control	  structure	   linking	   it	  to	  politicians	  and	  [interest]	  
groups”	   (1995:	   122).	   This	   is	   further	   complicated	   by	   the	   potential	   multiplicity	   of	   possible	  
principals	  and	  agents.	  Consider	  that	  a	  given	  politician	  may	  represent	  multiple	  constituencies	  
who	  are	  characterized	  as	  having	  competing	  interests.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  politician	  as	  agent	  
would	  ultimately	  have	  to	  favor	  the	  interests	  of	  one	  group	  of	  constituents	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
others,	   implying	   a	   subjective	   prioritization	   of	   the	   interests	   of	   her	   various	   constituencies.	  
However,	  even	  if	  a	  given	  politician	  has	  a	  constituency	  with	  fully	  homogeneous	  interests,	  she	  
must	  share	  decision	  making	  with	  other	  politician-­‐agents,	  whose	  constituents’	  interests	  may	  
compete	  with	   those	  of	  hers.	  Thus,	   the	  problem	  of	  multiple	  agents	  with	  multiple	  groups	  of	  
principals	  who	  have	  heterogeneous	  and	  competing	  interests	  may	  arise.	  	  This	  “multiprincipal”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 	  The	   tendency	   to	   invest	   in	   manager-­‐specific	   assets	   to	   shield	   the	   incumbent	   manager	   from	  
replacement	  by	  a	  successor	  is	  dealt	  with	  specifically	  by	  Schleifer	  and	  Vishny	  (1989).	  
18	  The	   implication	   here	   is	   that	   equity	   investors	   have	   a	   greater	   interest	   in	   the	   cash	   benefits	   of	  
ownership	  that	  accrue	  to	  them	  in	  the	  form	  of	  cash	  dividend	  payments,	  whereas	  creditors	  are	  more	  
concerned	  with	  the	   liquidation	  value	  of	  non-­‐current	  assets,	  which	  serve	  as	  collateral	  to	  secure	  debt	  
obligations	  (Williamson,	  1988:	  586).	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or	  “common	  agency”	  problem	  in	  particular	  distinguishes	  the	  public	  from	  the	  private	  sector,	  
in	  which	  it	  is	  “the	  rule	  rather	  than	  the	  exception”	  (Dixit,	  2002:	  709).	  
3.3.3 From	  the	  Boardroom	  to	  the	  Ivory	  Tower:	  A	  Seamless	  Transfer?	  	  
3.3.3.1 The	  Board	  of	  Directors	  
	  
Eisenhardt	   (1989)	  describes	  governance	  mechanisms	  aimed	  at	  mitigating	  agency	  problems	  
as	   being	   either	   behavior-­‐oriented	   or	   outcome-­‐oriented	   in	   their	   design.	   Behavior-­‐oriented	  
governance	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	  hierarchical	  control	  within	  an	  organization,	  may	  be	  utilized	  
when	  the	  behavior	  of	  agents	  may	  be	  easily	  observed,	  monitored	  and	  controlled.	  Given	  the	  
separation	   of	   ownership	   and	   control,	   this	   function	   is	   delegated	   to	  members	   of	   the	   firm’s	  
board	   of	   directors	   (hereafter	   referred	   to	   as	   “the	   board”),	   who	   are	   elected	   by	   the	  
shareholder-­‐principals.19	  The	  function	  of	   the	  board	  therefore	   is	   to	  monitor	  and	  control	   top	  
management	  on	  behalf	  of	   shareholders,	   thereby	  ensuring	   that	  manager-­‐agents	   fulfill	   their	  
fiduciary	  obligation	  to	  their	  shareholder-­‐principals	  (Finkelstein	  &	  D’Aveni,	  1994).	  The	  board	  
pursues	   its	  monitoring	  and	   control	  mandate	   through	   structural	   arrangements,	   such	  as	   the	  
design	  of	  executive	  compensation	  plans,	  and	  through	  procedural	  arrangements,	  such	  as	  the	  
hiring	  and	  firing	  of	  top	  executives	  (Walsh	  &	  Seward,	  1990:	  427).	  
	  
A	   clear	   trend	   toward	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   corporate	  model	   of	   university	   governance	   can	   be	  
observed	   in	   Germany.	   Firstly,	   executive	   power	   is	   increasingly	   being	   transferred	   from	   the	  
state	  to	  the	  presidents	  of	  individual	  universities,	  thereby	  granting	  them	  managerial	  authority	  
comparable	  to	  that	  of	  the	  CEO	  and	  CFO,	  respectively,	  of	  a	  firm.	  Secondly,	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  
dual	   board	   structure	   is	   being	   tested	   in	   some	   German	   universities.	   Comparable	   to	   the	  
executive	   board	   of	   a	   corporation	   is	   an	   academic	   senate,	   comprised	   by	   members	   of	   the	  
academic	   staff	   and,	   comparable	   to	   a	   supervisory	   board,	   is	   a	   board	   (the	   Hochschulrat)	  
composed	   of	   outside	   directors	   including	   state	   politicians,	   business	   executives,	   and	   trade	  
union	   representatives	   (Huefner,	   2003).	   Lastly,	   and	   despite	   the	   general	   trend	   toward	   the	  
corporate	  model	  as	  described	  above,	  the	  reforms	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  thus	  far	  at	  German	  
universities	   implicitly	   treat	   the	  professors	  as	  agents	  and	  places	   top	  university	  managers	   in	  
the	   role	   of	   principals,	   which	   is	   not	   entirely	   consistent	   with	   the	   corporate	   model	   of	  
governance.	  
	  
Several	   factors	   have	   been	   found	   to	   hinder	   the	   optimal	   functioning	   of	   the	   board	   as	   a	  
governance	  structure	   in	   the	  corporate	  context.	  Firstly,	   there	   is	   the	  simple	   fact	   that	  boards	  
convene	  infrequently.	  This	  preempts	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  board	  to	  effectively	  and	  consistently	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Firms	  may	   have	   a	   unitary	   board	   structure,	   with	   a	  membership	   comprised	   of	   executive	   directors	  
(including	  members	  of	   the	  firm’s	  top	  management)	  and	  non-­‐executive	  members,	  who	  are	  recruited	  
from	  outside	  the	  firm	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  independence,	  or	  a	  dual	  board	  structure,	  with	  an	  executive	  
board	   composed	   exclusively	   of	   members	   of	   top	   management	   and	   a	   separate	   supervisory	   board,	  
whose	  members	  are	  typically	  elected	  by	  shareholders	  and	  employees.	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monitor	  the	  behavior	  of	  managers	  on	  an	  ongoing	  basis.	  Secondly,	  many	  non-­‐executive	  board	  
members	   may	   lack	   the	   specific	   industry	   and/or	   market	   (product,	   geographic)	   knowledge	  
necessary	  to	  objectively	  and	  critically	  evaluate	  the	  decisions	  –	  especially	  strategic	  decisions	  –	  
of	  top	  management.	  This	  problem	  is	  likely	  to	  increases	  as	  the	  size	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  firm	  
increases;	  highly	  diversified	  firms	  and	  firms	  that	  are	  active	  in	  many	  geographic	  markets	  are	  
especially	  vulnerable.	  Thirdly,	  it	  is	  often	  the	  case	  that	  one	  individual	  is	  a	  member	  of	  several	  
boards.	   While	   she	   may	   be	   an	   expert,	   and	   therefore	   not	   suffer	   from	   the	   deficiencies	  
described	  above	  in	  the	  second	  point,	  she	  may	  nevertheless	  struggle	  to	  manage	  the	  amount	  
of	   information	   required	   to	   effectively	  monitor	   and	   control	   the	  management	   of	   numerous	  
firms.	  Fourthly,	  it	  is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  the	  CEO	  to	  also	  hold	  the	  position	  of	  chairman	  of	  the	  
board.	  This	  dual	  role	  of	  the	  CEO,	  coupled	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  top	  executives	  on	  the	  
board,	   diminishes	   the	  overall	   independence	   and	  objectivity	   of	   the	  board.	   This	   can	   lead	   to	  
“board	   capture”,	  whereby	   executives	   exploit	   their	   proximity	   to	   and	  personal	   relationships	  
with	   non-­‐executive	   board	  members.20	  This	  may	   include	   influencing	   important	   decisions	   to	  
their	   own	   advantage,	   concerning,	   for	   example,	   firm	   strategy	   and	   their	   own	   compensation	  
package	   (Bebchuk	   &	   Fried,	   2003;	   Hall,	   2003;	   Holmstrom	  &	   Kaplan,	   2003;	   Thomas,	   2004).	  
Relatedly,	   executives	   can	   exploit	   information	   asymmetries	   arising	   from	   their	   own	   insider	  
knowledge	   and	   expertise	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   less	   knowledgeable	   non-­‐executive	   board	   members.	  
Finally,	   the	   monitoring	   and	   controlling	   of	   management	   by	   widely	   dispersed	   individual	  
shareholders	  is	  costly	  and	  prone	  to	  a	  collective	  action	  problem	  (Easterbrook,	  1984;	  Soskice,	  
1997)	   and	   is	   further	   exacerbated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   no	   single	   shareholder	   has	   a	   sufficiently	  
large	   share	   of	   voting	   rights	   to	   directly	   elect	   a	   member	   to	   the	   board,	   since	   individual	  
shareholders	   generally	   own	   a	   relatively	   small	   proportion	  of	   the	   total	   number	   of	   shares	   of	  
common	   stock	   issued	   and	   outstanding. 21 	  In	   addition	   to,	   and	   largely	   because	   of	   these	  
weaknesses,	   the	  board,	   as	   a	   governance	   structure,	   entails	   high	   agency	   costs.	   In	   summary,	  
the	  costs	  of	  having	  a	  board	  of	  directors	  are	  quite	  high	  but	  the	  related	  benefits	  may	  be	  quite	  
low,	  which,	  taken	  together,	  may	  yield	  a	  net	  negative	  benefit	  to	  individual	  shareholders.	  
	  
To	   the	   extent	   that	   a	   university	   possesses	   these	   ‘high	   risk’	   organizational	   characteristics,	   it	  
can	   be	   expected	   to	   suffer	   from	   the	   same	   governance	   weaknesses	   with	   which	   they	   are	  
associated	   in	   the	   corporate	   context.	   For	   example,	   a	   unique	   aspect	   of	   German	   university	  
governance	   that	  makes	   it	   especially	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   ‘board	   capture’	   problem	   is	   the	   fact	  
that	  presidents	  are	  generally	  professors	  who	  have	  been	  elected	  by	  their	  fellow	  professors	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The	   board	   capture	   hypothesis	   is	   based	   on	   the	   observation	   that	   board	  members	   are	   “frequently	  
nominated	   …	   by	   the	   company’s	   executives	   and	   receive	   large	   fees	   and	   benefits	   (in	   amounts	  
determined	  largely	  by	  those	  same	  executives)	  for	  their	  services”	  (Thomas,	  2004:	  1189-­‐1190).	  
21 	  As	   Soskice	   argues,	   the	   coordination	   of	   monitoring	   and	   controlling	   of	   management	   (and,	   in	  
particular,	   gaining	   access	   to	   inside	   information	   to	  which	  management	   is	   usually	   only	   privy)	   among	  
widely	   dispersed	   owners	   is	   costly	   and	   is	   subject	   to	   the	   collective	   action	   problem.	   That	   is,	   “if	   any	  
shareholder	   carries	  out	   satisfactory	  monitoring	  and	  credibly	   reveals	   it	  publicly,	   it	  will	  pay	   the	  other	  
shareholders	  to	  free-­‐ride”	  (1997:	  85).	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serve	  a	  managerial	  and	  supervisory	  role	  similar	  to	  the	  dual	  role	  assumed	  by	  a	  CEO	  when	  she	  
is	   also	  elected	  as	   chairman	  of	   the	  board	  of	   directors.	   This	  may	  prove	  problematic,	   from	  a	  
governance	   perspective,	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons.	   As	   a	   former	   professor	   who	   is	   likely	   to	  
return	   to	   her	   academic	   position	   once	   her	   term	   as	   president	   is	   over,	   a	   president	   is	   much	  
more	  likely	  to	  sympathize	  with	  her	  former	  colleagues	  (i.e.,	  the	  other	  professors),	  whom	  she	  
is	  meant	  to	  manage	  and	  monitor,	  than	  she	  is	  to	  sympathize	  with	  the	  broader	  public	  (i.e.,	  the	  
principals),	   whose	   interests	   she	   is	   meant	   to	   represent.	   Furthermore,	   a	   president	   may	   be	  
reluctant	   to	   support	   a	   reform	   agenda	   that	   is	   unpopular	   with	   professors,	   fearing	   social	  
rejection	  and	   reprisal	   from	  her	  colleagues	  when	  she	   returns	   to	  her	  academic	  post.	  Finally,	  
she	  may	  be	  further	  biased	  in	  her	  willingness	  to	  enact	  meaningful	  reforms	  that	  are	  unpopular	  
with	   professors	   since	   she,	   too,	   will	   have	   to	   comply	   with	   them	   when	   she	   returns	   to	   her	  
academic	   post.	   Consequently,	   the	   introduction	   of	   board-­‐like	   governance	   structures	   in	  
German	   public	   universities	   are	   not	   only	   likely	   to	   suffer	   from	   the	   same	   problems	   that	  
undermine	   the	   proper	   function	   of	   corporate	   boards,	   but	   are	   also	   likely	   to	   suffer	   from	   a	  
further	  set	  of	  weaknesses	  unique	  to	  the	  university	  context.	  
3.3.3.2 The	  Use	  of	  Performance	  Indicators	  
	  
When	   behavior-­‐oriented	   approaches	   to	   governance,	   such	   as	   reliance	   on	   the	   board,	   prove	  
insufficient,	   principals	   must	   rely	   on	   outcome-­‐oriented	   forms	   of	   governance.	   Rather	   than	  
directly	   monitoring	   the	   behavior	   of	   agents,	   outcome-­‐oriented	   governance	   mechanisms	  
monitor	  and	  control	  the	  results	  of	  agent	  behavior.	  The	  formulation	  of	  measures	  with	  which	  
to	   evaluate	   results	   are	   the	   driving	   force	   behind	   the	   use	   of	   performance	   indicators,	  
performance-­‐based	   incentive	   schemes	   and	   the	   information	   requirements	   necessary	   to	  
support	   the	  use	  of	  outcome-­‐oriented	  governance.	  Thus,	   stakeholders	   (primarily	  owners	  or	  
potential	  owners)	  evaluate	  management	  performance	  using	  indicators	  that	  reflect	  their	  own	  
interests	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  firm.	  
	  
The	  use	  of	  performance	  indicators	  as	  a	  means	  of	  governance	  by	  stakeholders	  external	  to	  the	  
firm	   is	   complemented	   by	   the	   use	   of	   responsibility	   accounting	   within	   the	   firm	   and	   the	  
obligation	  to	  publish	  financial	  and	  other	   information	  about	  the	  firm	  at	  regular	   intervals	  for	  
external	   stakeholders.	   In	   the	   corporate	   context,	   management	   accounting	   techniques	   are	  
utilized	   that	   link	   internal	   performance	   measures	   with	   external	   financial	   reporting	  
requirements.	   This	   approach	   offers	   several	   advantages.	   Firstly,	   it	   enables	   the	   use	   of	  
responsibility	  accounting	  within	  the	  firm,	  a	  technique	  that	  holds	  a	  manager	  accountable	  only	  
for	  those	  costs	  and	  revenues	  over	  which	  she	  has	  direct	  influence.	  Secondly,	  it	  complements	  
the	   use	   of	   performance-­‐based	   pay	   and	   similar	   incentive	   schemes.	   Thirdly,	   it	   provides	   a	  
degree	   of	   transparency	   and	   objectivity	   that	   allows	   shareholders	   to	   evaluate	   firm	  
performance	  and,	  therefore,	  management’s	  achievement	  of	  operational	  and	  strategic	  goals.	  
Similarly,	  it	  allows	  for	  firm	  performance	  to	  be	  benchmarked	  against	  that	  of	  key	  competitors	  
and	   industry	   leaders.	   Most	   importantly,	   performance	   indicators	   reflect	   market-­‐based	  
outcomes	   that	   represent	   an	   aggregation	   of	   the	   sentiments	   of	   investors	   and	   consumers	  
about	  firm	  strategy	  and	  managerial	  performance.	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In	  contrast,	  public	  organizations	  are	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  issues	  such	  as	  equal	  access	  to	  
and	  the	  affordability	  of	  services	  offered,	  rather	  than	  organizational	  profitability,	  liquidity	  and	  
solvency.	   This	  has	   traditionally	  been	   the	   case	   concerning	  access	   to	  university	  education	   in	  
Germany.	  Unfortunately,	  such	  goals	  are	  often	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  and	  objectively	  measure.	  
This	   problem	   of	   goal	   ambiguity	   distinguishes	   the	   public	   sector	   from	   the	   private	   sector	  
(Boyne,	  2002;	  Chen,	  2012;	  Fottler,	  1981;	  Rainey	  &	  Bozeman,	  2000).22	  
	  
It	  is	  widely	  accepted	  in	  the	  public	  management	  literature	  that	  public	  sector	  managers	  must	  
grapple	  with	  “vague,	  hard-­‐to-­‐measure,	  multiple,	  and	  conflicting	  goals”	  (Rainey	  &	  Bozeman,	  
2000:	   452)	   that	   are	   “derived	   from	   the	   value-­‐laden	   nature	   of	   public	   service”	   (Chen,	   2012:	  
440).	   Consequently,	   there	   is	   no	   standardized	   or	   otherwise	   ‘common’	   toolbox	   of	  
performance	  management	   indicators	   used	   in	   the	   public	   sector	   that	   is	   comparable	   to	   the	  
corporate	   sector.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   public	   sector	   performance	   goals	   can	   be	   objectively	  
quantified	   and	   measured	   (i.e.,	   improving	   operational	   efficiency	   by	   lowering	   costs),	   the	  
setting	  of	  performance	  goals	  is	  often	  arbitrary,	  since	  there	  are	  often	  no	  comparable	  market	  
data	  against	  which	  performance	  can	  be	  benchmarked.	  Earlier	  work	  in	  the	  comparative	  study	  
of	   public	   and	   private	   management	   practices	   has	   attributed	   the	   traditional	   orientation	  
toward	   input	  planning	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  measuring	  outputs	  of	  public	  sector	  organizations	  
(see	  Fottler,	  1981,	  for	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature).	  	  
	  
In	   line	  with	   the	   general	   NPM	  movement,	   public	   finance	   of	   German	   universities	   is	   shifting	  
away	   from	   an	   input-­‐oriented	   system	   of	   budgeting	   toward	   an	   output	   and	   performance-­‐
oriented	   system	  of	   funding	   allocation.	   As	   discussed	   above,	   closer	   attention	   is	   increasingly	  
being	   paid	   to	   key	   performance	   indicators,	   such	   as	   the	   size	   of	   enrollment,	   the	   number	   of	  
graduates	   at	   each	   level	   of	   education	   (i.e.,	   undergraduate,	   graduate	   and	   doctoral),	   the	  
average	  duration	  of	   studies,	   the	  number	  of	   scientific	   staff,	   and	   the	  ability	   to	  attract	   third-­‐
party	  funding	  for	  research.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  these	  goals,	  and	  their	  relative	  
importance,	  are	  determined	  by	  state-­‐level	  politicians	  and	  education	  ministries	  and	  not	   set	  
by	   the	   individual	  universities.	   	   This	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	  use	  of	  performance	   indicators	   in	  
the	   corporate	   context,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   key	   stakeholders	   (namely,	   owners)	   determine	  
organizational	  goals	   that	  are	  generally	  aligned	  with	   their	  own	   interests.	  To	  the	  extent	   that	  
authority	   is	   shared	   with	   individual	   universities,	   it	   is	   limited	   to	   the	   involvement	   of	   top	  
managers	   (i.e.,	   the	   rector	   and	   chancellor),	   who,	   like	   managers	   of	   highly	   diversified	  
conglomerates,	   may	   lack	   the	   power	   to	   exert	   much	   meaningful	   influence	   on	   overall	  
organizational	  performance.23	  Thus,	  key	  performance	  indicators	  used	  to	  assess	  teaching	  and	  
research	  performance	  are	  generally	  defined	  by	  non-­‐academic	  administrators	  and	  politicians;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 	  For	   example,	   Fottler	   (1981)	   attributes	   this	   to	   “conflicting	   political	   pressures	   from	   various	  
constituencies”	  (5).	  
23	  Since	  the	  majority	  of	  public	  universities	  are	  large	  and	  offer	  a	  numerous	  and	  diverse	  areas	  of	  study	  
(spanning	   the	   humanities,	   the	   social	   sciences,	   physical	   and	   biological	   sciences,	   and	   so	   on),	   a	  
comparison	  can	  be	  made	  with	  a	  highly	  diversified	  conglomerate	  firm.	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in	  other	  words,	  they	  are	  generally	  not	  defined	  by	  academic	  or	  other	  scientific	  staff	  that	  have	  
direct	   experience	  with	   and	   responsibility	   for	   their	   execution	   and	   realization.	   Furthermore,	  
the	   weighting	   assigned	   to	   each	   performance	   criteria	   in	   the	   funding	   allocation	   process	  
reflects	   the	   relative	   importance	   placed	   on	   each	   indicator	   by	   the	   state.	   In	   addition,	  
differences	   may	   be	   observed	   between	   states,	   adding	   further	   complexity	   to	   the	   task	   of	  
making	  comparisons	  between	  universities	  located	  in	  different	  states.	  
3.3.3.3 Performance-­‐based	  Compensation	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   provide	   managers	   with	   an	   adequate	   incentive	   to	   achieve	   the	   desired	  
performance	  goals,	  their	  compensation	  may	  be	  fully	  or	  partially	  linked	  to	  their	  performance.	  
In	   line	  with	   the	   paradigm	   shift	   in	   corporate	   finance	   that	   took	   place	   in	   the	   1980s,	   equity-­‐
based	  performance	  pay	  has	  increasingly	  been	  viewed	  as	  an	  appropriate	  incentive	  with	  which	  
to	  align	   the	   interests	  of	  managers	   and	   shareholders.	  Characteristic	  of	   this	   approach	   is	   the	  
disproportionate	  use	  of	  firm	  stock	  and	  stock	  options,	   in	   lieu	  of	  cash	  salary	  and	  bonuses,	   in	  
executive	   compensation	   packages	   (Hall	   &	   Liebman,	   1998:	   654).	   The	   rationale	   is	   simple:	   if	  
managers	   are	   shareholders,	   then	   they	   will	   think	   and	   act	   like	   shareholders.	   This	   new	  
approach	  to	  the	  design	  of	  performance-­‐based	  pay	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  a	  superior	  means	  with	  
which	   to	  motivate	  managers	   to	  work	   in	   earnest	   toward	   the	  goal	  of	  maximizing	   firm	  value	  
and	  shareholder	  wealth	   (Bushman	  &	  Smith,	  2001;	  Hall,	  2003;	  Heath	  &	  Norman,	  2004).24	  In	  
addition,	   it	  was	   thought	   to	  provide	  a	  clear	  goal	   for	  management	  and,	  at	   the	  same	   time,	  a	  
clear	  metric	  (i.e.,	  share	  price)	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  executive	  performance,	  thus	  ensuring	  a	  
transparent	  and	  consistent	  accountability	  and	  control	  arrangement	  between	  executives,	  the	  
board	  and	  shareholders.	  	  
	  
Although	  equity-­‐based	  pay	  has	  been	  widely	  adopted	  among	  publicly	  traded	  firms	  (Conyon,	  
2006)	  and	  median	  executive	  compensation	  grew	  600%	  between	  1980	  and	  200025	  as	  a	  result,	  
its	   direct	   impact	   on	   firm	   performance	   has	   yielded	  mixed	   results	   (Bebchuk	   &	   Fried,	   2004;	  
Bushman	  &	  Smith,	  2001;	  Hall,	  2003).	  Hall	  (2003)	  outlines	  several	  key	  issues	  in	  the	  structuring	  
of	  equity-­‐based	  compensation	  that	  have	  a	  critical	  impact	  on	  influencing	  managerial	  behavior	  
that	   leads	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   firm	   value.	   For	   example,	   long	   vesting	   periods	   and	   the	   related	  
uncertainty	  about	  the	  size	  of	  any	  eventual	  gain	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  shares	  make	  the	  use	  of	  stock	  
and	   stock	   options	   unattractive	   in	   comparison	  with	   immediate	   cash	   payments	   (e.g.,	   in	   the	  
form	  of	  a	  salary	  and/or	  bonus).	  A	  similar	   logic	  explains	  why	  shareholders	  prefer	  to	  receive	  
dividends	   in	   the	   present	   to	   the	   risky	   prospect	   of	   eventual	   capital	   gains	   or	   losses	  
(Easterbrook,	  1984).	  In	  addition,	  the	  specific	  details	  relating	  to	  the	  design	  of	  an	  equity-­‐based	  
can	   result	   in	   varying	   degrees	   of	   sensitivity	   to	   overall	   market	   fluctuations,	   over	   which	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  In	  prior	  periods,	  performance-­‐based	  pay	  was	  utilized	   in	  executive	  compensation.	  However,	   it	  was	  
typically	  tied	  to	  firm	  profitability	  measures,	  such	  as	  sales	  growth	  and	  earnings	  per	  share,	  rather	  than	  
to	  share	  value	  (Healy,	  1985;	  Holmstrom	  &	  Kaplan,	  2003).	  
25	  Calculations	  are	  based	  on	  data	  from	  S&P	  500	  firms	  (Hall,	  2003:	  4-­‐5).	  
 
	   42	  
executive	   has	   no	   influence	   or	   control.	   Relatedly,	   the	   incentive	   effects	   of	   such	   a	  
compensation	   scheme	   will	   reflect	   the	   perceived	   or	   actual	   ability	   that	   a	   manager	   has	   to	  
influence	   firm	  performance	  with	  her	   functioning	  as	  a	  manager.	  The	   typical	  publicly-­‐traded	  
firm	  is	  so	  large	  and	  complex	  that	  a	  given	  executive’s	  performance	  as	  a	  manager	  may,	  in	  fact,	  
have	  little	  (direct)	  effect	  on	  the	  overall	  performance	  of	  the	  firm;	  thus,	  the	  incentive	  effects	  
associated	  with	  ownership	  and	  participation	  in	  profits	  is	  much	  lower	  here	  than,	  for	  example,	  
in	  a	  partnership	  or	  a	  privately-­‐held	   firm	   (as	  will	  be	  discussed	   in	  greater	  detail	  below).	  The	  
accounting	   complexities	   associated	   with	   stock	   and	   stock	   option	   grants	   may	   further	  
undermine	   their	   incentive	   effects,	   since	   many	   executives	   who	   receive	   them	   -­‐	   and	   most	  
board	  members	  who	  grant	  them	  -­‐	  do	  not	  adequately	  understand	  their	  real	  value.26	  Lastly,	  to	  
the	   extent	   that	   an	   executive’s	   compensation	   will	   depend	   on	   short-­‐term	   performance	  
indicators	  (e.g.,	  the	  firm’s	  share	  price),	  she	  may	  be	  tempted	  to	  manipulate	  accounting	  data	  
to	  ensure	  her	  own	  desired	  compensation	   level	   is	  attained	  (Burgstahler,	  Hail,	  &	  Leuz,	  2005;	  
Leuz,	   Nanda,	   &	   Wysocki,	   2003;	   Moerland,	   1995).	   	   Consequently,	   the	   use	   of	   (potential)	  
ownership	  as	  a	  governance	  mechanism	  that	   is	   intended	  to	  align	   the	  outcome	  of	  executive	  
behavior	  with	  shareholder	  wealth	  has	  generated	  such	  mixed	  results	  that	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  it	  
cannot	  be	  made	  without	  the	  inclusion	  of	  many	  caveats.	  Hall	  (2003),	  for	  example,	  concludes	  
that	  a	  return	  to	  performance-­‐based	  pay	  packages	  that	  make	  greater	  use	  of	  cash	  and	  less	  use	  
of	  stock	  options	  should	  be	  given	  serious	  consideration	  due	  to	  the	  superior	  incentive	  effects	  
of	  the	  former.	  	  
	  
Despite	   the	   complexity	   and	   variety	   of	   design	   associated	   with	   performance-­‐based	  
compensation	  packages	  and	  the	  mixed	  empirical	  results	  concerning	  their	  efficacy,	  they	  have	  
been	  widely	  adopted	  in	  the	  corporate	  sector	  and	  are	  increasingly	  being	  utilized	  in	  the	  public	  
sector.	   Given	   the	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted	   assumption	   that	   performance-­‐based	   pay	   provides	  
superior	   incentives	   in	   comparison	  with	   a	   fixed	   salary,	   the	   introduction	  of	   such	   schemes	   is	  
also	  associated	  with	  the	  NPM	  reform	  movement.	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  corporate	  sector,	  employment	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  has	  traditionally	  been	  
associated	  with	   job	  security,	  career	  advancement	  via	  a	  merit	   system	  and	  salary	  protection	  
based	  on	  a	  system	  of	  collective	  labor	  bargaining	  (Boyne,	  2002;	  Buchanan,	  1974;	  Chen,	  2012;	  
Rainey,	   1982,	   2009;	   Vandenabeele,	   2008).	  While	   an	   elaborate	   system	  of	   rules	   and	   formal	  
procedures	   is	   seen	   as	   decreasing	  managerial	   flexibility	   and	   autonomy	   in	   the	   public	   sector	  
(Chen,	  2012),	  which	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  drawback,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  public	  sector	  managers	  
have	   been	   shielded	   from	   the	   market	   pressures	   and	   individual	   accountability	   for	  
organizational	  performance	  that	  is	  faced	  by	  managers	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  The	  introduction	  
of	   performance-­‐based	  management	   techniques	  was	   intended	   to	   change	   this	   bureaucratic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  The	   design	   of	   executive	   compensation	   packages	   is	   often	   outsourced	   to	   consulting	   firms	   that	  
specialize	  in	  this	  area.	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culture	  by	  stimulating	  public	  servants	  to	  think	  and	  act	  more	  like	  their	  peers	  working	  in	  the	  
private	  sector	  
	  
As	  might	  reasonably	  be	  expected,	  the	  use	  of	  performance-­‐based	  pay	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  has	  
thus	  far	  generated	  even	  more	  mixed	  and	  inconclusive	  results	  than	  in	  the	  corporate	  context.	  
The	   findings	   of	   an	   1982	   survey	   of	   US	   federal	   government	   and	   private	   sector	   ‘middle	  
managers’27 	  by	   Rainey	   (1982)	   might	   have	   been	   viewed	   as	   a	   harbinger	   of	   such	   future	  
difficulties.	   Specifically,	   this	   research	   revealed	   clear	   differences	   in	   the	   reward	   preferences	  
between	  these	  two	  groups.	  The	  study	  found	  that	  government	  managers	  gave	  a	  lower	  rating	  
to	   the	   importance	   of	   financial	   reward,	   as	   a	   career	   goal,	   than	   did	   their	   private	   sector	  
counterparts,	  while	  giving	  a	  higher	  rating	  to	  the	   importance	  of	  “helping	  other	  people”	  and	  
doing	  work	   that	   is	   “worthwhile	   to	   society”	   than	   their	   private	   sector	   counterparts	   (Rainey,	  
1982:	  290).	  	  
	  
A	   recent	   meta-­‐analysis	   of	   research	   exploring	   the	   relationship	   between	   individual	  
performance	   and	   performance-­‐related	   pay	   in	   the	   public	   sector	   corroborates	   Rainey’s	  
findings	   (Weibel,	   Rost,	   &	   Osterloh,	   2010).	   These	   authors	   analyzed	   the	   results	   of	   forty-­‐six	  
experimental	  studies	  and	  concluded	  that	  increased	  performance	  by	  public	  sector	  managers	  
can	   largely	   be	   attributed	   to	   intrinsic	   motivation	   rather	   than	   extrinsic	   motivation	   (and,	  
specifically,	   to	   the	   promise	   of	   a	   financial	   reward).	   In	   fact,	   it	   was	   found	   that	   the	   use	   of	  
monetary	   (i.e.,	   extrinsic)	   rewards	   tended	   to	   reduce	   the	   performance	   of	   those	  with	   a	   high	  
level	  of	  intrinsic	  motivation,	  suggesting	  that	  extrinsic	  motivators,	  such	  as	  performance-­‐based	  
pay,	  may	  ‘crowd	  out’	  the	  positive	  performance	  effects	  related	  to	  intrinsic	  motivation.	  	  
	  
Finally,	   the	  problem	  of	  goal	  ambiguity,	   combined	  with	  a	   lack	  of	   standardized	  performance	  
measurement	  techniques	  (which	  appear	  to	  frequently	  preempt	  the	  successful	  utilization	  of	  
performance	  indicators	  in	  public	  sector	  organizations),	  also	  significantly	  weakens	  the	  ability	  
of	   managers	   to	   motivate	   their	   staff	   by	   offering	   performance-­‐based	   rewards	   (Chen	   2012:	  
440).	  
	  
Turning	  to	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  German	  universities,	  until	  now,	  a	  very	  small	  percentage	  of	  
a	   state’s	   budget	   for	   higher	   education	   (between	   about	   one	   and	   five	   percent)	   could	   be	  
allocated	  to	  individual	  universities	  as	  a	  reward	  for	  good	  performance	  (Huefner,	  2003:	  158).	  
Presumably	   the	   incentive	   effects	   of	   such	   small	   bonuses	   are	   low.	   In	   addition,	   it	   should	   be	  
pointed	   out	   that	   neither	   the	   annual	   compensation	   of	   university	   managers	   nor	   of	   faculty	  
members	  is	  directly	  linked	  with	  achievement	  of	  these	  goals.	  Rather,	  the	  benefit	  usually	  takes	  
the	  form	  of	  increased	  financing	  for	  the	  university	  as	  a	  whole	  or	  for	  individual	  faculties.	  This	  
could	   be	   expected	   to	   moderate	   the	   incentive	   effects	   for	   improvement	   of	   individual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  “A	  ‘middle	  manager’	  was	  defined	  as	  a	  person	  below	  the	  level	  of	  vice-­‐president	  or	  assistant	  agency	  
director,	  with	  at	  least	  one	  level	  of	  supervision	  below	  him	  or	  her”	  (Rainey,	  1982:	  292)	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performance.	   Last	   but	   not	   least,	   linking	   a	   rector	   or	   dean’s	   salary	   to	   overall	   university	  
performance	  may	  nevertheless	  fail	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  performance	  enhancement,	  since	  
these	  individuals	  may	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  exert	  meaningful	  influence	  on	  aggregate	  university-­‐
wide	   performance.	  Making	   a	   significant	   part	   of	   their	   compensation	   contingent	   on	   factors	  
outside	   of	   their	   control	   is,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   likely	   to	   be	   more	   de-­‐motivating	   than	  
motivating	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   inconsistent	   with	   responsibility	   accounting	   best	  
practices.	  
	  
In	  general,	  the	  compensation	  of	  university	  managers	  and	  faculty	  members	  continues	  to	  be	  
consistent	  with	   the	   traditional	  public	  administration	  model,	   leaving	  open	   the	  possibility	  of	  
introducing	   performance-­‐based	   compensation	   schemes	   to	   directly	   reward	   individual	   staff	  
members	   for	   their	  achievements.	  Keeping	   in	  mind	   the	  “crowding	  out”	  effect	   that	   financial	  
rewards	  arguably	  have	  on	  public	  employees	  possessing	  a	  high	   level	  of	   intrinsic	  motivation,	  
alternative	   forms	   of	   rewards	   should	   be	   tested	   for	   their	   efficacy	   in	   improving	   individual	  
performance.	  This	  would	  also	  need	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  system	  of	  responsibility	  accounting	  
as	  well	  as	  a	  common	  set	  of	  transparent	  and	  objective	  indicators	  of	  individual	  performance.	  
Lastly,	   it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  awarding	  significant	  monetary	  bonuses	  to	  academic	  staff	  may	  
be	  politically	  unpopular,	  given	  the	  negative	  media	  coverage	  of	  top	  executive	  compensation	  
in	  the	  private	  sector.	  
	  
This	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  has	  highlighted	  the	  opportunities	  and	  risks	  related	  to	  the	  
use	  of	  performance-­‐based	  pay	  in	  both	  the	  corporate	  and	  public	  sector	  contexts,	  from	  which	  
several	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn.	  Firstly,	  when	  well	  designed,	   transparent,	  and	  not	  overly	  
complex,	   a	   performance-­‐based	   pay	   scheme	   may	   function	   appropriately	   as	   an	   effective	  
governance	  instrument.	  However,	  the	  associated	  costs	  may	  be	  high,	  therefore	  offsetting	  at	  
least	   some	   of	   the	   intended	   benefits.	   	   In	   the	   worst	   case,	   such	   schemes	   may	   reduce	  
managerial	   performance,	   which	   will	   have	   consequences	   for	   overall	   organizational	  
performance.	   Lastly,	   several	   decades	   of	   research	   findings	   have	   revealed	   the	   difficulty	   in	  
changing	  the	  public	  sector	  organizational	  culture	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  motivation	  and	  work	  
attitudes	  of	  public	  managers	  toward	  their	   jobs	  (Boyne,	  2002;	  Buchanan,	  1974;	  Chen,	  2012;	  
Rainey,	  1982,	  2009;	  Vandenabeele,	  2008).	  
3.3.3.4 Information	  Requirements	  	  
	  
Complementing	   the	   use	   of	   performance	   indicators,	   responsibility	   accounting	   and	  
performance-­‐based	  pay	  is	  the	  publication	  of	  financial	  and	  other	  information	  about	  the	  firm	  
at	  regular	   intervals	   for	  use	  by	  external	  stakeholders;	  namely,	  shareholder-­‐owners.	   In	  order	  
to	   lend	   credibility	   to	   the	   use	   of	   performance	   goals	   and	   performance-­‐based	   pay,	  
shareholders	   need	   to	   be	   able	   to	   objectively	   measure	  management’s	   performance	   on	   the	  
achievement	   of	   goals	   and,	   in	   order	   to	   do	   so,	   require	   access	   to	   objective	   information.	   To	  
enable	   this	   insight,	   external	   accounting	   reporting	   requirements	   are	   imposed	   on	   publicly	  
traded	  firms.	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Bushman	  and	  Smith	  define	  the	  governance	  role	  of	  financial	  accounting	  information	  as	  “the	  
use	  of	  externally	  reported	  financial	  accounting	  data	  in	  control	  mechanisms	  that	  promote	  the	  
efficient	   governance	   of	   corporations”	   (2001:	   238).	   The	   use	   of	   a	   common	   set	   of	   financial	  
accounting	  reporting	  standards	   (including	  measurement	  and	  reporting	  practices)	   facilitates	  
the	   evaluation	   of	   a	   given	   firm’s	   performance	   over	   a	   number	   of	   periods	   but	   also	   enables	  
comparisons	   between	   different	   firms	   to	   be	   made.	   Financial	   accounting	   and	   reporting	  
standards	   also	   provide	   the	   basis	   for	   key	   performance	   indicators	   with	   which	   firm	   (and,	  
therefore,	  management)	  performance	  is	  measured	  and	  evaluated.	  	  
	  
The	  governance	  value	  of	   financial	   reporting	  standards	   is	   strengthened	  by	   the	   independent	  
audit	  requirement	  for	  financial	  statements	  (Bushman	  &	  Smith,	  2001).	  From	  this	  perspective,	  
the	   external	   auditor	   is	   viewed	   as	   a	   ‘gatekeeper’	   who	   safeguards	   the	   interests	   of	  
shareholders	  and	  the	  capital	  markets	  by	  attesting	  to	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  financial	  statements	  
provided	  by	  the	  firm’s	  management	  (Coffee,	  2003;	  Ribstein,	  2009).	  While	  an	  audit	  does	  not	  
preclude	   accounting	   fraud,	   it	   does	   provide	   reasonable	   assurance	   that	   the	   information	  
reported	   in	   the	   financial	   statements	   is	   fair	   and	   accurate	   and	   is	   compliant	   with	   financial	  
accounting	  standards.	  The	  legal	  obligation	  to	  regularly	  publish	  audited	  financial	  statements	  
helps	  to	  remedy	  the	  problem	  of	  information	  asymmetries	  that	  lead	  to	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  
that	  agency	  theory	  addresses.	  	  
	  
A	   key	   aspect	   of	   NPM	   reform,	   which	   has	   been	   increasingly	   embraced	   by	   public	   sector	  
reformers	   in	  Germany,	   is	   the	   adoption	   of	   accounting	   practices	   used	   in	   the	   private	   sector.	  
Similarly,	  advocates	  of	  education	  finance	  reform	  have	  pleaded	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  
new,	  accrual	  basis	  system	  of	  accounting	  at	  universities	  to	  replace	  the	  traditional	  cash	  basis	  
system	   of	   accounting	   (Kuepper,	   2003).	   However	   well-­‐intended	   they	   are,	   such	   aspirations	  
are,	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	   doomed	   to	   fail	   from	   the	   outset,	   since	   the	   fundamental	   principles	  
underlying	  accrual-­‐basis	   financial	  accounting	  are	  premised	  on	  organizations	  being	  privately	  
owned	  and	  profit-­‐seeking.	  
	  
Instead,	   a	   more	   fruitful	   approach	   would	   involve	   the	   design	   and	   implementation	   of	   an	  
information	   system	   that	   would	   record	   data	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   measure,	   report	   and	  
evaluate	  performance	  on	  universities	  goals.	  While	  these	  goals	  may	  be	  quantifiable,	  they	  are	  
not	   necessarily	   related	   to	   financial	   goals,	   such	   as	   profitability.	   The	   important	   point	   is	   not	  
that	  private	  sector	  accounting	  practices	  are	  directly	  adopted	  by	  universities;	  rather,	  that	  an	  
information	  system	  is	  created	  that	  reflects	  the	  governance	  characteristics	  of	  private	  sector	  
reporting	   systems.	   These	   characteristics	   include	   (but	   are	   not	   limited	   to)	   the	   following:	  
information	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  key	  stakeholders;	  information	  that	  is	  verifiable,	  accurate	  and	  
free	   from	  bias;	   and,	   information	   that	   is	   consistently	   reported	   at	   regular	   intervals	   and	   in	   a	  
timely	  manner.	  	  
	  
Given	   that	   education	   policy	   in	   Germany	   falls	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   state	   government	  
control,	  the	  development	  of	  a	  common	  system	  of	  university	  accounting	  that	  is	  appropriate	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for	   the	  public	   sector	  context	   should	  be	   feasible	  at	   the	  state-­‐level.	   In	  order	   to	   improve	   the	  
competitiveness	  of	  German	  universities	  at	  the	  national	  and	  international	  levels,	  the	  use	  of	  a	  
‘universal’	  set	  of	  university	  reporting	  requirements	  would	  be	  recommended;	  whether	  or	  not	  
the	  political	  will	  to	  harmonize	  a	  system	  across	  states	  exists	  is	  another	  question.	  Should	  the	  
willingness	  be	   forthcoming,	   such	  a	   set	  of	   standards	  could	  be	  developed,	   for	  example,	  as	  a	  
cooperative	   effort	   amongst	   the	   states	   via	   the	  KMK	  or	   the	  HRK.	  However,	   a	   thorough	   cost	  
benefit	  analysis	  should	  first	  be	  conducted	  in	  order	  to	  analyze	  the	  feasibility	  of	  implementing	  
such	  an	  information	  system	  and	  to	  determine	  the	  number	  of	  states	  and	  universities	  willing	  
to	  participate,	  before	  constructive	  steps	  in	  this	  direction	  could	  be	  taken.	  
3.3.3.5 Performance	  indicators	  are	  no	  panacea	  
	  
Despite	   the	  many	  merits	  of	  using	  performance	  goals	   as	   a	   governance	   instrument,	   there	   is	  
always	   the	   risk	   that	   the	   goals	   will	   have	   unintended	   consequences.	   Firstly,	   if	   goals	   are	  
perceived	  as	  unrealistic,	  responsible	  managers	  may	  either	  resist	  them	  or	  resort	  to	  falsifying	  
results	   in	   order	   to	   give	   the	   appearance	   that	   goals	   were	   achieved.	   The	   risk	   that	   such	  
“gaming”	  behavior	  will	  occur	  increases	  in	  an	  organizational	  environment	  with	  weak	  internal	  
controls.	   Accounting	   fraud	   is	   well	   documented	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   but	   has	   also	   been	  
observed	   in	   the	   public	   sector	   (Bevan	   &	   Hood,	   2006).	   Even	   academia	   is	   not	   immune	   to	  
gaming	  and	  fraud,	  as	  recent	  cases	  of	  plagiarism,	  the	  manipulation	  of	  research	  findings	  and	  
the	  falsification	  of	  data	  have	  revealed.	  Secondly,	  too	  great	  an	  emphasis	  on	  specific	  goals	  can	  
result	  in	  managers	  “hitting	  the	  target	  and	  missing	  the	  point”	  (Bevan	  &	  Hood,	  2006:	  521).	  For	  
example,	   once	   a	   target	   goal	   is	   reached,	   managers	   may	   reduce	   their	   efforts,	   with	   the	  
consequence	   that	   the	   maximum	   potential	   performance	   that	   might	   otherwise	   have	   been	  
reached	   will	   not	   be	   achieved.	   In	   this	   respect,	   it	   reduces	   managerial	   flexibility	   and,	   more	  
importantly,	  it	  reduces	  managerial	  incentives	  to	  react	  proactively	  to	  unexpected	  changes	  in	  
the	   environment	   that	   could	   otherwise	   be	   exploited	   for	   organizational	   gain.	   Thirdly,	   the	  
selection	  of	  certain	  performance	  goals	  implies	  an	  opportunity	  cost	  related	  to	  goals	  that	  were	  
not	   selected.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   German	   university	   system,	   the	   new	   emphasis	   on	   output	  
numbers	   (i.e.,	   the	   number	   of	   students	   enrolled,	   the	   number	   of	   graduates,	   duration	   of	  
studies,	   the	   number	   of	   academic	   staff,	   etc.)	   ignores	   the	   quality	   of	   outputs.	   It	  may	   be	   the	  
case	   that	   some	  study	  programs	  require	  a	  more	  costly	   student-­‐teacher	   ratio	   than	  others	   in	  
order	   to	   achieve	   an	   adequate	   quality	   of	   educational	   service.	   A	   focus	   on	   numbers	   ignores	  
variation	   in	   the	   labor	   intensity	   and	   quality	   standards	   that	   differentiate	   different	   study	  
programs.	  Lastly,	  even	  a	  well-­‐designed	  system	  of	  performance-­‐based	  management	  can	  fall	  
victim	  to	  the	  political	  process.	  Namely,	  public	  organizations	  may	  face	  substantial	  resistance	  
to	   scaling	   back	   or	   discontinuing	   inefficient	   or	   ineffective	   services	   due	   to	   external	   political	  
pressures	   from	   (small)	   constituencies	   who	   benefit	   the	   most	   from	   these	   services	   (Fottler,	  
1981).	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3.3.4 Summary:	  Implications	  of	  the	  Corporate	  Model	  for	  Organizational	  Governance	  and	  
Strategy	  
	  
The	   foregoing	   discussion	   has	   highlighted	   some	   similarities	   in	   the	   governance	   of	   the	  
archetypal	   large	   corporation,	   with	   a	   widely	   dispersed	   ownership	   structure,	   and	   the	  
archetypal	  public	  organization,	  which	  may	  explain	   the	   rationale	   for	   the	   tendency	   to	  adopt	  
corporate	   governance	   features	   in	   the	   public	   sector;	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   German	   public	  
university	  sector.	  Both	  types	  of	  organizations	  are	  governed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  aligned	  with	  the	  
interests	   of	   their	   owners	   (or	   their	   political	   equivalent)	   as	   the	  most	   important	   stakeholder	  
group.	   In	   both	   cases,	   small	   shareholders	   and	   individual	   politicians	   can	   be	   described	   as	  
pursuing	  their	  own,	  respective,	  interests,	  which	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  maximizing	  the	  short-­‐
term	  return	  on	  their	  investments	  of	  capital;	  financial	  capital,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  former,	  and	  
political	  capital,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  latter.	  These	  interests	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  consistent	  
with	   the	   best	   long-­‐term,	   strategic	   interest	   of	   the	   organization	   (or	   the	   interests	   of	   other	  
stakeholders)	  and	  may	  even	  be	  detrimental	  to	  its	  long-­‐term	  performance.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  
key	   corporate	   governance	   techniques	   that	   are	   especially	   popular	  with	   advocates	   of	  NPM-­‐
style	   reform	   suffer	   from	   inherent	  weaknesses	   that	   compromise	   their	   efficacy.	   In	   the	   best	  
case,	   they	   may	   have	   little	   or	   no	   effect	   on	   managerial	   functioning	   and	   organizational	  
performance;	   in	   the	  worst	  case,	   they	  may	  have	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  both.	  Therefore,	   it	  
can	   be	   concluded	   that	   replacing	   certain	   elements	   of	   the	   traditional	   public	   administration	  
approach	   to	   the	   governance	   of	   German	   public	   universities	   by	   borrowing	   heavily	   from	   the	  
corporate	  model	   of	   governance	   cannot	   be	   expected	   to	   improve	   university	   governance.	   In	  
fact,	  it	  may	  simply	  amount	  to	  replacing	  old	  governance	  problems	  with	  new	  ones,	  or,	  adding	  
additional	  governance	  problems	  to	  existing	  ones.	  
3.3.5 New	  Public	  Management:	  Inspired	  by	  Corporate	  “Raiders”?	  
	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  NPM	  reform	  movement	  began	   in	  the	  period	  of	  the	   late	  1970s	  to	  
early	   1980s.	   This	   paradigm	   shift	   in	   the	   public	   sector	   did	   not,	   however,	   take	   place	   in	   a	  
vacuum.	  The	  1980s	  are	  perhaps	  best	  known	  for	  the	  transformation	  in	  organizational	  finance	  
and	   management	   that	   occurred	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   and,	   most	   notably,	   in	   corporate	  
America.	   According	   to	   Holmstrom	   and	   Kaplan,	   “before	   1980,	   corporate	   managements	  
tended	   to	   think	   of	   themselves	   as	   representing	   not	   the	   shareholders,	   but	   rather	   ‘the	  
corporation’.	  In	  this	  view,	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  firm	  was	  not	  to	  maximize	  shareholder	  wealth,	  but	  
to	  ensure	  the	  growth	  (or	  at	  least	  the	  stability)	  of	  the	  enterprise	  by	  ‘balancing’	  the	  claims	  of	  
all	   important	   corporate	   ‘stakeholders’—	   employees,	   suppliers,	   and	   local	   communities,	   as	  
well	  as	  shareholders”	  (2003:	  10).	  Corporate	  strategy	  was	  indisputably	  the	  exclusive	  domain	  
of	   top	  management,	  with	   little	   shareholder	   influence.	   In	   the	  early	  1980s,	   financial	  experts	  
began	  to	  argue	  that,	  from	  the	  shareholder	  perspective,	  many	  firms	  were	  underperforming;	  
particularly	   the	   highly	   diversified	   conglomerates.	   This	   lead	   to	   the	   now	   infamous	   wave	   of	  
corporate	  restructurings,	  conglomerate	  bust-­‐ups,	  and	  leveraged	  buy-­‐outs,	  which	  were	  both	  
glamorized	   and	   vilified	   by	   such	   Hollywood	  movies	   as	  Wall	   Street.	   The	   resulting	   shake-­‐up	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illuminated	   the	   newfound	   power	   of	   capital	   markets	   in	   disciplining	   poorly	   performing	  
management	  (Holmstrom	  &	  Kaplan,	  2003:	  11;	  Jensen,	  1993:	  869,	  871).	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  recency	  of	  these	  transformational	  changes	  in	  corporate	  governance,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  
not	  surprising	  that	  the	  governance	  literature	  has	  largely	  focused	  on	  the	  governance	  of	  large,	  
publicly	  traded	  firms	  and	  the	  agency	  problems	  associated	  with	  the	  separation	  of	  ownership	  
and	  control.	  Consequently,	  this	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  modern	  corporation	  has	  eclipsed	  the	  
study	   of	   governance	   in	   other	   organizational	   forms	  with	   alternative	   governance	   structures	  
(Greenwood	  &	   Empson,	   2003;	   Ribstein,	   2009).	   This	  may	   account	   for	   the	   observation	   that	  
NPM-­‐inspired	   reformers	   have	   tended	   to	   focus	   their	   attention	   on	   the	   adoption	   and	  
adaptation	   of	   the	   corporate	   model	   of	   organizational	   governance,	   while	   neglecting	   to	  
consider	   alternative	   private	   sector	   approaches	   to	   governance	   in	   their	   advocacy	   of	   public	  
sector	  reforms.	  
	  
In	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  paper,	  an	  alternative	  model	  of	  university	  governance	  is	  proposed	  
that	  combines	  the	  most	  promising	  features	  of	  the	  professional	  partnership	  form	  of	  business	  
and,	  specifically,	  of	  the	  professional	  service	  firm,	  	  and	  exploits	  the	  unique	  characteristics	  of	  
the	  higher	  education	  context.	  Its	  practical	  applications	  for	  university	  governance	  and	  finance	  
reform	  in	  Germany	  are	  critically	  discussed.	  
	  
3.4 Governance	  in	  Professional	  Service	  Firms:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Professional	  
Partnership	  
	  
Professional	  service	  firms	  (hereafter,	  PSFs)	  are	  businesses	  characterized	  as	  employing	  highly	  
skilled	   individuals	   who	   provide	   knowledge-­‐	   and	   human-­‐capital	   intensive	   services	   (von	  
Nordenflycht,	  2010).	  While	  these	  individuals	  typically	  belong	  to	  a	  profession,	  that	  need	  not	  
be	  the	  case.	  Examples	  of	  PSFs	  frequently	  cited	  in	  the	  literature	  include	  law	  firms,	  accounting	  
firms,	   management	   consultancies,	   medical	   practices	   and	   advertising	   agencies.28	  Taking	   a	  
resource-­‐based	  view	  of	  the	  firm,	  human	  capital	   is	  the	  key	  source	  of	  competitive	  advantage	  
in	  a	  PSF	  (Empson,	  2001).	  	  
	  
While	  sometimes	  organized	  as	  corporations	  with	  outside	  shareholders,	  the	  archetypal	  PSF	  is	  
organized	  as	  a	  professional	  partnership29.	  This	  choice	  of	  organizational	  form	  is	  significant,	  in	  
that	   a	   partnership	   has	   unique	   governance	   features	   that	   distinguish	   it	   from	   the	   corporate	  
model	   of	   governance.	  Namely,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   corporation,	  with	   its	   clear	   separation	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  See	  von	  Nordenflycht	  (2010:	  156)	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  industries	   included	  in	  a	  review	  of	  the	  PSF	  
literature.	  
29	  Some	   self-­‐regulating	   professions,	   such	   as	   law	   and	   accountancy,	   do	   not	   allow	   outside	   ownership;	  
only	   licensed	  professionals	  may	  participate	   in	   the	  ownership	  of	   the	   firm.	  This	   is	   related	   to	  a	   strong	  
code	   of	   professional	   ethics	   and	   “is	   intended	   to	   prevent	   the	   introduction	   of	   pressures	   that	   might	  
compromise	  the	  interests	  of	  clients”	  (von	  Nordenflycht,	  2010:	  163).	  
 
	   49	  
ownership	   and	   control,	   a	   partnership	   combines	   ownership,	   management	   and	   operations	  
(Greenwood,	  Hinings,	  &	  Brown,	  1990;	  2007;	  Ribstein,	  2009;	  von	  Nordenflycht,).	  As	  explained	  
by	  Greenwood	  et	  al.,	  “a	  partner	  is	  an	  owner	  of	  a	  firm,	  is	  involved	  in	  its	  overall	  management,	  
and	   is	   a	   key	  production	  worker”	   (1990:	  730).	  As	   a	   consequence,	   authority	   is	   shared	  by	  all	  
owner-­‐managers	  and	  is	  characterized	  by	  “broad	  participation	  in	  strategic	  decisions,	  rotating	  
executive	   positions	   and	   high	   individual	   autonomy	   in	   the	   production	   process”	   (von	  
Nordenflycht,	  2007:	  431).	  Greenwood	  et	  al.	  observe	  that,	  “in	  a	  partnership,	  the	  professional	  
system	  of	  authority	  is	  institutionalized	  in	  the	  ownership	  structure.	  The	  formal	  voting	  system	  
underpins	   the	  equality	  of	  authority.	  Thus,	   individualized,	  autonomous	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activities	  
and	  collegial,	  group-­‐based	  decision	  making	  on	  policy	  are	  combined.	  This	  juxtaposition	  makes	  
the	   authority	   system	   very	   different	   from	   that	   of	   a	   corporation,	   with	   its	   institutionalized	  
recognition	   of	   positional	   authority	   funneled	   to	   a	   strategic	   apex”	   (1990:	   734).	   Thus,	  
employee-­‐owners	  are	  actively	   involved	   in	   formulating	  and	  executing	  strategy,	  while	  at	   the	  
same	  time	  representing	  the	  organization’s	  key	  strategic	  assets.	  
	  
Professions,	  as	  occupational	  groups,	  have	  been	  a	   focus	  of	   sociological	   research,	  which	  has	  
identified	   key	   traits	   that	   distinguish	   them	   from	   other	   occupational	   groups	   (von	  
Nordenflycht,	  2010:	  156;	  Scott,	  1965).	  In	  general,	  professionals	  are	  characterized	  as	  having	  a	  
high	   degree	   of	   bargaining	   power	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   employers,	   given	   both	   the	   scarcity	   and	   the	  
transferability	  of	  their	  knowledge,	  skills,	  and	  abilities,	  combined	  with	  a	  strong	  preference	  for	  
“autonomy	  and	  freedom	  from	  external	  constraint”	   in	  their	  work	  environment	  (Greenwood	  
&	  Empson,	   2003:	   916;	  Moe,	   1995;	   von	  Nordenflycht,	   2010).	   They	   are	   typically	   engaged	   in	  
work	  that	  involves	  solving	  complex	  and	  unique	  problems	  for	  individual	  clients,	  which	  makes	  
bureaucratic	  approaches	  to	  monitoring	  and	  control	  (i.e.,	  characteristic	  of	  large	  corporations	  
and	  public	  organizations)	  infeasible	  (Greenwood	  et	  al.,	  1990).	  	  Consequently,	  they	  have	  been	  
viewed	   as	   “exceptions	   to	   the	   rationalization	   of	   much	   of	   economic	   life	   into	   hierarchical	  
bureaucracies”	   and	   as	   being	   difficult	   for	   organizations	   to	   direct	   and	   retain	   (von	  
Nordenflycht,	  2010:	  157,	  160).	  	  
	  
This	  field	  of	  research	  has	  also	  encompassed	  professional	  organizations.	  For	  example,	  Weber	  
offered	   a	   typology	   of	   “autonomous”	   and	   “heteronomous”	   professional	   organizations	  
distinguished	  by	   their	   internal	  governance	  structures	  and	   the	  degree	  of	   relative	  autonomy	  
accorded	   to	   the	   professionals	   they	   employ	   (Scott,	   1965:	   66).	   As	   explained	   by	   Scott,	   in	  
autonomous	   professional	   organizations,	   “professional	   officials	   delegate	   to	   the	   group	   of	  
professional	  employees	  considerable	  responsibility	  for	  defining	  and	  implementing	  the	  goals,	  
for	   setting	   performance	   standards,	   and	   for	   seeing	   to	   it	   that	   standards	   are	   maintained…	  
Individual	   professionals	   are	   expected	   to	   be	   highly	   skilled	   and	   motivated	   and	   to	   have	  
internalized	  professional	  norms	  so	  that	  little	  external	  surveillance	  is	  required”	  (1965:	  66).	  In	  
the	   case	   of	   heteronomous	   professional	   organizations,	   “professional	   employees	   are	   clearly	  
subordinated	   to	   an	   administrative	   framework,	   and	   the	   amount	   of	   autonomy	   granted	  
professional	  employees	  is	  relatively	  small.	  An	  elaborate	  set	  of	  rules	  and	  a	  system	  of	  routine	  
supervision	   controls	   many	   if	   not	   most	   aspects	   of	   the	   tasks	   performed	   by	   professional	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employees…”	   (Scott,	   1965:	   67).	   Scott’s	   own	   case	   study	   of	   professional	   workers	   in	   an	  
American	  public	  social	  work	  agency	  complemented	  prior	  research,	  which	  had	  indicated	  that	  
professionals	  place	  high	  value	  on	  autonomy	  in	  the	  workplace,	  by	  showing	  that	  professional	  
workers	   also	   tend	   to	   be	   more	   critical	   of	   monitoring	   and	   control	   structures	   found	   in	  
heteronomous	  organizations	  (1965:	  81).	  
	  
As	  an	  organizational	  form,	  when	  viewed	  from	  a	  legal	  and	  financial	  perspective,	  a	  partnership	  
is	  created	  by	  a	  contractual	  agreement	  between	  two	  or	  more	  individuals	  who	  agree	  to	  share	  
the	  risks	  and	  the	  profits	  resulting	  from	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  business.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  limited	  
liability	  enjoyed	  by	  shareholders,	  owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  corporation	  is	  a	  legally	  separate	  
entity,	  the	  partnership	  is	  not	  a	  legal	  entity	  separate	  from	  its	  partner-­‐owners.	  Consequently,	  
each	  partner	  bears	  unlimited	  personal	  liability	  for	  the	  debts	  of	  the	  partnership,	  even	  if	  they	  
were	   incurred	  by	  another	  partner	  (on	  behalf	  of	  the	  partnership).30	  Given	  that	  an	   individual	  
partner	  is,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  mutual	  beneficiary	  of	  her	  partners’	  actions	  but	  is	  also,	  on	  the	  
other	   hand,	   mutually	   liable,	   she	   has	   very	   strong	   incentives	   to	   monitor	   and	   control	   her	  
partners’	  behavior.	  This	  results	  in	  an	  internal	  agency	  problem	  that	  is	  resolved	  with	  a	  form	  of	  
governance	   referred	   to	   by	   Fama	   and	   Jensen	   (1983)	   as	   a	   strong	   “mutual	   monitoring	  
system”.31	  In	   fact,	   it	   is	   the	   primary	   form	   of	   governance	   in	   partnerships	   and	   professional	  
service	   firms.	   Control	   within	   the	   organization	   reflects	   an	   “emphasis	   on	   collegiality,	   peer	  
evaluation,	   and	   autonomy”,	   which	   are	   unique	   governance	   features	   characteristic	   of	   the	  
professional	  partnership	  (Greenwood	  et	  al.,	  1990:	  733).	  
	  
Greenwood	  and	  Empson	  provide	  a	  number	  of	  arguments	  to	  support	  their	  assertion	  that	  the	  
internal	  agency	  costs	  in	  a	  professional	  partnership	  or	  a	  PSF	  are,	  in	  general,	  much	  lower	  than	  
the	   external	   agency	   costs	   associated	  with	   the	   separation	   of	   ownership	   and	   control	   in	   the	  
modern	   firm.	   First,	   partners	   are	  more	   knowledgeable	   about	   the	  business	  of	   the	   firm	   than	  
are	  investors	  in	  public	  corporations,	  enabling	  them	  to	  monitor	  more	  efficiently	  the	  behavior	  
of	   their	   agents	   (Fama	   &	   Jensen	   1983).	   Second,	   the	   proximity	   of	   partners	   to	   managers	  
provides	   opportunities	   to	   exercise	   influence	   in	   a	   way	   not	   available	   to	   more	   dispersed	  
shareholders.	  Third,	  managers	  are	   likely	  aware	  of	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  their	  colleagues.	   In	  short,	  
professional	   partnerships	   and	   private	   corporations	   are	   more	   efficient	   than	   public	  
corporations	  because	   their	   internal	   agency	   costs	   are	   lower	   than	   the	  external	   agency	   costs	  
incurred	  by	  public	  corporations	  (Greenwood	  &	  Empson,	  2003:	  915-­‐916).	  
	  
Thus,	   the	   professional	   partnership	   avoids	   the	   agency	   problems	   arising	   from	   information	  
asymmetries	  that	  plague	  the	  relationship	  between	  managers	  and	  shareholders	  of	  the	  firm.	  
An	   additional	   benefit	   of	   the	   partnership	   identified	   by	   Ribstein	   (2009)	   is	   its	   flow-­‐through	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Some	  relief	   from	   full	  personal	   liability	   is	  offered	   in	   the	   form	  of	   the	  “limited	   liability	  partnership”.	  
However,	   in	  order	   to	  be	  exempted	   from	  full	   liability,	  a	  partner	  must	  be	  able	   to	  prove	   that	   she	  was	  
unaware	  of	   and	  not	   involved	   in	   any	  wrongdoing	  or	   negligence	  perpetrated	  by	   the	  other	   partner(s)	  
(Greenwood	  &	  Empson,	  2003:	  915).	  
31	  Mutual	  monitoring	   as	   a	   form	   of	   governance	   has	   proven	   to	   be	   especially	   effective	   in	   knowledge-­‐
intensive	  organizations	  and	  particularly	  in	  professional	  service	  firms.	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entity	  status.	  Namely,	  earnings	  must	  legally	  be	  distributed	  to	  partners,	  thereby	  preempting	  
the	  agency	  problem	  associated	  with	  control	  over	  free	  cash	  flows	  that	  increases	  agency	  costs	  
in	   firms	   (Easterbrook,	   1984,	   Jensen,	   1986;	   Kochhar,	   1996;	   Lehn	   &	   Poulsen,	   1989).	   In	  
summary,	  partnerships	  “substitute	  effective	  incentive	  and	  disciplinary	  mechanisms	  for	  costly	  
corporate	  monitoring	  mechanisms”	  (Ribstein,	  2009:	  306).	  
	  
According	   to	   von	   Nordenflycht,	   “both	   economic	   and	   sociological	   theorists	   argue	   that	   a	  
strong	  culture	  that	  fosters	  cooperation	  and	  intrinsic	  motivation	  is	  a	  key	  source	  of	  advantage	  
for	   PSFs,	   because	   professionals’	   portable	   skills	   render	   formal	   authority	   and	   traditional	  
incentive	   systems	   less	   effective”	   (2007:	   431-­‐432).	   This	   accounts	   for	   the	   prevalence	   of	  
“collegial	  rather	  than	  hierarchical	  controls”,	  characteristic	  of	  both	  professional	  partnerships	  
and	  PSFs,	  and	  contrasts	  with	  the	  “emphasis	  on	  targets	  and	  the	  close	  monitoring	  of	  results”	  
typical	   of	   the	   hierarchical	   controls	   observed	   in	   firms	   and	   increasingly	   utilized	   by	   public	  
organizations	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   NPM-­‐oriented	   reforms	   (Greenwood	   &	   Empson,	   2003:	  
916).	   Thus,	   the	   formal	   processes	   and	   hierarchical	   control	   structures	   associated	   with	  
corporate	   governance	   and	   traditional	   public	   administration	   are	   likely	   to	   conflict	   with	  
informal	   processes	   and	   ‘collegial	   controls’	   that	   underlie	   the	   governance	   of	   professional	  
partnerships	   (Moe,	   1995;	   von	   Nordenflycht,	   2007:	   432).	   Moe	   argues	   instead	   for	   the	  
judicious	  selection	  of	  professionals	  for	  bureaucratic	  positions	  coupled	  with	  an	  organizational	  
design	  that	  “affords	  them	  substantial	  discretion	  and	  autonomy”	  (1995:	  135).	  
	  
In	   fact,	   the	   costly	   information	   requirements	   associated	   with	   the	   use	   of	   performance	  
indicators	   and	   performance-­‐based	   incentive	   schemes	   as	   means	   of	   governance	   directly	  
related	   to	   the	   external	   agency	   relationship	   arising	   from	   the	   separation	   of	   ownership	   and	  
control	   in	   the	  modern	   firm.	  Given	   that	   there	   is	   no	  outsider	   ownership	   in	   the	   professional	  
partnership,	   no	   external	   agency	   relationship	   exists	   that	   gives	   rise	   to	   possible	   information	  
asymmetries,	   which	   necessitate	   costly	   information	   requirements.	   Mutual	   monitoring	  
internalizes	   organizational	   governance	   and	   control,	   providing	   better	   and	   more	   efficient	  
governance	  at	  lower	  cost.	  
	  
Also	   unique	   to	   the	   professional	   partnership	   is	   the	   influence	   of	   personnel	   policy	   on	  
organizational	   finance.	   The	   primary	   source	   of	   capital	   for	   a	   professional	   partnership	   is	   the	  
capital	  contributed	  by	  the	  partners.	   Indeed,	   the	  chief	  advantages	  of	   the	  corporate	   form	  of	  
business	   are	   access	   to	   capital	   markets	   and	   the	   ease	   with	   which	   ownership	   can	   be	  
transferred	  (von	  Nordenflycht,	  2007:	  430).	  Since	  partnerships	  have	  limited	  access	  to	  capital	  
beyond	  the	  capital	  that	  is	  contributed	  by	  (new)	  partners	  (Greenwood	  &	  Empson,	  2003),	  it	  is	  
crucial	   that	  becoming	  a	  partner	   is	   considered	   to	  be	  desirable.	   Expressed	   in	   terms	  of	  basic	  
supply	  and	  demand,	  a	  low	  supply	  of	  partnership	  vacancies	  combined	  with	  a	  high	  demand	  for	  
becoming	  a	  partner	  will	  result	  in	  a	  premium	  price	  that	  potential	  partners	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  
to	  gain	  entry	  to	  a	  partnership,	  as	  reflected	  by	  the	  initial	  capital	  contribution.	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In	   fact,	  partnership	   in	  most	  professional	  service	   firms	   is	  highly	  sought	  after	  by	   junior	  staff,	  
given	  the	  high	  monetary	  rewards,	  the	  social	  prestige,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  actively	  participate	  in	  
decision-­‐making	   that	   it	   entails	   (Greenwood,	   Deephouse,	   &	   Li,	   2007:	   222;	   Greenwood	   &	  
Empson,	   2003;	   Ribstein,	   2009;	   von	   Nordenflycht,	   2007).	   The	   ‘up-­‐or-­‐out’	   system	   of	   career	  
advancement,	  which	  is	  often	  utilized	  in	  professional	  service	  firms,	  exploits	  the	  ‘tournament	  
system’	   of	   motivation	   (Becker	   &	   Huselid,	   1992;	   Greenwood,	   Deephouse,	   &	   Li,	   2007).	   As	  
explained	  by	  von	  Nordenflycht,	  “after	  several	  years	  of	  employment	  junior	  professionals	  are	  
either	  invited	  to	  become	  partners	  (up)	  or	  are	  asked	  to	  leave	  (out)	  but	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  stay	  
indefinitely	  as	  nonpartners”	  (2012:	  168).	  This	  approach	  to	  career	  advancement	  supports	  the	  
selectivity	   and,	   therefore,	   exclusivity	   of	   becoming	   a	   partner,	   stimulating	   demand	   for	  
becoming	  a	  partner	  and	  thus	  allowing	  the	  partnership	  to	  require	  a	  high	  capital	  contribution	  
from	  new	  partners	  and	  thereby	  supplying	  the	  firm	  with	  needed	  capital.	  	  	  
	  
This	   relationship	   between	   organizational	   finance	   and	   human	   resource	   management	   is	   a	  
direct	   consequence	   of	   the	   unification	   of	   ownership,	   management	   and	   operations	   that	  
distinguish	  the	  professional	  partnership	  as	  a	  unique	  organizational	  form.	  It	  also	  reflects	  the	  
unique	  governance	  features	  associated	  with	  this	  organizational	  form.	  Namely,	  the	  up-­‐or-­‐out	  
career	  trajectory	  serves	  a	  latent	  monitoring	  and	  control	  function.	  It	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  very	  
diligent	  work	   ethic	   and	   a	   commitment	   to	   quality	   that	   are	   frequently	   associated	  with	   such	  
professional	   service	   firms,	  which	   is	   further	   reinforced	  by	   the	   capital	   contribution	  made	  by	  
eventual	  partner-­‐owners.	   In	  addition,	  the	  significant	  commitment	  of	  capital	  combined	  with	  
the	   ability	   to	   actively	   engage	   in	   both	   operational	   and	   strategic	  management	   increase	   the	  
long-­‐term	  orientation	  of	  partners	  to	  their	  partnership	  as	  an	  organization.	   	   In	  summary,	  the	  
up-­‐or-­‐out	   system	   of	   career	   advancement	   functions	   as	   a	   behavior-­‐oriented	   governance	  
mechanism	   that	   ensures	   the	   alignment	   of	   interests	   of	   partners	   (as	   capital	   providers	   and	  
decision	  makers),	  junior	  staff	  (as	  aspiring	  partners),	  and	  clients	  of	  the	  firm.32	  Importantly,	  it	  
promotes	   consensus	   in	   decisions	   concerning	   strategy	   and	   the	   use	   of	   available	   capital	   in	  
pursuing	   strategic	   goals.	   Furthermore,	   it	   ensures	   a	   high	   level	   of	   commitment	   among	   its	  
partners	  and	  staff	  to	  the	  firm,	  to	  its	  goals	  and	  its	  clients.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  a	  much	  clearer	  and	  
stronger	   link	   between	   an	   individual	   partner’s	   effort,	   firm	   performance	   and	   the	   financial	  
results.	  This	  clear	  link	  has	  a	  powerful	  influence	  on	  partner	  behavior,	  given	  both	  its	  incentive	  
and	  governance	  effects.	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  use	  of	  ownership	  as	  an	  incentive	  in	  partnerships	  
in	   comparison	   to	  publicly	   traded	   firms.	  Firstly,	  becoming	  a	  partner	   results	   from	  hard	  work	  
and	   an	   exemplary	   level	   of	   performance	   achieved	   in	   a	   highly	   competitive	   internal	   labor	  
market.	   Participation	   in	   strategic	   decisions	   and	   general	   management	   of	   the	   partnership	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Concerning	   professional	   partnerships	   employing	   highly	   educated	   and	   highly	   skilled	   workers,	   a	  
“collegial”	   style	   of	   management	   that	   encourages	   and	   respects	   the	   autonomy	   and	   freedom	   of	   the	  
individual	   is	   preferred	   to	   the	  hierarchical	   controls	   that	   emphasize	   performance	   targets	   and	   involve	  
the	   close	   monitoring	   of	   results	   that	   are	   generally	   associated	   with	   management	   in	   publicly-­‐traded	  
firms	  (Greenwood	  &	  Empson	  2003:	  916).	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represent	  a	  privilege	  of	  partnership	  that	  must	  be	  earned.	  	  In	  contrast,	  executives	  of	  publicly	  
traded	   firms	  are	  hired	   for	   the	  express	  purpose	  of	  making	  high-­‐level	   decisions	   for	   the	   firm	  
and	  are	  automatically	  made	  owners	  when	  shares	  of	  stock	  (or,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  stock	  options,	  
potential	  owners)	  are	  included	  in	  their	  compensation	  package.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  ownership	  is	  
granted	  in	  advance	  and	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  ‘earned’	  or	  paid	  for.	  Secondly,	  partner-­‐owners	  
place	   a	   substantial	   amount	   of	   their	   own	   wealth	   at	   risk	   and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   expose	  
themselves	  to	  debts	  incurred	  by	  the	  partnership,	  which	  has	  a	  strong	  incentive	  effect	  on	  the	  
behavior	   of	   both	   current	   and	   aspiring	   owners.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   a	   partner	   exposes	  
herself	   not	   only	   to	   the	   potential	   financial	   rewards	   of	   partnership	   but,	   crucially,	   she	   also	  
exposes	   herself	   to	   significant	   risk	   of	   financial	   loss.33	  Since	   a	   corporate	   executive	   does	   not	  
have	   to	   buy	   the	   shares	   or	   the	   options,	   she	   simply	   receives	   them	   as	   compensation,	   she	  
cannot	   lose	   money;	   rather,	   she	   only	   stands	   to	   gain	   an	   uncertain	   amount,	   based	   on	   the	  
overall	   performance	   of	   the	   firm.	   This	   highlights	   a	   crucially	   important	   aspect	   of	   the	  
governance	  attributes	  of	  ownership;	  namely,	   that	   the	  risk	  of	   financial	   loss	  appears	   to	  be	  a	  
much	   more	   effective	   instrument	   of	   governance	   than	   does	   the	   possibility	   financial	  
gain.34Thirdly,	  partners	  become	  partners	  for	  life.	  Unlike	  an	  employment	  contract,	  which	  has	  
definite	   expiration	  date	  or	  may	  otherwise	  be	   terminated	  at	   the	  discretion	  of	   the	  board,	   a	  
partnership	  is	  for	  an	  indefinite	  period.	  Consequently,	  partners	  implicitly	  make	  a	  substantial,	  
long-­‐term	   financial	   and	   reputational	   investment	   in	   the	   partnership,	   which	   results	   in	   a	  
greater	   commitment	   to	   the	   long-­‐term	   strategic	   interests	   of	   the	   partnership	   and	   its	  
stakeholders	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  commitment	  made	  by	  an	  executive	  to	  a	  firm	  she	  is	  hired	  to	  
manage.	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  publicly	  traded	  firms,	  which	  explicitly	  accord	  the	  interests	  of	  shareholders	  the	  
highest	   priority,	   a	   core	   “trusteeship”	   norm	   thought	   to	   be	   common	   to	   the	  professions	   is	   a	  
sense	   of	   responsibility	   to	   “protect	   the	   interests	   of	   clients	   and/or	   society	   in	   general”	   (von	  
Nordenflycht,	  2010:	  163).	  Describing	  the	  legal	  profession,	  Greenwood	  and	  Empson	  observe	  
that	  “clients	  can	  engage	  professionals	  confident	  that	  their	  interests	  will	  not	  be	  subordinated	  
to	   the	   commercial	   interests	   of	   other	   outside	   the	   firm”	   and	   that	   the	   partnership	   form	  will	  
ensure	  that	  this	   is	  so,	  whereas	  “the	  corporate	  form	  legitimately	  attends	  to	  the	   interests	  of	  
the	  shareholder	  with	  the	  result	  that	  commercial	  success	  supplants	  or	  qualifies	  service	  as	  the	  
primary	  motive”	  (2003:	  919).	  As	  von	  Nordenflycht	  points	  out,	  this	  trusteeship	  norm	  also	  has	  
an	   important	   influence	   on	   organizational	   form	   and	   ownership	   structure.	   Specifically,	   he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  As	   described	   by	   Ribstein,	   each	   partner	   has	   a	   significant	   equity	   investment	   and	   thus	   “substantial	  
upside	  profit	  and	  downside	  risk”	  exposure	  (2009:	  298).	  
34	  For	  scholars	  of	  prospect	  theory,	   this	   insight	  will	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise.	  Empirical	   research	   in	  this	  
field	  has	  found	  that	   individuals	  are	  substantially	  more	  sensitive	  to	   losses	  than	  to	  gains	  (of	  the	  same	  
amount)	   (Tversky	  &	  Kahneman,	  1981).	   Specifically,	  Thaler,	  Tversky,	  Kahneman,	  and	  Schwartz	   found	  
that	  individual’s	  rate	  the	  disutility	  they	  experience	  from	  losing	  $100	  as	  approximately	  twice	  the	  utility	  
they	  experience	  from	  gaining	  $100	  (1997:	  648).	  Furthermore,	   individuals	  perceive	  the	  relative	  value	  
difference	  between	  gains	  (losses)	  of	  $10	  and	  $20	  to	  be	  greater	  than	  between	  gains	  (losses)	  of	  $110	  
and	  $120	  (Tversky	  &	  Kahneman,	  1981:	  454).	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argues	   that	   “the	   existence	   of	   normative	   and	   coercive	   prohibitions	   against	   organizational	  
forms	   that	   are	   perceived	   to	   threaten	   trusteeship	   behavior”,	   such	   as	   “having	  
nonprofessionals,	   especially	   commercially	   oriented	   nonprofessionals	   (such	   as	   investors),	  
involved	  in	  the	  ownership	  and	  governance	  of	  professional	  firms”,	  “is	  intended	  to	  prevent	  the	  
introduction	  of	  pressures	  that	  might	  compromise	  the	  interests	  of	  clients”	  (2010:	  163).	  Thus,	  
in	  contrast	  to	  the	  firm	  and	  the	  public	  organization	  -­‐	  both	  of	  which	  emphasize	  the	  centrality	  
of	   the	   organization	   and	   interests	   of	   owners	   (and	   their	   political	   equivalents)	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  
organization	   -­‐	   of	   central	   concern	   in	   the	   governance	   of	   professional	   partnerships	   and	   PSFs	  
are	   the	   services	   being	   rendered.	   Therefore,	   key	   mechanisms	   of	   governance	   monitor	   and	  
control	  the	  behavior	  of	  stakeholders	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  provision	  of	  professional	  services.	  
	  
Finally,	   research	   suggests	   that	   the	   unique	   governance	   features	   associated	   with	   the	  
professional	   partnership	   and	   the	   PSF	   are	   also	   associated	  with	   organizational	   performance	  
that	   is	  superior	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  corporation.	  An	  empirical	  study	  of	  management	  
consultancies	   by	   Greenwood	   et	   al.	   found	   that	   partnerships	   and	   privately	   held	   firms	  
outperformed	   publicly-­‐traded	   firms	   in	   the	   consulting	   industry,	   regardless	   of	   the	   level	   of	  
organizational	   complexity	   or	   geographical	   scope	   of	   operations.	   The	   authors	   conclude	   that	  
organizations	  that	  are	  managed	  and	  controlled	  by	  owners	  perform	  on	  average	  better	  than	  
those	  organizations	   that	  are	  characterized	  by	  a	   separation	  of	  ownership	  and	  management	  
(2007:	  232).	  Indeed,	  the	  fact	  that	  owners	  place	  their	  own	  capital	  at	  risk	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  
‘signal’	  of	  quality	  and	  integrity	  to	  clients	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  (Van	  Lent,	  1999:	  240).	  	  
	  
3.5 Relevance	  for	  the	  Academic	  Context	  and	  University	  Governance	  Reform	  in	  
Germany	  	  
	  
In	   several	   important	   aspects,	   the	   combined	   governance	   features	   of	   the	   professional	  
partnership	   and	   the	  professional	   service	   firm	  offer	   a	   superior	   alternative	   to	   the	   corporate	  
model	   of	   governance	   for	   reform	   of	   public	   university	   governance	   in	   Germany.	   These	   key	  
aspects	  are	  highlighted	  below.	  
3.5.1 Greater	  Similarities	  Imply	  a	  Better	  Fit	  
	  
University	  faculties	  share	  important	  characteristics	  with	  professional	  partnerships	  and	  PSFs	  
that	   can	   lead	   to	   overall	   lower	   agency	   costs	   and	   superior	   governance	   outcomes	   for	  
universities	   than	   can	   be	   realized	   by	   universities	   following	   either	   the	   corporate	   or	   the	  
traditional	   bureaucratic	   models	   of	   governance.	   Firstly,	   academic	   faculties	   employ	   mostly	  
knowledge	   workers	   who	   engage	   in	   unique	   and	   complex	   human	   capital-­‐intensive	   work.	  
Sociological	   research	   indicates	   that	   such	   workers	   thrive	   in	   autonomous	   professional	  
organizations,	   as	   typified	   by	   the	   professional	   partnership	   and	   PSF,	   compared	   with	  
heteronomous	   organizations,	   which	   more	   closely	   resemble	   organizations	   with	   steep	  
hierarchies,	   such	   as	   corporations	   and	   public	   bureaucracies.	   Secondly,	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  
professors	  within	  a	  faculty	  are	  sufficiently	  similar,	  thus	  ensuring	  that	  reaching	  consensus	  in	  
both	  operational	  and	  strategic	  decision-­‐making	  is	  facilitated.	  Thirdly,	  and	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	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knowledge-­‐intensive	  work	   in	   the	  private	   sector,	   the	  work	  of	   academic	   staff	   does	  not	   lend	  
itself	  to	  monitoring	  and	  control	  by	  bureaucratic,	  hierarchical	  techniques,	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  
performance	   indicators.35	  Instead,	   there	   is	   a	   sufficient	  overlap	   in	   knowledge	  of	   colleagues’	  
work,	  despite	  individual	  specializations,	  such	  that	  internal	  “mutual	  monitoring”	  and	  control	  
is	   facilitated.	   These	   characteristics	   mirror	   key	   attributes	   of	   knowledge	   workers	   and	  
governance	   in	   the	   partnership	   and	   PSF	   contexts.	   In	   addition,	   German	   professors	   have	  
historically	   enjoyed	   a	   large	   degree	   of	   “academic	   freedom”,	   implying	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  
autonomy	   in	   planning	   and	   carrying	   out	   their	   own	  work.	   This	   characteristic	   is,	   once	   again,	  
consistent	  with	   the	  general	  profile	  of	  professionals	  and	  knowledge	  workers.	  Finally,	   to	   the	  
extent	  that	  individuals	  attracted	  to	  academic	  employment	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  intrinsically	  than	  
extrinsically	   motivated,	   the	   nonfinancial	   rewards	   associated	   with	   partnership	   in	   a	   faculty	  
may	  produce	   greater	   performance	  benefits	   and	  higher	   job	   satisfaction	   than	   the	  monetary	  
rewards	   linked	   to	   performance	   goals	   set	   by	   nonacademic	   administrators	   outside	   of	   the	  
faculty,	   as	   are	   currently	   under	   consideration	   following	   the	   corporate	   approach	   to	  
governance	  reform.	  This	  is	  also	  consistent	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  both	  professionals	  and	  
public	  sector	  workers	  tend	  to	  gain	  greater	  utility	  from	  actually	  engaging	   in	  their	  work	  than	  
the	  utility	  gained	  by	  monetary	  rewards	  for	  work	  done	  (Dixit,	  2002:	  714-­‐715).	  
	  
Although	  an	  academic	  career	  is	  not	  a	  profession	  comparable	  with	  law	  or	  accounting,	  which	  
have	   very	   specific	   requirements	   for	   entry	   into	   the	   profession,	   including	   educational	  
background,	   formal	   work	   experience	   and	   state	   licensure	   exams,	   an	   academic	   may	   be	  
considered	  a	  professional	  as,	  “someone	  who	  receives	  important	  occupational	  rewards	  from	  
a	  reference	  group	  whose	  membership	  is	  limited	  to	  people	  who	  have	  undergone	  specialized	  
formal	   education	   and	   have	   accepted	   the	   group	   defined-­‐code	   of	   proper	   conduct”	   (Wilson,	  
1989	   cited	   in	   Dixit,	   2002:	   715).	   Furthermore,	   universities	   may	   be	   conceptualized	   as	  
professional	  service	   firms,	  since	  they	  “depend	  on	  professional	  employees	  to	  carry	  on	  their	  
central	  activities	  and	  achieve	  their	  primary	  purposes”	  (Scott,	  1965:	  66).	  
3.5.2 	  More	  consistent	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  NPM	  
	  
In	   adopting	   the	   partnership	   model,	   key	   operational	   and	   financial	   management	   decisions	  
would	   be	   devolved	   and	   decentralized	   to	   the	   level	   of	   faculty	   partnerships,	   which	   is	   more	  
consistent	   with	   the	   spirit	   of	   NPM	   reforms,	   as	   explained	   above,	   than	   the	   current	   reform	  
trend,	  which	  divides	  authority	  for	  decisions	  between	  state-­‐level	  government	  and	  university	  
executive	   management.	   	   Implementation	   of	   the	   partnership	   model	   at	   the	   faculty-­‐level	  
would	  result	  in	  a	  hybrid	  organizational	  form,	  in	  which	  partnerships	  are	  embedded	  in	  a	  larger	  
organization.	  An	  important	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  overall	  organizational	  structure	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  For	  example,	  whether	  a	  certain	  percentage	  of	  students	  pass	  a	  lecturer’s	  course	  says	  little	  about	  the	  
quality	  of	  her	  teaching,	  the	  design	  of	  her	  assessment	  instruments	  or	  the	  efficiency	  of	  her	  work	  (it	  may	  
be	  more	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  students	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  admissions	  
office).	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the	  university	  becomes	  a	  flatter,	  rather	  than	  a	  steeper,	  hierarchy,	  as	  would	  result	  from	  full	  
implementation	  of	  a	  corporate-­‐based	  model	  of	  governance.	  This	  is	  more	  consistent	  with	  the	  
spirit	  of	  NPM	  than	  the	  corporate	  model	  of	  governance.	  
	  
As	   such,	   individual	   faculties	   may	   be	   treated	   as	   profit	   centers	   by	   the	   central	   university	  
leadership.	  In	  other	  words,	  responsibility	  for	  both	  cost	  management	  and	  revenue	  generation	  
(e.g.,	  via	  the	  establishment	  of	  tuition	  fees)	  would	  be	  delegated	  to	  the	  individual	  faculties.36	  
Considerable	   decision	  making	   in	   all	   key	   areas	   -­‐	   operations,	   finance,	   and	   strategy	   –	  would	  
therefore	   be	   devolved	   to	   the	   level	   of	   the	   individual	   partnership-­‐faculty,	   which	   is	   more	  
consistent	   both	   with	   responsibility	   accounting	   practices	   and	   with	   management	   practices	  
observed	   in	  professional	  partnerships.	  Crucially,	  each	   faculty	  would	  have	   the	  autonomy	   to	  
determine	   the	   mix	   of	   financing	   appropriate	   to	   fund	   its	   own	   operational	   and	   its	   strategic	  
goals.	   In	   this	   respect,	   faculties	   could	   consider	   a	  mix	  of	   financing	   sources	   that	  may	   include	  
tuition	   fees,	   debt	   (via	   the	   sale	   of	   bonds,	   for	   example),	   state	   funding	   (as	   a	   result	   of	   a	  
competitive	   bidding	   process),	   and	   third-­‐party	   funding,	   which	   may	   include	   charitable	  
contributions	   or	   even	   venture	   capital,	   which	   is	   not	   uncommon	   to	   fund	   innovative	  
educational	  projects,	  such	  as	  Coursera.	  
	  
In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   this	   model	   allows	   for	   a	   market	   dynamic	   to	   flourish	   within	   the	   broader	  
organization,	  enabling	   individual	   faculty-­‐partnerships	   to	  not	  only	  compete	  with	  but	   to	  also	  
cooperate	  with	  each	  other	  on	  a	  voluntary	  basis,	  when	  synergies	  and	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  
scope	  can	  be	  exploited.	  Individual	  faculties	  would	  be	  stimulated	  to	  seek	  out	  opportunities	  to	  
cooperate	   with	   other	   faculties,	   where	   mutual	   benefits	   can	   be	   exploited	   (e.g.,	   to	   reduce	  
overhead	   costs	   for	   facilities	   or	   for	   secondary	   services,	   such	   as	   administration	   and	  
marketing).	   Faculties	  may	  also	  enter	   into	   strategic	  alliances	  or	   joint	  ventures	   to	  cooperate	  
on	  projects	  or	   to	  share	   in	   the	  purchase	  of	  equipment	  or	   the	  construction	  of	  new	  facilities.	  
Thus,	   the	  partnership	  model	  would	  promote	  natural	  market	  bargaining	  dynamics	  between	  
faculties	  within	  the	  university	  that	  would	  ultimately	   increase	  overall	  operational	  efficiency,	  
while	   the	   internal	   governance	   mechanisms	   of	   the	   model	   would	   improve	   the	   quality	   of	  
education	  and	  research	  output	  by	  individual	  faculties	  (and	  departments	  therein).	  
	  
This	   change	   in	   organizational	   governance	   at	   the	   university	   level	   may	   result	   in	   a	  
reorganization	  of	  way	  in	  which	  states	  allocate	  funds	  for	  education.	  For	  example,	  funds	  may	  
be	   shifted	   away	   from	   global	   budgets	   allocated	   to	   fund	   university	   operations	   and	   capital	  
expenditures,	  to	  funds	  for	  student	  loans	  and	  special	   loans	  for	  professors	  who	  may	  lack	  the	  
personal	  wealth	   required	  to	  make	  an	   initial	  capital	  contribution	  to	   their	   faculty	  when	  they	  
become	  eligible	  for	  partnership.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  trusteeship	  norm	  holds,	   it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  faculties	  would	  
not	  charge	  an	  exploitative	  tuition	  fee	  and	  would,	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  continue	  to	  support	  the	  long-­‐held	  
social	  goal	  of	  equitable	  access	  to	  higher	  education.	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Concerning	   the	   latter,	   the	   capital	   contribution	   requirement	   of	   the	   partnership	  model	   is	   a	  
governance	   feature	   that	   has	   relevance	   in	   the	   university	   context	   in	   two	   important	   ways.	  
Firstly,	  a	  capital	  contribution	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  signal	  to	  the	  public	   indicating	  the	  credibility	  
and	   integrity	   of	   a	   professor’s	   commitment	   to	   her	   profession	   and	   to	   her	   trusteeship	   role.	  
Secondly,	   the	   capital	   contribution	   requirement	   improves	   upon	   the	   traditional	   tenureship	  
model	   by	   providing	   continual	   incentives	   for	   professors	   to	   be	  meaningfully	   involved	   in	   the	  
operational	  and	  strategic	  management	  of	  their	  faculties	  even	  after	  gaining	  partner	  status.	  
3.5.3 Reduced	  Agency	  Costs	  and	  More	  Effective	  Governance	  	  
	  
Key	   governance	   features	   such	  as	  peer	   assessment	  and	  mutual	  monitoring	   represent	  more	  
effective,	  objective	  and	  appropriate	  means	  of	  managing	  and	  evaluating	  both	  individual	  and	  
group	  performance	  of	  professional	  knowledge	  workers,	   in	   the	  university	  context,	   than	   the	  
use	   of	   performance	   indicators	   set	   by	   state	   bureaucrats	   or	   other	   nonacademic	   managers.	  
They	   are	   also	   less	   costly,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   do	   not	   necessitate	   the	   information	  
requirements	  that	  underlie	  external	  monitoring	  and	  control.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   the	   unintended	   consequences	   of	   the	   new	   performance-­‐based	   governance	  
techniques	   implemented	   in	   universities	   can	   be	   seen.	   For	   example,	   the	   increased	   use	   of	  
temporary	  employment	  contracts	  contingent	  on	   the	  achievement	  of	   certain	  goals,	   such	  as	  
the	   number	   of	   articles	   published	   in	   peer-­‐reviewed	   journals,	   has	   resulted	   in	   a	   startling	  
number	  of	  cases	  of	  academic	  fraud	  –	  ranging	  from	  plagiarism,	  to	  the	  fabrication	  of	  data,	  and	  
to	   the	   falsification	   of	   research	   findings.	   Moral	   hazard,	   adverse	   selection	   and	   gaming	  
problems	   increase	  with	   the	   selection	  of	   academic	   staff	   and	   the	  use	  of	  performance-­‐based	  
management	   techniques	   by	   non-­‐academic	  managers.	  While	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   completely	  
prevent	   fraud,	   the	   internal	   monitoring	   and	   control	   features	   unique	   to	   the	   professional	  
partnership	  and	  PSF	  are	  more	  promising	  than	  the	  external	  monitoring	  and	  control	  features	  
of	   external	   governance	   executed	   by	   non-­‐academic	   managers	   and	   state	   politicians,	  
particularly	   in	   the	   university	   context.	   They	   provide	   constructive	   incentives	   that	   are	  
consistent	   with	   the	   characteristics	   of	   academic	   workers,	   who	   are	   intrinsically	   motivated,	  
highly	   skilled,	   autonomous	   professionals,	   while	   minimizing	   the	   (agency)	   costs	   of	   external	  




The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  was	  to	  offer	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  corporate	  model	  of	  governance	  for	  
consideration	  in	  the	  reform	  of	  public	  university	  governance	  in	  Germany.	  As	  a	  first	  step,	  the	  
relative	   strengths	   and	  weaknesses	   of	   key	   features	   of	   the	   corporate	  model	   of	   governance	  
were	   reviewed	   and	   their	   implementation	   in	   the	   German	   higher	   education	   sector	   was	  
critically	   discussed.	   Next,	   the	   unique	   governance	   features	   of	   the	   professional	   partnership	  
and	   the	   professional	   service	   firm	  were	   discussed	   to	   provide	   a	   comparison	  with	   corporate	  
governance.	  	  Lastly,	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  alternative	  model	  of	  organizational	  governance	  for	  
reform	  of	  public	  university	  governance	   in	  Germany	  was	  discussed.	  On	   this	  basis,	   it	   can	  be	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concluded	  that	  the	  combined	  features	  of	  the	  professional	  partnership	  and	  the	  professional	  
service	  firm	  provide	  a	  model	  for	  university	  governance	  reform	  that	  is	  far	  superior	  to	  that	  of	  
the	   corporate	   model	   for	   three	   fundamental	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   the	   key	   characteristics	   of	  
governance	   are	   far	   more	   consistent	   with	   the	   academic	   work	   environment	   and	   academic	  
workers	   than	   is	   the	   corporate	   model	   of	   governance.	   Secondly,	   its	   decentralization	   and	  
devolution	   of	   key	   decision	  making	   authority	   to	   the	   level	   of	   individual	   university	   faculties,	  
particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  financial	  and	  personnel	  management	  is	  much	  more	  in	  line	  with	  
the	   spirit	   of	   the	  NPM	  reform	   initiative	  and	  with	  historical	   university	   tradition	   in	  Germany.	  
Finally,	   such	  an	  approach	   to	  university	   reform	   is	  much	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  accepted	  by	  both	  
academics	  and	  the	  broader	  public,	  as	  it	  restores	  the	  historical	  trust	  in	  and	  freedom	  accorded	  
to	   the	   academic	   profession	   and	   avoids	   controversial	   corporate	   governance	   instruments,	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4 The	  Professional	  Partnership	  as	  an	  Alternative	  Model	  for	  University	  




In	   Chapters	   2	   and	   3	   of	   the	   dissertation,	   a	   theoretical	   foundation	   for	   the	   formal	  
professionalization	   of	   more	   types	   of	   knowledge	   work	   and	   for	   the	   partnership	   as	   an	  
organizational	   form	   and	   as	   alternative	   governance	   structures	   for	   knowledge-­‐intensive	  
organizations	   and	   transactions	   in	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   services	   is	   developed.	   In	   the	  
academic	   context,	   these	   complementary	   approaches	   to	   governance	   are	   proposed	   to	   be	  
superior	  to	  both	  the	  traditional	  public	  bureaucratic	  model	  of	  university	  administration	  and	  
the	   corporate	   style	   of	   management	   and	   governance.	   In	   particular,	   the	   professional	  
partnership	   is	   argued	   to	   optimize	   the	   governance	   of	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   service	  
transactions,	   such	   as	   education,	   in	   a	   cost	   minimizing	   way.	   Arguments	   are	   grounded	   in	  
agency	   theory,	   institutional	   theory,	   and	   transaction	   cost	   theory.	   Importantly,	   such	   an	  
approach	   to	   university	   governance	   is	   also	   consistent	   with	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   German	  
Hochschulgesetz,	   referenced	   above,	   as	   well	   as	   several	   recent	   reports	   published	   by	   the	  
Wissenschaftsrat	   (the	   German	   Council	   of	   Science	   and	   Humanities) 37 ,	   which	   plead	   for	  
fundamental	   and	   far-­‐reaching	   reforms	   in	   German	   higher	   education,	   including	   the	  
professionalization	   of	   academia.	   Building	   on	   this	   work,	   the	   current	   paper	   examines	   two	  
approaches	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  professional	  partnership	  concept	  in	  German	  public	  
higher	  education:	  a	  market-­‐based	  model	  and	  a	  hybrid	  organizational	  model.	  
	  
The	   chapter	   is	   structured	   as	   follows.	   In	   section	   one,	   an	   approach	   to	   the	   formal	  
professionalization	  of	  academics	  is	  explained	  and	  discussed.	  In	  section	  two,	  two	  alternative	  
ways	   of	   implementing	   the	   professional	   partnership	   concept	   are	   discussed:	   the	   hybrid	  
organizational	  model	  and	  mode	  of	  governance	   -­‐	  briefly	   introduced	   in	   the	   second	  paper	  of	  
this	   dissertation	   -­‐	   is	   more	   fully	   elaborated	   and	   a	   market-­‐based	   model	   is	   presented.	   The	  
discussion	  of	  each	  respective	  governance	  model	  is	  structured	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  organizational	  
characteristics	   of	   control,	   funding	   and	   ownership.	   In	   addition,	   the	   implications	   of	   each	  
model	   for	   university	   finance	   and	   strategy,	   the	   consistency	   of	   each	   with	   the	   spirit	   of	  
university	  governance	  reform,	  and	  the	  incentive	  effects	  for	  those	  working	  in	  academics	  are	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  The	  Wissenschaftsrat	   describes	   itself	   as,	   “one	   of	   the	   leading	   science	   policy	   advisory	   bodies	   in	  
Germany.	   It	   advises	   the	   Federal	  Government	   and	   the	   governments	   of	   the	  German	   Länder	   (Federal	  
States).	  It	  produces	  recommendations	  on	  the	  development	  of	  science,	  research	  and	  higher	  education,	  
thus	  helping	  to	  ensure	  that	  German	  science	  and	  humanities	  remain	  competitive	  at	  national,	  European	  
and	   international	   level.	   The	   recommendations	   of	   the	   Wissenschaftsrat	   involve	   considerations	  
concerning	  quantitative	  and	  financial	  effects	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  such	  considerations,	  always	  
taking	   into	  account	   the	  demands	  of	   societal,	   cultural	  and	  economic	   life.”	  Accessed	  on	  December	  9,	  
2013	  at	  11:00	  URL:	  http://www.wissenschaftsrat.de/en/about/function.html	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4.2 The	  Professionalization	  of	  Academia	  
	  
Academia,	  while	  not	  a	   formally	   recognized	  and	   legally	   sanctioned	  profession,	  nevertheless	  
possesses	   many	   of	   the	   hallmark	   characteristics	   of	   a	   profession38.	   As	   such,	   the	   academic	  
community	  has	  traditionally	  enjoyed	  the	  social	  prestige	  and	  reputational	  capital	  afforded	  to	  
the	  professions.	  Thus,	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  academia	  as	  a	  quasi-­‐profession.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  arguably	  
the	  failure	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  expectations	  associated	  with	  this	  quasi-­‐professional	  status	  that,	  
to	   a	   great	   extent,	   accounts	   for	  much	   of	   the	   bad	   press	   that	   the	   academic	   community	   has	  
received	   in	   recent	   years.	  As	  an	  example,	   the	   front	  page	  headline	  of	   the	  October	  19th-­‐25th,	  
2013,	   edition	   of	   The	   Economist	   declared	   “How	   science	   goes	   wrong”,	   accompanied	   by	   a	  
lengthy	  article	  detailing	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  academic	  community	  has	  failed	  to	  live	  
up	  to	  the	  high	  standards	  that	  society	  has	  come	  to	  expect	  from	  it.	  The	  failures	  can	  basically	  
be	   summarized	   as	   twofold:	   a	   failure	   to	   self-­‐regulate,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   combined	  with	   an	  
inappropriate	   incentive	   system,	   on	   the	   other	   hand.	   Perhaps	   its	   quasi-­‐professional	   status,	  
coupled	  with	   a	   lack	   of	  actual	  professional	   norms	   and	   formal	   codes	   of	   ethics,	   has	   led	   to	   a	  
failure	   to	   consistently	   and	   rigorously	   self-­‐regulate	   that,	   when	   further	   coupled	   with	  
inappropriate	   incentives	   (e.g.,	   publish	   or	   perish),	   has	   led	   to	   a	   growing	   incidence	   of	  
negligence,	  fraud	  and	  wrongdoing	  by	  academics	  that	  is	  eroding	  its	  reputational	  capital.	  This	  
raises	   the	   question,	   how	   can	   academia	   successfully	   overcome	   this	   crisis	   of	   freedom	   and	  
accountability	   in	   order	   to	   restore	   its	   credibility	   and	   reputational	   capital?	   I	   reiterate	   the	  
theoretical	  arguments	  made	   in	   the	  previous	   two	  papers,	  which	  are	  also	   in	   line	  with	  policy	  
recommendations	   set	  out	  by	   the	  Wissenschaftsrat	   in	   reports	  published	   in	  2007	  and	  2008,	  
that	   the	   formal	   professionalization	   of	   academia	   is	   an	   essential	   step	   in	   solving	   the	  
governance	   dilemma	   and,	   in	   the	   paragraphs	   below,	   explain	   how	   the	   professionalization	  
process	  could	  be	  implemented	  at	  the	  national	  level	  in	  Germany.	  
4.2.1 The	  Establishment	  of	  a	  Governing	  Professional	  Body	  
	  
The	  first	  crucial	  step	  in	  the	  formal	  professionalization	  of	  academia	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  
national-­‐level	   governing	   body.	   As	   is	   the	   case	   with	   the	   “classic”	   professions	   (e.g.,	  
accountancy,	  law	  and	  medicine),	  governing	  professional	  bodies	  are	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  state	  
with	  the	  mandate	  to	  self-­‐regulate	  the	  profession.	  Self-­‐regulation	  may	  be	  achieved	  by	  such	  a	  
body	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  	  
	  
Firstly,	  self-­‐regulation	  occurs	  at	  the	  most	  fundamental	  level	  via	  the	  standards	  established	  for	  
selection	  and	  admission	  to	  the	  profession.	  This	  is	  primarily	  achieved	  via	  the	  accreditation	  of	  
educational	   programs,	   the	   formulation	   of	   entry	   requirements	   and	   administration	   of	   entry	  
exams,	  when	  relevant.	  Successful	  entry	  is	  acknowledged	  by	  certification	  or	  licensure,	  which	  
must	  be	  maintained	  through	  continuing	  education.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  professions,	  please	  refer	  to	  the	  first	  paper	  in	  this	  dissertation.	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Secondly,	  the	  establishment	  and	  enforcement	  of	  a	  professional	  code	  of	  ethics	  is	  an	  integral	  
aspect	  of	  self-­‐regulation.	  A	  professional	  governing	  body	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  establish	  such	  a	  
code,	  to	  sanction	  members	  for	  ethical	  breaches,	  and	  to	  determine	  the	  appropriate	  level	  of	  
punishment.	  This	  may	  vary	  from	  the	  imposition	  of	  monetary	  fines,	  to	  temporary	  suspension	  
of	   licensure	   and,	   in	   extreme	   cases,	   to	   expulsion	   from	   the	   profession	   (that	   is,	   loss	   of	  
licensure).	   	   The	   concept	   of	   a	   code	   of	   professional	   ethics	   for	   the	   academic	   community	   is	  
discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  below.	  
	  
Lastly,	  a	  governing	  professional	  body	  has	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  responsibilities	  that	  impact	  on	  
the	   governance	   of	   members.	   For	   example,	   they	   institutionalize	   professional	   norms	   that	  
inform	   the	   attitudes	   and	   behaviors	   of	   members.	   In	   addition,	   they	   are	   responsible	   for	  
clarifying	   the	   mission	   and	   vision	   of	   the	   profession,	   as	   well	   as	   for	   strategic	   planning.	  
Concerning	   the	   latter,	   study	   groups	   or	   task	   forces	  may	   be	   formed	   for	   the	   purpose	   of,	   for	  
example,	   identifying	   emerging	   issues	   and	   taking	   public	   positions	   on	   them,	   for	   lobbying	  
activities,	  and	  for	  establishing	  an	  agenda	  for	  continuing	  professional	  education.	  
4.2.2 Selection,	  Admission	  and	  Socialization	  into	  the	  Academic	  Profession	  
	  
Again,	   in	   line	   with	   the	   established	   professions,	   selection	   and	   admission	   to	   the	   academic	  
profession	   should	   be	   based	   on	   a	   standardized	   set	   of	   assessment	   criteria	   that	   are	   to	   be	  
established	  and	  periodically	  updated,	  when	  appropriate,	  by	  the	  profession’s	  governing	  body.	  
Candidates’	   demonstration	   of	   the	   achievement	   of	   these	   criteria	   serves	   as	   the	   key	  
prerequisite	   for	   admission	   into	   the	   profession.	   The	   assessment	   may	   be	   carried	   out	   via	  
examinations	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  assessment.	  If	  doctoral	  dissertation	  is	  to	  be	  retained	  as	  an	  
assessment	   instrument,	   a	   set	   of	   criteria	   must	   be	   established	   that	   seek	   to	   assess	  
competencies	   in	   the	  knowledge	  and	  skills	   that	  define	   the	  academic	  profession	  and	  are	  not	  
limited	   to	   those	   that	   are	   purely	   domain-­‐specific39.	   Transparency	   and	   harmonization	   of	  
selection	   and	   entry	   criteria	   are	   integral	   to	   effective	   governance,	   in	   that	   they	   enable	  
subsequent	   peer	   mutual	   monitoring	   by	   establishing	   a	   common	   base	   of	   domain-­‐specific	  
knowledge	  and	  behavioral	  norms.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  they	  facilitate	  quality	  control,	  which	  is	  a	  
key	   to	   maintaining	   a	   profession’s	   reputational	   capital.	   Last	   but	   not	   least,	   this	   phase	   of	  
training	   and	   preparation	   represents	   a	   decisive	   initial	   stage	   of	   the	   socialization	   process,	   in	  
which	  professional	  norms	  are	   first	   introduced	  and	  unsuitable	   candidates	  are	   (self)selected	  
out	  of	  the	  pool	  of	  aspirants.	  	  
	  
Selection	   and	   admission	   by	   examination	   presupposes	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	   explicitly	  
defined	   set	   of	   core	   competencies,	   the	   possession	   of	   which	   defines	   a	   profession	   and	   its	  
constituent	  members.	  Such	  a	  set	  of	  objective	  criteria	  and	  a	  transparent	  examination	  system	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Concerning	   teaching	  competencies	   in	  higher	  education,	   the	  Wissenschaftsrat	   (2008)	   recommends	  
that,	  already	  beginning	  during	  the	  doctoral	  phase,	  the	  competencies	  of	  aspiring	  academics	  should	  be	  
evaluated	   by	  means	   of	   a	   certification	   system	   based	   on	   a	   set	   of	   universal	   (hochschulübergreifend)	  
standards	  (Empfehlungen	  zur	  Qualitätsverbesserung	  von	  Lehre	  und	  Studium,	  2008:	  67;	  author’s	  own	  
translation	  from	  the	  original	  German).	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is	   currently	   lacking	   in	   academia,	   as	   illustrated	   by	   the	   disturbing	   degree	   of	   variance	   in	   the	  
requirements	  for	  doctoral	  dissertations,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  quality	  and	  competency	  of	  teaching	  
and	   research	   produced	   across	   institutions	   within	   a	   given	   discipline. 40 	  As	   with	   other	  
professions,	   the	   mastery	   of	   a	   broad-­‐based	   set	   of	   core	   competencies	   should	   be	   a	  
prerequisite,	   while	   also	   allowing	   for	   further	   specialization.	   Concerning	   the	   latter,	  
specialization	  may	  occur	   along	   two	  dimensions:	   across	   and	  within	   the	   knowledge	  domain,	  
on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  between	  the	  two	  core	  functional	  domains	  of	   teaching	  and	  research,	  
on	   the	   other	   hand.	   I	   am	   here	   primarily	   concerned	   with	   the	   latter,	   as	   the	   former	   can	   be	  
solved	  following	  practices	  common	  to	  the	  established	  professions.	  
	  
Offering	   opportunities	   to	   specialize	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   career	   between	   research	   and	  
teaching	  complements	  reports	  published	  in	  2007,	  2008	  and	  2010	  by	  the	  Wissenschaftsrat41.	  
Among	  its	  recommendations,	  it	  strongly	  supports	  differentiation	  within	  universities	  “in	  favor	  
of	   teaching-­‐orientated	  areas”,	  which	   should	  be	   reflected	   in	   “the	  necessary	  adjustments	   to	  
staffing	   structures”	   (2010:	   9).	   These	   adjustments	   are	   discussed	   in	   detail	   in	   the	   2007	   and	  
2008	  reports	  and	  include	  a	  number	  of	  salient	  recommendations,	  such	  as:	  the	  development	  
of	  a	  positive	  teaching	  culture	  in	  German	  higher	  education	  that	  offers	  adequate	  recognition	  
for	  performance	  in	  teaching;	  the	  introduction	  of	  periodic	  meetings	  in	  which	  staff	  members	  
can	   exchange	   thoughts	   on	   teaching	   quality;	   a	   new	   approach	   to	   staffing	   faculties	  with	   the	  
goal	   of	   hiring	   personnel	   who	   are	   specifically	   engaged	   in	   teaching,	   rather	   than	   research;	  
enhanced	   professionalization	   of	   teaching	   by	   the	   support	   of	   systematic	   training	   and	  
continuing	  education	  of	   teaching	  staff;	  paying	  more	  attention	  to	   teaching	  competencies	   in	  
the	   selection	   of	   new	   scientific	   staff	  members;	   and,	   the	   establishment	   of	   (or	   expansion	   of	  
existing)	   training	   courses	   in	   pedagogics	   and	   didactics	   for	   the	   further	   education	   of	   staff	  
(Empfehlungen	   zur	  Qualitätsverbesserung	  von	  Lehre	  und	  Studium,	  2008:	  77;	  author’s	  own	  
translation	  from	  the	  German).	  
	  
In	  addition,	  the	  Wissenschaftsrat	  advocates	  for	   increased	  differentiation	  between	  research	  
universities	   and	   teaching	   universities,	   albeit	   by	   taking	   care	   to	  maintain	   a	   strong	   scientific	  
basis.	  Here,	  the	  university	  college	  concept,	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  successful	  Dutch	  
model,	   is	  offered	  as	  an	  example	  of	   the	  successful	   introduction	  of	  a	   scientifically-­‐based	  yet	  
teaching-­‐oriented	   approach	   to	   undergraduate	   studies	   (2010:	   95-­‐108).	   I	   will	   return	   to	   this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   common	   standards	   guarantee	   similar	  outcomes;	   it	  would	  not.	  However,	   it	  
might	   establish	   a	   floor	   for	   minimum	   quality,	   while	   allowing	   plenty	   of	   room	   for	   more	   talented	  
individuals	  to	  excel.	  
41	  „Die	   Bereitstellung	   von	   Personalressourcen	   speziell	   für	   die	   Lehre	   lässt	   sich	   bisher	   nur	   schwer	  
steuern.	  In	  einem	  ausdifferenzierten	  Hochschulsystem	  und	  angesichts	  steigender	  Studierendenzahlen	  
wächst	   aber	   auch	   der	   Bedarf,	   Personal	   differenziert	   nach	   Tätigkeitsschwerpunkten	   Forschung	   oder	  
Lehre	   zu	   beschäftigen“	   (Empfehlungen	   zu	   einer	   lehrorientierten	   Reform	   der	   Personalstruktur	   an	  
Universitäten,	  2007:	  27;	  emphasis	  added).	  
„Die	  Qualifizierung	   sollte	   regelmäßig	   schon	   in	   der	   Promotionsphase	  begonnen	  werden	  und	   sich	   als	  
kontinuierliche	   Weiterbildung	   im	   Verlauf	   der	   beruflichen	   Tätigkeit	   fortsetzen“	   (Empfehlungen	   zur	  
Qualitätsverbesserung	  von	  Lehre	  und	  Studium,	  2008:	  66).	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recommendation	  when	  I	  discuss	  the	  possible	  consequences	  of	  reform	  for	  university	  strategy	  
below.	  
	  
Specialization	   within	   the	   profession	   is	   also	   consistent	   with	   standard	   practice	   among	   the	  
established	   professions.	   Concerning	   the	   latter,	   specialization	   represents	   a	   tacit	  
acknowledgment	   of	   the	   basic	   fact	   that	   no	   individual	   can	   be	   good	   at	   everything	   all	   of	   the	  
time.	   Professions	   typically	   encompass	   a	   (for	   non-­‐experts)	   startlingly	   broad	   base	   of	  
knowledge	  that	  cannot	  realistically	  be	  retained	  by	  a	  single	   individual	  over	  the	   longer	  term,	  
also	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   fact	   that	   domain-­‐specific	   knowledge	   generally	   evolves	   and	  
grows	  with	  time.	  Secondly,	  specialization	  also	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  individuals	  may	  develop	  
a	  special	   interest	  or	  demonstrate	  talent	   in	  a	  particular	  aspect	  of	  a	  knowledge	  or	  functional	  
domain	  (or	  both),	  which	  they	  may	  wish	  to	  pursue	  further.	  Thirdly,	  specialization	  is	  consistent	  
with	  both	  economic	   theory	   (i.e.,	  gains	   from	  trade)	  and	  strategic	  management	   theory	   (e.g.,	  
the	   resource-­‐based	   view	   of	   competitive	   advantage)	   and	   yields	   benefits	   to	   both	   the	   client	  
(high-­‐quality,	   targeted	   services)	   and	   the	   professional	   (a	   financial	   premium	   and	   high	  
reputational	  capital).	  Lastly,	  allowing	  young	  academics	  to	  elect	  to	  follow	  either	  a	  teaching	  or	  
a	   research	   career	   trajectory	   is	   not	   only	   consistent	  with	   the	   foregoing	   discussion,	   it	   is	   also	  
expected	  to	  lead	  to	  an	  improvement	  in	  the	  overall	  levels	  of	  quality	  in	  teaching	  and	  research	  
in	   comparison	   with	   current	   levels.	   At	   present,	   academics	   are	   required	   to	   teach	   courses,	  
although	   most	   lack	   any	   formal	   training	   in	   higher	   education	   pedagogics	   and	   didactical	  
methods	   (Hochschuldidaktik),	   while	   their	   career	   advancement	   hinges	   chiefly	   on	   their	  
research	  performance.	  These	  competing	  pressures	  and	  divergent	  requirements	  often	  result	  
in	  sub-­‐standard	  teaching	  and	  research	  outcomes,	  as	  well	  as	  frustrated	  and	  unhappy	  young	  
academics.	   In	   the	   worst	   case,	   some	   individuals	   resort	   to	   fraudulent	   behavior,	   such	   as	  
falsifying	  data	  or	  research	  findings,	  simply	  to	  satisfy	  the	  demands	  of	  their	  employer	  and	  to	  
keep	   their	   career	   on	   track	   (The	   Economist,	   2013).	   This	   author’s	   recommendation	   for	  
specialization	   at	   the	   individual	   level	   complements	   the	   recommendations	   of	   the	  
Wissenschaftsrat	   and	   should	   go	   a	   long	   way	   toward	   ameliorating	   the	   negative	   outcomes	  
observed	   when	   academics	   face	   pressures	   to	   provide	   both	   high	   quality	   research	   and	  
teaching.	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   opportunity	   to	   specialize	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   their	   career,	   I	   argue	   –	  
consistent	  with	  my	  previous	   line	  of	   reasoning	   -­‐	   that	  professionals	   should	  also	  have	  a	  mid-­‐
career	  opportunity	  to	  specialize	   in	  management.	  As	  discussed	  previous	   in	  this	  dissertation,	  
professionals	   (i.e.,	   expert	   managers)	   are	   better	   able	   to	   evaluate	   the	   work	   of	   other	  
professionals	  than	  are	  non-­‐expert	  managers.	  Not	  only	   is	  this	  consistent	  with	  the	  view	  held	  
by	   professionals	   themselves,	   but	   also	   reflects	   the	   credence	   goods	   qualities	   of	   knowledge-­‐
based	   services	   that	   render	   them	  difficult	   for	  non-­‐experts	   to	   judge	  and	   value	  both	  ex	   ante	  
and	  ex	  post.	  To	  this	  end,	  mid-­‐career	  nomination	  or	  self-­‐selection	  of	  qualified	  and	  motivated	  
professionals	   to	   enter	   into	   a	   special	   educational	   program	   for	   preparation	   to	   assume	  
management	  functions	  in	  higher	  education	  is	  foreseen.	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Finally,	   and	   as	   with	   the	   established	   professions,	   maintaining	   certification	   should	   be	  
contingent	  on	   the	   regular	  and	  ongoing	  completion	  of	   continuing	  education	  courses.	  These	  
courses	  offer	  at	  least	  two	  important	  benefits:	  they	  ensure	  that	  professionals	  maintain	  their	  
basic	   domain-­‐specific	   and	   function-­‐specific	   knowledge,	   skills	   and	   abilities	   throughout	   their	  
working	  life	  and	  they	  ensure	  that	  professionals	  remain	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  on	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art	  in	  
the	  profession.	  
4.2.3 First,	  Do	  No	  Harm:	  Professional	  Norms,	  Codes	  of	  Ethics	  and	  Sanctioning	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  lend	  credibility	  and	  legitimacy	  to	  self-­‐regulation,	  a	  code	  of	  professional	  ethics	  is	  
required	  that	  should	  be	  comprehensive	  and	  explicit	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  members’	  behavior.	  
It	  should	  include	  sanctions	  for	  serious	  ethical	  breaches,	  such	  as	  research-­‐related	  plagiarism	  
and	  fraud	  (e.g.,	  in	  data	  collection,	  data	  analysis,	  reporting	  of	  research	  findings,	  etc.),	  ethical	  
breaches	  and	  negligent	  conduct	  in	  carrying	  out	  the	  teaching	  function,	  as	  well	  as	  negligence	  
in	   carrying	   out	   the	   peer	   review	   function	   (e.g.,	   in	   reviewing	   manuscripts	   submitted	   for	  
publication).	   	  As	  discussed	  above,	  the	  appropriate	  level	  of	  punishment	  is	  to	  be	  determined	  
and	  enforced	  by	  the	  profession’s	  governing	  body.	  	  
	  
A	   further	  professional	  norm	  that	  has	  an	   important	  governance	   function	   is	  an	  allegiance	   to	  
the	  profession.	  In	  the	  academic	  context,	  this	  would	  be	  reflected	  in	  an	  allegiance	  to	  scientific	  
inquiry	   and	   teaching	   excellence,	   rather	   than	   to	   a	   given	   employer	   (i.e.,	   a	   university)	   or	  
sources	   of	   funding	   (e.g.,	   research	   grants	   provided	   by	   third	   parties,	   including	   the	  
government,	  foundations	  and	  private	  firms).	  	  
	  
Relatedly,	  the	  trusteeship	  norm	  is	  particularly	  salient	  for	  the	  academic	  community,	  reflecting	  
the	   public	   service	   ethos	   characteristic	   of	   the	   professions	   (Hall,	   1968;	   von	   Nordenflycht,	  
2010).	  As	  explained	  by	  von	  Nordenflycht,	  under	  the	  trusteeship	  norm,	  “professionals	  have	  a	  
responsibility	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  clients	  and/or	  society	  in	  general”	  (2010:	  163).	  Given	  
that	  much	  so-­‐called	  “basic	  research”	  is	  state-­‐funded	  and,	  therefore,	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  
a	  public	  good,	   this	  norm	   is	   foreseen	  as	  being	  particularly	   instrumental	   in	  militating	  against	  
opportunistic	  behavior.	  The	  development	  of	  such	  a	  norm	  will	  require	  some	  self-­‐reflection	  by	  
the	  academic	  community	   in	  order	  to	  clarify	  where	  it	  positions	   itself	   in	  the	  broader	  society.	  
The	  result	  should,	   ideally,	  be	  reflected	   in	  a	  vision	  and	  mission	  statement	   formulated	  by	   its	  
governing	   body.	   Concerning	   the	   latter,	   there	   should	   be	   a	   clear	   and	   strong	   link	   between	  
professional	  norms	  and	  codes	  of	  ethics	  and	  the	  mission	  of	  the	  profession	  and	  its	  vision	  of	  its	  
role	   in	   a	   society.	   As	   an	   example,	   the	   preamble	   to	   the	   American	   Society	   of	   Professional	  
Journalists’	   code	  of	   ethics	   states	   that,	   “members	  of	   the	   Society	  of	   Professional	   Journalists	  
believe	   that	   public	   enlightenment	   is	   the	   forerunner	   of	   justice	   and	   the	   foundation	   of	  
democracy…	  Members	  of	  the	  Society	  share	  a	  dedication	  to	  ethical	  behavior	  and	  adopt	  this	  
code	  to	  declare	  the	  Society’s	  principles	  and	  standards	  of	  practice”.	  42	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Society	  of	  Professional	  Journalists,	  SPJ	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  (1996).	  
	   65	  
4.2.4 Self-­‐regulation,	  Peer	  Mutual	  Monitoring	  and	  the	  Profession	  as	  Institution	  
	  
As	   already	   discussed	   in	   the	   first	   two	   papers	   in	   this	   dissertation,	   the	   chief	   appeal	   of	   the	  
profession	   as	   institution	   lies	   in	   the	   variety	   of	   advantageous	   governance	   properties	   that	   is	  
possesses.	   Chief	   among	   these	   is	   self-­‐regulation	   via	   peer	   mutual	   monitoring.	   This	   key	  
governance	  aspect	  of	  professionalization	   is	  particularly	  appealing	   for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  
Firstly,	   it	   is	   a	   tacit	   acknowledgment	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   professionals	   deal	   in	   credence	   goods,	  
which	  places	  them	  at	  a	  unique	  advantage	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  non-­‐experts;	  namely,	  consumers	  of	  their	  
services	   and	   those	   who	   may	   wish	   to	   evaluate	   their	   work,	   such	   as	   non-­‐expert	   managers.	  
Secondly,	   and	   relatedly,	   it	   is	   the	   consensus	   of	   knowledge	   workers	   in	   general	   and	  
professionals	  in	  particular	  that	  only	  other	  experts	  are	  able	  to	  adequately	  valuate	  their	  work.	  
The	  significance	  of	  these	  first	  two	  points	  is	  underscored	  by	  a	  third	  point;	  namely,	  that	  titles	  
have	   an	   effect	   on	   the	   interaction	   between	   title-­‐holding	   individuals	   (equivalent	   to	   experts	  
here)	  and	  non-­‐title	  holders	   (equivalent	  to	  non-­‐experts).	  Research	  conducted	   in	  the	  field	  of	  
psychology	  has	  found	  that	  non-­‐title	  holders	  attribute	  authority	  to	  title-­‐holders	  and	  therefore	  
tend	   to	   defer,	   unquestioningly,	   to	   the	   title-­‐holders’	   will.	   This	   theory	   has	   been	   tested	  
extensively,	   with	   the	   most	   surprising	   –	   and	   startling	   –	   evidence	   gathered	   in	   the	   medical	  
context.	   In	  studies	  conducted	  at	  several	  different	  American	  hospitals,	   it	  was	  demonstrated	  
that	  the	  reluctance	  of	  nurses	  -­‐	   themselves	  highly	  skilled	  and	  experienced	  -­‐	   to	  question	  the	  
orders	  of	  doctors	  would	  have	  led	  to	  a	  number	  of	  egregious	  errors,	  many	  of	  which	  may	  have	  
resulted	   in	   the	  death	  of	  patients.	   It	  was	  concluded	  that	   this	   reluctance	  of	  non-­‐expert	  staff	  
(or,	  at	  least,	  those	  who	  viewed	  their	  own	  expertise	  as	  being	  inferior	  to	  that	  of	  the	  doctor)	  to	  
challenge	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  (expert)	  doctors	  (particularly	  when	  the	  doctors’	  orders	  were	  
clearly	  erroneous)	   that	  accounts	   for	  a	   large	  number	  of	  errors	   in	  medicine	  administered	   to	  
patients	  and,	  sadly,	  to	  an	  increased	  rate	  of	  patient	  mortality	  during	  hospitalization	  (Cialdini,	  
2007).	   Lastly,	   self-­‐regulation	   and	   peer	   mutual	   monitoring	   are	   expected	   to	   produce	   the	  
greatest	  governance	  benefits	  at	  the	  lowest	  cost	  –	  both	  in	  agency	  theoretic	  terms	  as	  well	  as	  
transaction	  cost	  theoretic	  terms.	  
	  
To	  summarize,	  the	  mandate	  to	  self-­‐regulate	  is	  a	  clear	  reflection	  of	  the	  privileged	  social	  and	  
legal	   status	   enjoyed	   by	   the	   professions,	   which	   accrue	   in	   large	   part	   from	   their	   unique,	  
institutionalized	  governance	  features.	  Its	  legitimacy	  and	  credibility	  depend	  on	  the	  reliability	  
of	  peer	  mutual	  monitoring,	  reinforced	  by	  professional	  norms	  and	  a	  code	  of	  ethics,	  both	  of	  
which	   are	   established	   and	  maintained	   by	   a	   professional	   governing	   body.	   Taken	   together,	  
these	   reinforce	   the	   reputational	   capital	   and	   social	   prestige	   that	   society	   attributes	   to	  
professionals.	  	  
	  
4.3 Two	  Approaches	  to	  the	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Professional	  Partnership	  
Model	  
	  
Following	   Boyne’s	   (2002)	   example,	   I	   loosely	   apply	   Bozeman’s	   (1987)	   framework,	   which	  
examines	   organizations’	   relative	   publicness	   versus	   privateness	   in	   terms	   of	   their	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characteristics	   of	   ownership,	   control	   and	   funding,	   to	   structure	   the	   discussion	   of	  
implementation	   and	   its	   (possible)	   consequences.	   By	   doing	   so,	   I	   implicitly	   and	   –	   at	   times,	  
explicitly	  –	  acknowledge	  that	  university	  governance	  reform	  in	  Germany	  is	  a	  dynamic	  process	  
in	  which	  the	  lines	  between	  public	  and	  private	  spheres	  are	  blurred	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  both	  
are	  intermingled	  and	  undeniably	  affected	  by	  the	  process	  and	  its	  outcomes.	  
4.3.1 The	  models	  
	  
Two	   prototypical	   organizational	   forms	   are	   foreseen:	   a	   hybrid	   model	   and	   a	   market-­‐based	  
model.	   In	   the	   hybrid	   organizational	  model,	   many	   of	   the	   existing	   university	   structures	   are	  
maintained,	  albeit	  with	  major	  transformations	  occurring	  within	  those	  structures;	  namely,	  in	  
how	   responsibility	   for	   operational	   management,	   organizational	   governance,	   strategy	   and	  
financial	  accountability	  are	  assigned.	  In	  this	  model,	  the	  partnership	  concept	  is	  implemented	  
in	   the	   German	   spirit	   of	   co-­‐determination43;	   that	   is,	   while	   some	   decision-­‐making	   requires	  
consensus	   to	   be	   reached	   between	   the	   central	   university	   board	   and	   the	   professorial	  
partnerships,	   much	   important	   authority	   and	   responsibility	   is	   devolved	   to	   the	   level	   of	   the	  
professorial	  partnerships.	   In	   the	  market-­‐based	  model,	  a	  more	   fundamental	   transformation	  
in	   the	  structure	  of	   the	  university	  would	  occur,	  most	  notably	  with	   the	  “outsourcing”	  of	   the	  
teaching	   and	   research	   functions	   to	   independent	   professor-­‐entrepreneurs	   and	   professorial	  
partnerships.	   Here,	   professors	   are	   no	   longer	   employees	   of	   the	   university.	   Rather,	   they	  
contract	  at	  arm’s	  length	  (i.e.,	  via	  the	  market)	  with	  the	  university	  as	  providers	  of	  educational	  
and	   research	   services.	   In	   this	   model,	   the	   partnership	   concept	   is	   introduced	   outside	   the	  
scope	   of	   existing	   university	   structures,	   with	   individual	   professors	   acting	   as	   independent	  
economic	  actors	  (i.e.,	  the	  professor	  as	  entrepreneur)	  or	  else	  forming	  a	  general	  partnership	  
with	  other	  professors	  and	  engaging	  in	  transactions	  with	  universities	  (and	  other	  institutions)	  
at	   arm’s	   length	   via	   the	  market.	   In	   the	   paragraphs	   below,	   the	   implications	   for	   ownership,	  
control,	  funding	  and	  strategy	  that	  each	  model	  would	  imply	  are	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail.	  	  
4.3.2 Ownership	  
	  
Arguably	  the	  most	  important	  assets	  owned	  by	  a	  university	  are	  its	  tangible	  fixed	  assets;	  that	  
is,	   facilities	   including	   buildings,	   laboratories,	   equipment,	   etc.,	   and	   intangible	   assets,	   most	  
notably	   intellectual	   property	   (“IP”),	   such	   as	   patents	   or	   copyrights	   created	   by	   its	   academic	  
staff).	  The	  discussion	  of	  ownership	  will	   therefore	  focus	  on	  the	  control	  of	  and	  claims	  to	  the	  
benefits	  yielded	  by	  these	  key	  assets.	  
	  
In	  both	  models,	  the	  university	  would	  remain	  a	  public	  entity	  but	  could,	  for	  example,	  take	  the	  
form	  of	  a	  holding	  company.	  The	  holding	  company	  would	  be	  comprised	  of	   several	  entities,	  
the	   ultimate	   ownership	   of	   which	   may	   be	   public,	   private	   or	   mixed.	   There	   would	   be	   a	  
“university	  board”,	  responsible	  for	  overseeing	  the	  management	  and	  operations	  of	  the	  entire	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  This	  application	  of	   co-­‐determination	  or,	  Mitbestimmung,	   is	  not	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	   reflection	  of	  private	  
sector	   practice;	   rather,	   it	   is	   intended	   to	   reflect	   the	   spirit	   of	   co-­‐determination,	   adapted	   to	   the	  
university	  context.	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organization.	   In	   the	  hybrid	  model,	  decisions	   for	  organizational	   funding	  and	   strategy	  would	  
be	  largely	  co-­‐determined	  by	  the	  university	  board	  and	  the	  faculty-­‐level	  partnerships,	  while	  in	  
the	   market-­‐based	   model,	   the	   university	   board	   would	   be	   ultimately	   responsible	   for	   all	  
strategic	   and	   operational	   decisions	   and	  would	   contract	  with	   professorial	   partnerships	   and	  
independent	  professor-­‐entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  its	  organizational	  goals.	  
	  
In	   both	   models,	   the	   use	   of	   a	   real	   estate	   investment	   trust	   (or,	   “REIT”)	   is	   foreseen,	   which	  
would	   own	   and	  manage	   university	   facilities.	   In	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   public	   interest	   is	  
promoted,	  the	  state	  could	  be	  a	  controlling	  shareholder,	  owning	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  (e.g.,	  
via	  a	  public	  employee	  pension	   fund)	  a	  majority	  of	   the	  REIT’s	   shares.	  However,	   in	  order	   to	  
raise	  the	  capital	  required	  to	  make	  much-­‐needed	  investments	  in	  modern	  facilities,	  ownership	  
may	  be	  sold	  to	  private	  investors	  or,	  likewise,	  bonds	  may	  be	  issued	  to	  private	  investors.	  Here	  
different	   options	   are	   possible.	   For	   example,	   large	   blocks	   of	   shares	   could	   be	   sold	   to	  
institutional	   investors,	   such	   as	   pension	   funds	   or	   private	   equity	   firms.	   Alternatively,	   shares	  
may	  be	  sold	  to	  the	  broader	  investing	  public	  and	  subsequently	  traded	  on	  a	  secondary	  market.	  
Again,	   consistent	   with	   public	   interest	   that	   the	   university	   represents,	   the	   return	   on	  
investment	   would	   be	   low	   but	   stable,	   and	   could	   be	   marketed	   as	   “socially	   responsible	  
investments”.	   Regardless	   of	   the	  ownership	   structure	   chosen,	   university	   facilities	  would	  be	  
transformed	  from	  cost	  centers	   to	  profit	  centers	  by	   leasing	  these	   facilities	   to	   third	  parties	   -­‐	  
primarily	   to	   individual	   professor-­‐entrepreneurs	   or	   professorial	   partnerships	   -­‐	   for	   teaching	  
and	   research	  purposes,	  but	   also	   to	  private	  entities,	   such	  as	   to	   students	   for	  extracurricular	  
activities	   (e.g.,	   campus	   clubs)	   as	   well	   as	   foundations	   (Stiftungen)	   and	   firms,	   to	   conduct	  
events,	  research	  and	  the	  like.	  This	  has	   important	  consequences.	  Firstly,	  university	  property	  
becomes	   an	   important	   source	   of	   revenues,	   which	   is	   expected	   to	   have	   a	   transformational	  
effect	   on	   centralized	   investment	   planning	   and	   capital	   budgeting	   processes.	   Secondly,	   this	  
shifts	   responsibility	   for	   cost	  management	   to	   the	   professors,	   who	  must	   set	   tuition	   fees	   in	  
order	  to	  cover	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  educational	  and	  research	  services	  they	  provide	  to	  students,	  
as	  well	  as	  generate	  a	  profit	  in	  order	  to	  earn	  a	  salary.	  
	  
Another	   entity	   common	   to	  both	  would	  be	   a	   central	   administrative	  unit.	   This	   entity	  would	  
have	   important	   managerial	   and	   administrative	   responsibilities	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	   constituent	  
entities	   and	   external	   stakeholders.	   Chief	   among	   its	   functions	   would	   be	   the	   awarding	   of	  
degrees	  to	  graduates	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  partnerships,	  negotiating	  with	  third-­‐party	  contractors,	  
and	   in	   dealings	   with	   professor-­‐entrepreneurs	   and	   professorial	   partnerships.	   This	   entity	  
would	  be	  owned	  by	  the	  state	  and	  managed	  by	  the	  university	  board.	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  ownership	  of	  intellectual	  property	  will	  vary	  between	  implementation	  models.	  In	  
the	  hybrid	  model,	  an	  additional	  entity	  could	  be	  created	  to	  own,	  fund	  and	  manage	  IP	  assets.	  
This	   implies	   that	   any	   IP,	   such	   as	   patents	   or	   copyrighted	  material,	   produced	   by	   professors	  
working	  for	  the	  university	  would	  be	  the	  property	  of	  the	  university	  and	  not	  of	  the	  professor	  
or	  professors	  who	  created.	  In	  the	  market-­‐based	  model,	  any	  IP	  created	  by	  professors	  working	  
in	   the	   partnership	   would	   be	   the	   property	   of	   the	   partnership,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   contributed	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capital	  by	  the	  partner	  or	  partners	  who	  created	  it.	   In	  this	  way,	  ownership	  and	  any	  claims	  to	  
revenues	  generated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  the	  IP	  would	  be	  retained	  by	  its	  creators.	  
4.3.3 Control	  
	  
The	  most	   crucial	   difference	   in	   the	   two	   approaches	   to	   implementation	   of	   the	   partnership	  
concept	  turns	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  control,	  which	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  organizational	  governance.	  
While	   the	   market-­‐based	   model	   relies	   on	   market	   mechanisms	   to	   govern	   transactions	  
between	   professors	   (as	   independent	   entrepreneurs	   or	   as	   professorial	   partnerships)	   and	  
third	   parties	   (namely,	   universities),	   in	   the	   hybrid	  model,	   as	   the	   name	   implies,	   governance	  
occurs	   at	   two	   levels	   within	   the	   existing	   university	   structure:	   between	   professors	   within	   a	  
faculty-­‐level	   partnership	   and	   between	   the	   individual	   professorial	   partnerships	   and	   the	  
central	  university	  board.	  
	  
As	  briefly	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  hybrid	  model,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  is	  inspired	  by	  the	  uniquely	  
German	  system	  of	   corporate	  governance	  –	  namely,	   co-­‐determination.	  On	   this	  basis,	  much	  
critical	   decision-­‐making	   is	   either	   devolved	   to	   the	   faculty-­‐level	   partnerships	   or	   is	   co-­‐
determined	  by	  the	  partnerships	  and	  the	  central	  university	  board.	  Key	  issues	  include:	  human	  
resource	  management;	   university	   strategy,	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   the	   number,	   type	   and	   specific	  
content	  of	  degree	  programs	  offered	  and	  to	  the	  financial	  planning	  that	  the	  strategy	  entails;	  
as	   well	   as	   tuition	   fees	   to	   be	   charged	   to	   students.	   These	   issues	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   turn	  
below.	  
4.3.4 Human	  Resource	  Management	  
	  
Given	   that	   education	   and	   research	   are	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   services,	   labor	   is	   the	   key	  
economic	   input.	   Since	   co-­‐determination	   recognizes	   the	   critical	   role	   played	   by	   labor	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  the	  firm,	  and	  grants	  generous	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  to	   labor	  accordingly,	  so	  
too	  does	  the	  hybrid	  model	  recognize	  the	  central	  role	  played	  by	  academic	  staff	  in	  the	  context	  
of	   the	  university.	  As	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	   firm,	   labor	  exerts	  perhaps	   its	  greatest	   influence	  on	  
decisions	   relating	   to	   human	   resource	  management,	   policies,	   and	   practices.	   In	   this	  model,	  
while	  professors	  are	  still	  technically	  employees	  of	  the	  university,	  all	  decisions	  related	  to	  the	  
hiring,	  compensation,	  promotion	  and	  firing	  of	  academic	  staff	  is	  devolved	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  
professorial	  partnerships.	  	  
	  
Following	   the	   practice	   observed	   in	   the	   established	   professions,	   a	   tournament	   system	   of	  
promotion	  is	  foreseen.	  This	  would	  imply	  that	  doctoral	  candidates44	  would	  compete	  for	  post-­‐
doc	  positions	  and	  junior	  professorships	  as	  non-­‐partner	  members	  of	  a	  partnership’s	  academic	  
staff.	  The	  existing	  partners	  would	  determine	  promotion	  to	  full	  professor	  and,	  consequently,	  
eligibility	   for	   partnership	   of	   non-­‐partner	   academic	   staff.	   Entry	   into	   the	   partnership	  would	  
require	   a	   unanimous	   vote	   of	   existing	   partners.	   Likewise,	   profit	   and	   loss	   participation	   (in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  This	  assumes	  that	  the	  doctoral	  dissertation	  is	  retained	  but	  reformed	  as	  an	  entry	  requirement	  into	  
the	  profession,	  next	  to	  exams	  and	  any	  other	  forms	  of	  assessment.	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other	   words,	   annual	   compensation)	   would	   be	   determined	   by	   agreement	   among	   the	  
partners,	  while	  the	  administration	  of	  pay	  would	  be	  handled	  by	  the	  university	  administration,	  
who	   is	   responsible	   for	   collecting	   (while	   not	   independently	   setting)	   tuition	   fees	   and	  
dispersing	  payments.	  A	  crucial	  question	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	   implementation	  strategy	  of	  
the	  hybrid	  model	   is	   that	  of	  capital	  contributions.	   In	   the	  private	  sector	  –	  and,	   therefore,	  as	  
foreseen	   ion	   the	   market-­‐based	   model	   -­‐	   capital	   contributions	   are	   often	   required	   of	   new	  
partners,	   in	   order	   to	   reinforce	   their	   commitment	   to	   the	   partnership	   and	   to	   be	   consistent	  
with	   the	   unification	   of	   ownership,	   management	   and	   operations	   –	   the	   hallmark	   of	   a	  
partnership,	   as	   an	   organizational	   form,	   which	   underlies	   its	   strengths	   as	   a	   mode	   of	  
governance.	  However,	  many	  professional	  service	  firms,	  such	  as	  law	  firms,	  have	  two	  classes	  
of	   partners:	   equity	   partners	   and	   salary	   partners	   (Richmond,	   2010).	  While	   equity	   partners	  
participate	   in	   the	   profits	   and	   losses	   of	   the	   partnership	   according	   to	   their	   allocable	   share,	  
salary	   partners	   simply	   receive	   a	   fixed	   salary	   and,	   possibly,	   a	   performance-­‐based	   bonus.	  
Voting	  and	  other	  key	  decision-­‐making	   rights	  will	   likely	  also	  differ	  and	  will	  be	   stated	   in	   the	  
partnership	   agreement	   (Richmond,	   2010).	   In	   the	   hybrid	   model,	   the	   two-­‐tier	   approach	   is	  
foreseen,	   in	   which	   more	   senior	   professors	   are	   equity	   partners	   and	   junior	   professors	   are	  
salary	   partners.	   In	   lieu	  of	   a	   cash	   contribution,	   an	   equity	   interest	   in	   the	  partnership	  would	  
most	  likely	  take	  the	  form	  non-­‐capital	  asset	  contributions,	  such	  as	  intellectual	  property	  (i.e.,	  
patent	  and	  copyright	  rights).	  This	   is	  also	  consistent	  with	  the	  proposal	  of	  equity	  partnership	  
for	  senior	  academics,	  who	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  created	  some	  intellectual	  property,	  which	  
may	   be	   contributed.	  However,	   this	   does	   not	   exclude	   younger,	   exceptionally	   accomplished	  
professors	   from	  being	  eligible	   for	  equity	  partner	  status.	  Lastly,	   the	  scarcity	  of	  membership	  
coupled	  with	   the	   prestige	   of	   the	   position	  would	   create	   strong	   performance	   incentives	   for	  
aspiring	  entrants	  (Cialdini,	  2007).	  
	  
Although	   as	   employees	   of	   the	   university,	   professors	   would	   still	   be	   public	   employees,	   the	  
tenure	  system	  would	  be	  scrapped.	  Instead,	  the	  right	  to	  remain	  a	  partner	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  
revocation	  by	  a	  vote	  of	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  partnership.	  Grounds	  for	  expulsion	  from	  
the	  partnership	  would	  include:	  consistently	  poor	  performance;	  financial	  malfeasance;	  ethical	  
violations	   or	   other	   breaches	   of	   professional	   norms;	   and,	   in	   the	   worst	   case,	   the	   loss	   of	  
professional	  status	  as	  evidenced	  by	  censure	  by	  the	  professional	  governing	  body.	  
	  
While	  key	  human	  resource	  management	  tasks	  are	  devolved	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  partnerships,	  
the	   central	   university	   board	  may	   appeal	   decisions	   if	   they	   believe	   that	   the	   decisions	  were	  
made	  without	   just	   cause.	   As	   a	   basic	   example,	   if	   a	   professor	   is	   voted	   out	   of	   his	   job	   by	   his	  
peers	  for	  poor	  performance,	  yet	  the	  university	  board	  suspects	  mobbing,	  sexual	  harassment	  
or	   any	   number	   of	   other	   types	   of	   unethical	   behavior	   is	   at	   play,	   they	  may	   intervene	   in	   the	  
decision	  making	  process.	  
	  
Human	  resource	  management	   in	  the	  market-­‐based	  model	   is	  essentially	   the	  same	  as	   in	  the	  
hybrid	   model,	   with	   the	   exception	   that	   the	   university	   may	   not	   intervene	   in	   the	   decisions	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made	  by	  the	  professorial	  partnerships,	  which	  are	  private	  economic	  entities	  unrelated	  to	  the	  
university.	  
	  
As	   discussed	   previously	   in	   this	   dissertation,	   the	   governance	   features	   of	   the	   (professional)	  
partnership	  are	  far	  more	  consistent	  with	  the	  defining	  characteristics	  of	  knowledge	  work	  and	  
knowledge	   workers.	   To	   briefly	   reiterate	   these,	   it	   is	   based	   on	   peer	   mutual	   monitoring	   by	  
fellow	  experts,	  it	  is	  conducive	  to	  a	  collegial	  work	  environment,	  rather	  than	  relying	  on	  a	  strict	  
hierarchy,	  and	  it	  allows	  individuals	  to	  exercise	  autonomy	  in	  preforming	  their	  work,	  which	  is	  
crucial,	  since	  much	  knowledge-­‐based	  work	  is	  non-­‐routine	  and	  non-­‐standardized.	  In	  addition,	  
to	  these	  advantageous	  governance	  features,	   it	   is	   further	  argued	  here	  that	  the	  professional	  
partnership	  is	  more	  provides	  superior	  incentives	  in	  the	  academic	  context	  than	  either	  of	  the	  
current	   hierarchical	   models	   in	   use:	   the	   traditional	   model	   of	   state	   bureaucracy	   and	   the	  
tenure	  system	  or	  the	  corporate	  model	  of	  management	  and	  governance.	  
	  
As	   already	  mentioned,	   the	  partnership	  would	   replace	   the	   tenureship	   system	   for	   academic	  
staff.	   Even	   without	   the	   formal	   professionalization	   of	   academics,	   the	   partnership	   context	  
would	   provide	   important	   positive	   incentives	   to	   enhance	   the	   performance	   of	   professors.	  
Firstly,	  the	  current	  system	  of	  one,	  tenured	  professor	  (Lehrstuhlinhaber)	  would	  be	  supplanted	  
by	  a	  group	  of	  equally	  qualified	  professors	  working	  together	  as	  partners	  engaged	   in	  mutual	  
peer	   monitoring.	   Given	   that	   non-­‐expert	   managers	   have	   a	   difficult	   time	   adequately	  
evaluating	   the	   work	   of	   expert	   staff,	   the	   current	   situation	   has	   resulted	   in	   an	   essentially	  
“feudal”	   system	   within	   universities	   in	   which	   each	   Chair	   (Lehrstuhl)	   represents	   an	  
autocratically	   ruled	   fiefdom.	   This	   severely	   undermines	   accountability	   and	   inherently	  
compromises	   attempts	   at	   introducing	   performance	   incentives.	   The	   contingency	   of	   pay	   on	  
the	   overall	   performance	   of	   the	   group	   (via	   the	   partnership	   agreement)	   and	   the	   threat	   of	  
expulsion	  from	  the	  partnership	  for	  consistently	  poor	  performance	  is	  more	  in	  line	  with	  both	  
prospect	  theory	  and	  evidence	  on	  intrinsic	  motivation.	  These	  will	  each	  be	  discussed	  in	  turn.	  
	  
The	   key	   insight	   offered	  by	   prospect	   theory	   is	   that,	   in	   general,	   an	   individual	   is	  much	  more	  
motivated	  by	  a	  fear	  of	  loss	  than	  by	  a	  promise	  of	  gain.	  Empirical	  research	  has	  born	  this	  out,	  
with	  the	  seminal	  finding	  that	  individuals	  rate	  the	  disutility	  they	  experience	  from	  losing	  $100	  
as	   approximately	   twice	   the	   utility	   they	   experience	   from	   gaining	   $100	   (Thaler,	   Tversky,	  
Kahneman,	  &	  Schwartz,	  1997:648;	  emphasis	  added).	  Furthermore,	   individuals	  perceive	  the	  
relative	  value	  difference	  between	  gains	  (losses)	  of	  $10	  and	  $20	  to	  be	  greater	  than	  between	  
gains	  (losses)	  of	  $110	  and	  $120	  (Tversky	  &	  Kahneman,	  1981:	  454).	  The	  latter	  suggests	  that	  
even	   a	   small,	   „symbolic“	   capital	   contribution	   by	   a	   professor	   could	   have	   a	   potentially	   high	  
impact	  on	  performance,	  given	  that	  they	  have	  placed	  their	  own	  private	  capital	  at	  risk.	  In	  the	  
current	  system,	  there	   is	  simply	  no	  risk	  of	   loss	  whatsoever,	  given	  that	  professors	  are	  public	  
employees	   shielded	   by	   the	   tenure	   system.	   They	   have	   lifetime	   employment	   guaranteed,	  
regardless	  of	  whether	  their	  performance	  improves	  or	  declines.	  	  
	  
	   71	  
The	   insights	   offered	   by	   prospect	   theory	   are,	   in	   a	   discussion	   of	   incentives	   in	   the	   public	  
university	   context,	   complemented	   by	   research	   on	   the	   interaction	   between	   motive	  
dispositions	  and	  forms	  of	  incentives.	  Employment	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  has	  traditionally	  been	  
associated	  with	   job	  security,	  career	  advancement	  via	  a	  merit	   system	  and	  salary	  protection	  
based	  on	  a	  system	  of	  collective	  labor	  bargaining	  (Chen,	  2012).	  While	  an	  elaborate	  system	  of	  
rules	  and	  formal	  procedures	  is	  seen	  as	  decreasing	  managerial	  flexibility	  and	  autonomy	  in	  the	  
public	   sector	   (Chen,	   2012),	  which	  may	  be	   viewed	   as	   a	   drawback,	   at	   the	   same	   time	  public	  
sector	   managers	   have	   been	   shielded	   from	   the	   market	   pressures	   and	   individual	  
accountability	   for	   organizational	   performance	   that	   is	   faced	   by	   managers	   in	   the	   private	  
sector.	  Public	  universities	  and,	  specifically,	  professors	  have	  been	  no	  exception.	  	  	  
	  
The	   recent	   introduction	  of	  performance-­‐based	  management	   techniques	  adopted	   from	   the	  
corporate	   model	   of	   governance	   was	   intended	   to	   change	   this	   bureaucratic	   culture	   by	  
stimulating	  professors	   to	   think	  and	  act	  more	   like	  private	   sector	  managers.	  A	   recent	  meta-­‐
analysis	   by	   Weibel,	   Rost	   and	   Osterloh	   (2010),	   who	   researched	   relationship	   between	  
individual	   performance	   and	   performance-­‐related	   pay	   in	   the	   public	   sector,	   found	   that	  
intrinsic	   motivation	   was	   greatly	   reduced	   by	   the	   use	   of	   performance-­‐based	   pay.	   These	  
authors	   analyzed	   the	   results	   of	   forty-­‐six	   experimental	   studies	   and	   concluded	   that	   intrinsic	  
motivation	   accounts	   for	  much	   greater	   performance	   by	   public	   sector	  managers	   than	   does	  
extrinsic	  motivation	  (specifically,	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  financial	  reward).	  Relatedly,	  a	  1982	  survey	  
of	  US	  federal	  government	  and	  private	  sector	  ‘middle	  managers’45	  revealed	  clear	  differences	  
in	  reward	  preferences	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  (Rainey,	  1982).	  Specifically,	  the	  government	  
managers	   rated	   the	   importance	   of	   financial	   reward	   as	   a	   career	   goal	   lower	   than	   did	   their	  
private	  sector	  counterparts	  and	  rated	  the	   importance	  of	  “helping	  other	  people”	  and	  doing	  
work	   that	   is	   “worthwhile	   to	   society”	   higher	   than	   private	   sector	   managers	   (Rainey,	   1982:	  
290).	   The	   work	   of	  Weibel,	   Rost	   and	   Osterloh	   (2010)	   tends	   to	   corroborate	   Rainey’s	   much	  
earlier	  findings.	  	  
	  
This	  leads	  to	  a	  further	  criticism	  of	  the	  use	  of	  corporate	  governance	  tools	  like	  performance-­‐
based	   pay	   by	   those	  who	   emphasize	   the	   social	   role	   played	   by	   public	   sector	   organizations.	  
These	   critics	   argue	   that	   financial	   goals	   are	   frequently	   at	   odds	   with	   social	   values,	   such	   as	  
equity	   and	   access,	   which	   public	   service	   organizations	   should	   prioritize.	   This	   argument	   is	  
particularly	   salient	   for	   such	   merit	   goods	   as	   education	   and	   health	   care.	   The	   normative	  
disagreement	  about	  the	  role	  played	  by	  public	  sector	  organizations	  in	  society	  has	  galvanized	  
political	   and	   philosophical	   opposition	   to	   the	   adoption	   oft	   he	   corporate	  model,	   but	  with	   a	  
notable	   lack	   of	   viable	   alternatives	   on	   offer.	   Given	   that	   professors	   can	   be	   described	   as	  
knowledge	  workers,	  with	  all	  of	  the	  associated	  characteristics,	  and	  as	  intrinsically	  motivated	  
public	   sector	   workers,	   professionalization	   is	   an	   incentive-­‐compatible	  mode	   of	   governance	  
that	  should	  promote	  both	  the	  enhanced	  performance	  of	  professors	  and	  the	  broader	  social	  
interests	  served	  by	  education	  and	  basic	  research.	  Indeed,	  both	  theory	  and	  evidence	  suggest	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  “A	   ‘middle	  manager’	  was	  defined	  as	  a	  person	  below	  the	   level	  of	  vice-­‐president	  or	  assistant	  agency	  director,	  
with	  at	  least	  one	  level	  of	  supervision	  below	  him	  or	  her”	  (Rainey,	  1982:	  292).	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that	   current	   experiments	   with	   the	   corporate	   model	   of	   performance-­‐based	   compensation	  
will	  not	  reap	  the	  expected	  benefits	  and	  may	  even	  reduce	  motivation	  and	  performance.	  
4.3.5 Financial	  Planning	  
	  
Given	   that	   people	   are	   the	   foundation	   of	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   firms,	   it	   should	   come	   as	   no	  
surprise	  that	   labor	  costs,	  and	  specifically	  those	  related	  to	  the	  academic	  staff,	  are	  the	  main	  
cost	  driver	   in	  a	  university.	  Consequently,	   the	  performance	  and	  efficiency	  of	  academic	  staff	  
are	  key	  concerns.	  Before	   the	   implications	  of	   reform	   following	   the	  partnership	  concept	  are	  
discussed,	  brief	  consideration	  is	  given	  to	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  general	  approach	  to	  budgeting	  
in	  public	   versus	  private	   sector	  organizations,	   in	  order	   to	  emphasize	   the	   significance	  of	   the	  
subsequently	  discussed	  reforms.	  	  
4.3.5.1 Traditional	  Budgeting	  in	  the	  Public	  Sector	  
	  
Budgeting	   is	   an	   important	   function	   of	   an	   organization’s	  management,	  which	   runs	   parallel	  
and	   complementary	   to	   the	   other	   key	   managerial	   functions	   of	   planning,	   executing,	  
communicating,	   controlling	   and	   evaluating.	   It	   also	   provides	   the	   basis	   for	   organizational	  
governance	   by	   assigning	   responsibility	   and	   enabling	   the	  measurement	   of	   outcomes	   (e.g.,	  
responsibility	  accounting).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  planning,	  organizational	  goals	  (be	  they	  strategic,	  
tactical	   or	   operational)	   -­‐	   once	   formulated	   -­‐	   must	   be	   expressed	   in	   financial	   terms.	   While	  
these	  goals	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  financial	  in	  nature46,	  realization	  of	  the	  goals	  will	  require	  
the	  use	  of	  resources,	  the	  value	  of	  which	  can	  be	  expressed	   in	  monetary	  terms.47	  Expressing	  
organizational	  goals	   in	   financial	   terms	  by	  (1)	   identifying	  the	  resources	  required	   in	  pursuing	  
those	  goals	  and	  (2)	  making	  reasonable	  estimates	  of	  the	  value	  of	  those	  resources	  expressed	  
in	  monetary	  terms,	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  budgeting.	  	  
	  
In	  public	  organizations,	  operational	  budgets	  consist	  primarily	  of	  the	  estimated	  expenditures	  
related	   to	   forecasted	   service	   provision.	   Since	   these	   organizations	   are	   primarily	   concerned	  
with	   issues	   of	   equitable	   accesses	   and	   affordability,	   rather	   than	   profitability,	   accurate	  
demand	   planning	   and	   pricing	   strategy	   are	   considerably	   less	   relevant.	   Furthermore,	   these	  
goals	  are	  often	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  and	  objectively	  measure.	  This	  problem	  of	  goal	  ambiguity	  
distinguishes	   the	   public	   sector	   from	   the	   private	   sector	   (Boyne,	   2002;	   Chen,	   2012;	   Fottler,	  
1981;	   Rainey	   and	   Bozeman,	   2000). 48 	  It	   is	   widely	   accepted	   in	   the	   public	   management	  
literature	  that	  public	  sector	  managers	  must	  grapple	  with	  “vague,	  hard-­‐to-­‐measure,	  multiple,	  
and	   conflicting	   goals”	   (Rainey	  and	  Bozeman,	  2000:	   452)	   that	   are	   “derived	   from	   the	   value-­‐
laden	  nature	  of	  public	  service”	  (Chen,	  2012:	  440)	  and	  are	  therefore	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  As	  an	  example,	  organizations	  such	  as	  Greenpeace	  and	  the	  World	  Wildlife	  Fund	  might	  have	  the	  goal	  
of	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  wild	  animals	  killed	  by	  poachers	  in	  a	  given	  year.	  
47	  With	   reference	   to	   the	   example	   provided	   in	   the	   preceding	   footnote,	   species	   preservation	   will	  
require	   the	  use	  of	   vehicles,	   facilities	   and	  human	   resources,	   to	   name	  but	   a	   few.	   The	   value	  of	   these	  
required	  resources	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  monetary	  terms.	  
48 	  For	   example,	   Fottler	   (1981)	   attributes	   this	   to	   “conflicting	   political	   pressures	   from	   various	  
constituencies”	  (5).	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measure.	   Consequently,	   there	   are	   no	   standardized	   or	   otherwise	   common	   toolbox	   of	  
performance	  management	  indicators	  or	  techniques	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  that	  are	  comparable	  
to	  the	  extensive	  repertoire	  used	  to	  measure	  the	  financial	  performance	  of	  firms	  in	  the	  private	  
sector.	  This	  has	  created	  much	  consternation	  for	  those	  who	  try	  to	  adapt	  the	  corporate	  model	  
to	  the	  public	  university	  setting	  and	  has	  provided	  endless	  fodder	  for	  their	  critics.	  Earlier	  work	  
in	   the	   comparative	   study	   of	   public	   and	   private	   management	   practices	   addressed	   the	  
difficulty	  of	  measuring	  outputs	   in	  public	   sector	  organizations,	  which	  probably	  accounts	   for	  
the	   traditional	  orientation	   toward	   input	  planning,	  as	  was	   the	  standard	  practice	  at	  German	  
public	   universities	   until	   very	   recently	   (see	   Fottler,	   1981,	   for	   a	   review	   of	   the	   literature).	   In	  
addition,	  public	  organizations	  may	  face	  resistance	  to	  scaling	  back	  or	  discontinuing	  inefficient	  
or	  ineffective	  services	  due	  to	  political	  pressures	  from	  (small)	  constituencies	  who	  benefit	  the	  
most	  from	  these	  services	  (Fottler,	  1981).	  
	  
To	  summarize,	  the	  budgeting	  process	  in	  public	  organizations	  does	  not	  involve	  the	  estimation	  
of	  revenues	  or	  profit	  planning	  calculations	  and	  cost	  estimates	  are	  based	  largely	  on	  trends	  in	  
historical	   demand.	   In	   essence,	   operating	   budgets	   are	   basically	   cost	   estimates,	   with	   final	  
decisions	  resulting	  from	  negotiations	  between	  politicians	  and	  public	  organization	  managers,	  
neither	  of	  whom	  are	  directly	  involved	  in	  service	  provision.	  
4.3.5.2 Traditional	  Budgeting	  in	  the	  Private	  Sector	  
	  
In	  private	  sector	  firms,	  a	  master	  budget	  is	  prepared	  on	  an	  annual	  basis.	  The	  first	  step	  in	  the	  
preparation	  of	   the	  master	   budget	   is	   always	   the	  preparation	  of	   the	   sales	   budget.	  All	   other	  
budgets	   are	   dependent	   on	   sales	   budget	   figures.	   The	   sales	   budget	   reflects	   management’s	  
estimate	  of	  forecasted	  consumer	  demand	  based	  on	  its	  chosen	  pricing	  strategy.	  The	  result	  is	  
the	   forecasted	   sales	   revenue	   for	   the	   next	   year.	   This	   underscores	   the	   key	   role	   played	   by	  
product-­‐market	  competition	   in	  organizational	  planning	  and	  strategy	   formulation.	  Based	  on	  
these	   figures,	  estimates	  can	  be	  made	  of	   the	   related	  costs	   that	  will	  be	   incurred	   in	  order	   to	  
achieve	   that	   level	   of	   sales	   volume.	   Combining	   the	   sales	   and	   expense	   budgets,	   budgeted	  
income	  for	  the	  next	  period	  can	  be	  calculated.	  	  
	  
These	   operating	   budgets	   are	   the	   result	   of	   cost-­‐volume-­‐profit	   analysis	   (also	   referred	   to	   as	  
“breakeven	  analysis”),	  a	  planning	  technique	  that	   requires	  managers	   to	  relate	  sales	  volume	  
and	  pricing	  strategy	  to	  the	  firm’s	  cost	  structure.	  Here,	  costs	  are	  differentiated	  based	  on	  their	  
relationship	  to	  the	  level	  of	  business	  activity;	  some	  costs	  vary	  in	  direct	  relation	  to	  the	  level	  of	  
activity	   (i.e.,	   variable	   costs),	   while	   other	   costs	   are	   remain	   unchanged	   within	   the	   firm’s	  
operating	   capacity	   (fixed	   costs).	   The	   latter	   costs	   reflect	   the	   allocation	   of	   a	   reasonable	  
portion	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  non-­‐current	  assets,	  such	  as	  property,	  plant	  and	  equipment,	  to	  each	  
accounting	  period	   spanning	   the	   asset’s	   useful	   life.	   This	   “matching”	  of	   costs	  with	   revenues	  
reflects	  a	  central	  purpose	  of	  accrual	  accounting;	  that	  is,	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  resource	  must	  be	  
matched	  with	  the	  benefits	   it	  yields.	  Firms	  undertake	  this	  matching	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	   in	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order	  to,	  among	  other	  things,	  measure	  and	  evaluate	  the	  efficiency	  with	  which	  resources	  are	  
being	  utilized.	  	  	  
	  
To	   summarize,	  budgeting	   in	  private	   sector,	   for-­‐profit	  organizations	   represents	  an	  essential	  
part	  of	  the	  management	  function.	  Budgets	  require	  mangers	  to	  express	  in	  financial	  terms	  the	  
organizational	  goals	   that	   they	  have	  established.	  Responsibility	  accounting	  allows	  managers	  
to	  assign	  accountability	  for	  the	  implementation	  and	  realization	  of	  steps	  required	  to	  achieve	  
goals	   and	   offer	   a	   way	   to	   readily	   measure	   achievement.	   In	   this	   way,	   budgets	   provide	  
backbone	   for	   the	   evaluation	   and	   controlling	   processes.	   Finally,	   the	   use	   of	   accrual	   basis	  
accounting	   allows	   for	   a	   more	   accurate	   assessment	   of	   performance,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	  
seeks	  to	  match	  expenses	  with	  the	  revenues	  that	  they	  produce,	  rather	  than	  simply	  report	  on	  
the	  cash	  flows	  of	  the	  period.	  
4.3.5.3 Budgeting	  and	  the	  “Socially	  profitable”	  Partnership	  –	  The	  Hybrid	  Model	  
	  
In	  the	  hybrid	  organizational	  model,	  cost	  management	  and	  the	  setting	  of	  tuition	  fees	  would	  
be	  co-­‐determined	  by	  the	  faculty-­‐level	  partnerships	  and	  the	  central	  university	  board,	  with	  a	  
large	  degree	  of	  autonomy	   in	  decision-­‐making	  –	  and	   the	   related	  accountability	   for	  decision	  
outcomes	   –	   devolved	   to	   faculty-­‐level	   partnerships.	   By	   devolving	   to	   professors	   the	  
responsibility	  of	  calculating	  the	  cost	  of	  providing	  education,	   it	   increases	  accountability	  and	  
creates	   incentives	   to	   enhance	   the	   “value	   for	   money”	   of	   education	   and	   research	   services	  
provided,	   rather	   than	   the	   current	   system	   that	   leads	   to	   budget	   padding	   and	   “December	  
fever”-­‐	   reckless	   end	   of	   the	   year	   spending	   to	   ensure	   that	   a	   Chair’s	   budget	   is	   not	   reduced.	  
First,	   however,	   professors	  would	   be	   required	   to	   estimate	   future	   demand	   for	   their	   various	  
degree	  programs,	  in	  order	  to	  come	  up	  with	  reasonable	  cost	  estimates.	  This	  will	  require	  them	  
to	  think	  about	  the	   level	  of	  quality	  of	  service	  they	  will	  provide	  and	  will	   therefore	  also	  drive	  
their	   tuition	   or	   pricing	   strategy.	   Last	   but	   not	   least,	   professors	  will	   also	   have	   to	   engage	   in	  
profit	  planning,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  earn	  a	  minimum	  desirable	  salary.	  The	  latter	  two	  
steps	  underscore	  the	  relevance	  of	  formal	  professionalization	  and	  the	  governance	  functions	  
of	  the	  trusteeship	  norm	  and	  the	  service	  ideal,	  since	  they	  oblige	  professors	  to	  balance	  their	  
own,	   personal	   financial	   interests	  with	   the	   interests	   of	   their	   (potential)	   students	   and	  other	  
clients	  (e.g.,	  contract	  research	  clients,	  such	  as	  government	  agencies).	  
	  
The	  setting	  of	  tuition	  fees	  is	  therefore	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  proposed	  partnership	  reform,	  as	  it	  
supports	   the	   internal	   governance	   mechanisms	   underlying	   the	   partnership	   model,	   is	  
supported	  by	  the	  governance	  features	  of	  formal	  professionalization,	  and	  features	  the	  added	  
external	   governance	   of	   students	   as	   fee-­‐paying	   consumers	  who	   “vote	  with	   their	   feet”	   and	  
make	  their	  study	  choice	  based	  on	  the	  cost	  and	  quality	  offered	  by	  a	  given	  university	  faculty49.	  
However,	  it	  represents	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  away	  from	  traditional	  input	  planning	  and	  toward	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  This	   is	   consistent	   with	   recent	   findings	   by	   Fischer,	   Bruckmeier	   and	   Wigger	   (2013)	   that	   German	  
students	  are	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  reputation	  of	  a	  specific	  faculty	  and/or	  degree	  program	  than	  the	  
reputation	  of	  a	  university	  as	  a	  whole.	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new	  path	  of	  sustainable	  and	  socially	  responsible	  provision	  of	  public	  education,	  in	  which	  the	  
cost	  of	  education	  services	  are	  not	  externalized	  to	  the	  broader	  society	  but	  are	  born	  by	  those	  
individual	   who	   receive	   the	   services	   and	   consequently	   enjoy	   the	   (lifetime)	   benefits	   of	   an	  
investment	  in	  their	  education	  (i.e.,	  higher	  wages	  and	  a	  better	  quality	  of	  life	  than	  those	  with	  
less	  or	  no	  higher	  education).	  
	  
Since	  costs	  are	  largely	  devolved	  to	  and,	  therefore,	  incurred	  by	  the	  faculty-­‐level	  partnerships,	  
they	  must	  set	  a	  tuition	  fee	  for	  their	  programs	  that	  covers	  their	  costs	  and	  generates	  a	  profit.	  
The	  latter	  can	  then	  distributed	  to	  the	  partners	  as	  per	  their	  partnership	  agreement	  in	  lieu	  of	  a	  
fixed	   salary,	   as	   has	   been	   traditionally	   the	   case.	   Given	   that	   the	   university,	   and	   not	   the	  
partnerships,	  own	  the	  non-­‐current	  assets	   that	  are	  used	   in	   the	  provision	  of	   the	  university’s	  
educational	   and	   research	   services,	   the	   university	   is	   involved	   in	   the	   setting	   of	   tuition	   fees	  
insofar	  as	  the	  partnerships	  require	   information	  about	  the	  value	  of	  these	  assets	   in	  order	  to	  
include	   a	   reasonable	   portion	   of	   their	   costs	   as	   an	   expense	   in	   the	   calculation	   of	   the	   tuition	  
fees.	   In	   addition,	   the	   university	  may	   charge	   the	   faculties	   fees	   for	   administrative	   services,	  
such	   as	   processing	   student	   data,	   processing	   tuition	   payments,	   and	   distributing	   monthly	  
payments	  to	  professors,	  among	  others.	  These	  charges	  will	  necessarily	  be	  incorporated	  in	  the	  
partnership’s	   expense	   budgets	   and	   figured	   into	   the	   final	   setting	   of	   tuition	   fees	   and	  
estimated	  profit	  calculation.	  
	  
Considering	   the	   consequences	   for	   each	   partner-­‐professor’s	   salary,	   the	   incentive	   to	   pay	  
careful	  attention	  to	  cost	  management	  and	  to	  be	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  pricing	  strategy	  for	  
tuition	   fees	   is	   high.	   It	   is	   also	   future-­‐oriented,	   in	   that	   the	   related	   level	   of	   education	   and	  
research	  quality	  will	  either	  create	  or	  destroy	  the	  reputational	  capital	  of	  the	  partnership	  and	  
therefore	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  the	  future	  earnings	  (potential)	  of	  all	  partners	  involved.	  
4.3.5.4 Budgeting	  and	  the	  “Socially	  profitable”	  University	  –	  The	  Market-­‐based	  Model	  
	  
In	   the	  market-­‐based	  model,	   universities	   contract	  out	   educational	   and	   research	   services	   to	  
professor-­‐entrepreneurs	   and	   professorial	   partnerships.	  With	   this	   approach,	   the	   university	  
sets	  tuition	  fees	  itself,	  based	  on	  a	  cost	  calculation	  that	  includes	  the	  service	  fees	  paid	  to	  the	  
professors,	  whom	  they	  engage	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  education	  services	  for	  their	  students,	  and	  
a	   reasonable	   allocation	   of	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   facilities	   used.	   Any	   residual	   income	   would	   be	  
retained	  by	  the	  university,	  to	  dispense	  with	  as	  the	  university	  board	  sees	  fit	  (e.g.,	  for	  student	  
scholarships,	  to	  fund	  future	   investments	   in	  facilities,	  etc.).	  This	  provides	  for	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
flexibility	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  operational	  and	  strategic	  planning.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  university	  
wants	   to	   develop	   a	   new	   degree	   program,	   it	  may	   contract	   a	   professorial	   partnership	  with	  
expertise	  in	  the	  relevant	  field	  for	  consultation	  on	  program	  development.	  It	  may	  then	  hire	  a	  
number	   of	   individual	   professors	   or	   else	   a	   diversified	   professorial	   partnership	   to	   teach	   the	  
individual	   courses	   belonging	   to	   the	   program.	   As	   in	   any	   contractual	   relationship,	   and	  
especially	   one	   involving	   credence-­‐type	   goods,	   the	   university	   may	   initially	   enter	   into	   only	  
short	   term	   contracts	   in	   order	   to	   verify	   the	  quality	   and	   value	   for	  money	  of	   the	   contracted	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professors	  before	  eventually	  entering	   into	   longer-­‐term	  contracts.	  By	  retaining	  control	  over	  
both	  university	  facilities	  and	  the	  setting	  of	  tuition	  fees,	  the	  state	  can	  ensure	  that	  universities	  
remain	   responsive	   to	   key	   stakeholders	   while,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   utilizing	   the	   flexibility	   in	  
managerial	  decision-­‐making	  to	  exploit	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  market.	  
	  
As	  is	  nowadays	  the	  case	  with	  many	  public	  services,	  the	  university	  would	  advertise	  a	  tender	  
that	   would	   serve	   as	   the	   bases	   for	   the	   competitive	   bidding	   process	   between	   partnerships	  
(and	  entrepreneur	  professors),	  who	  could	  respond	  to	  a	  tender	  for	  the	  teaching	  of	  individual	  
courses	   all	   the	  way	   through	   to	   the	   development	   of	   curricula	   and	   course	   design	   for	   entire	  
degree	  programs.	  This	  would	  likewise	  be	  the	  case	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  research	  projects.	  	  
	  
At	   the	  partnership-­‐level,	  professorial	  partnerships	  and	  professor-­‐entrepreneurs	  are	  private	  
economic	  actors	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  their	  own	  financial	  management.	  Working	  capital	  
needs	   (including	   salaries)	  would	   be	   provided	   by	   the	   revenues	   generated	   from	   contracting	  
with	   third	   parties	   –	   namely,	   universities	   and	   government	   agencies,	   but	   also	   private	  
organizations	   –	   to	   provide	   educational	   and	   research	   services.	   Any	   larger	   capital	  
requirements	   related	  to,	   for	  example,	   the	   financing	  of	   long-­‐term	   investments,	  would	  most	  
likely	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  private	  loan.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  government	  saw	  an	  interest	  in	  
subsidizing	   these	   independent	  academics,	  at	   least	   in	   the	  early	  years	   in	  which	   the	  model	   is	  
being	  phased-­‐in,	  special	  funds	  could	  be	  set	  aside	  to	  provide	  debt	  financing.	  	  
4.3.6 Strategic	  Management	  
	  
As	  already	  mentioned,	  university	  strategy	   in	   the	  hybrid	  model	  would	  be	  co-­‐determined	  by	  
the	  university	  board	  and	  the	  faculty-­‐level	  partnerships.	  Given	  that	  professors	  are	  still	  public	  
employees	  of	   the	  university	  and	  given	   that	  any	   strategy	  proposed	  by	   the	  university	  board	  
requires	   the	   consensus	   of	   the	   professors,	   the	   university	   has	   limited	   latitude	   in	   effecting	  
(radical)	   change.	   However,	   this	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   governance	   ideal	   underlying	   co-­‐
determination.	   So,	   while	   the	   partnership	   concept	   can	   be	   feasibly	   implemented	   within	  
existing	  university	  structures	  and	  can	  be	  done	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  traditional	  
German	   labor	   relations,	   it	   comes	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   organizational	   responsiveness	   and,	  
ultimately,	  competitiveness.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  improvement	  on	  the	  
current	   situation,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   does	   allow	   for	   strategies	   that	   enhance	   university	  
competitiveness,	   albeit	   limited	   in	   scope,	   in	   areas	   such	   as	   quality	   and	   between	   having	   a	  
teaching	   or	   a	   research	   focus.	   To	   this	   end,	   it	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   consistent	   with	   the	   more	  
modest	   policy	   recommendations	   of	   the	  Wissenschaftsrat.	   On	   a	   more	   general	   note,	   the	  
proposal	   here	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   REIT	   offers	   greater	   ability	   to	   finance	   aggressive	  
improvements	   to	   and	   expansion	   of	   university	   facilities,	   in	   support	   of	   an	   “excellence”	  
strategy	   seeking	   to	   attract	   top	  professors	   and	   students,	   the	   latter	   being	  more	  willing	   to	   a	  
premium	   tuition	   fee	   for	   premium	   educational	   services	   and	   facilities.	   This	   strategy	   can,	  
however,	  be	  more	  fully	  exploited	  in	  the	  market-­‐based	  model,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  next.	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The	  market-­‐based	  model	   offers	   the	  most	   flexibility	  with	   respect	   to	   strategic	   and	   financial	  
management	  for	  both	  universities	  and	  professors.	  The	  advantages	  for	  each	  will	  be	  discussed	  
in	  turn,	  starting	  with	  the	  university	  perspective.	  
	  
Firstly,	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  market-­‐based	  model	  and	  its	  consequences	  for	  university	  
structure,	  management	  and	  governance,	   allow	   for	   a	   continuum	  of	  organizational	   change	   -­‐	  
from	   incremental	   to	   radically	   transformational.	  This	   represents	  a	   true	  paradigm	  shift	  away	  
from	  the	  process	  of	  “disjointed	  incrementalism”	  (Lindblom,	  1979:	  282)	  that	  has	  historically	  
characterized	  planning	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual	  organization	  in	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  liberation	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  tenure	  system	  implies	  that	  the	  university	  is	  
free	  to	  contract	  on	  any	  basis	  it	  wishes	  –	  from	  short-­‐term	  to	  long-­‐term,	  for	  individual	  courses	  
to	   multi-­‐year	   teaching	   and	   research	   engagements	   –	   with	   individual	   professors	   and	  
professorial	   partnerships	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   its	   strategic	   goals.	   This	   flexibility	   in	   human	  
resources	  allows	  for	  more	  aggressive	  strategic	  management.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  university	  may	  
adopt	   proactive	   organizational	   behavior,	   characteristic	   of	   the	   private	   sector,	   where	  
successful	   strategies	   (innovative	   strategies	   in	   particular)	   tend	   to	   be	   proactive.	   	   This	  
represents	  a	   fundamental	  change,	   to	   the	  extent	   that	  strategy	   in	  public	  sector	  organization	  
tends	  to	  be	  reactive,	  responding	  to	  changes	   in	  the	  external	   (political)	  environment	  (Ring	  &	  
Perry,	  1985).	  
	  
Thirdly,	  and	  as	  already	  discussed	  above,	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  REIT	  can	  be	  more	  fully	  exploited	  in	  
the	   market-­‐based	   model.	   Flexibility	   in	   making	   investment	   decisions	   –	   and	   the	   financing	  
strategy	  to	  support	  them	  -­‐	  concerning	  the	  type	  of	  facilities	  offered	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  those	  
facilities	  enables	  the	  university	  board	  far	  greater	   latitude	   in	  determining	  a	  generic	  strategy	  
orientation.	  For	  example,	  a	  university	  may	  choose	  a	  generic	  “cost	  leadership”	  strategy.	  Such	  
a	   strategy	   would	   imply	   opting	   for	   low	   to	   intermediate	   quality	   facilities,	   contracting	   with	  
professors	  who	   have	   a	  moderately	   good	   reputation,	  whose	   services	   can	   be	   secured	   for	   a	  
modest	   fee,	  all	  of	  which	  would	  then	  be	  reflected	   in	  a	   low	  to	  moderate	  tuition	   fee.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  the	  university	  may	  opt	  for	  a	  generic	  “premium”	  or	  “excellence”	  strategy,	  which	  
would	   imply	   aggressive	   improvements	   in	   university	   facilities	   in	   order	   to	   attract	   top	  
professors	  and	  students,	  the	  latter	  being	  more	  willing	  to	  a	  premium	  tuition	  fee	  for	  premium	  
educational	   services	   and	   facilities.	   Lastly,	   universities	   could	   decide	   whether	   to	   pursue	   a	  
generalist	  or	  a	  specialist	  strategy,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  types	  and	  number	  of	  subjects	  and	  degrees	  
offered,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  terms	  of	  either	  a	  teaching	  or	  a	  research	  orientation.	  
	  
Likewise,	   the	   market-­‐based	   model	   offers	   a	   number	   of	   advantages	   to	   professors.	   Firstly,	  
professors	  are	  not	  bound	  to	  one	  employer;	   rather,	   they	  are	   free	  to	  contract	  with	  as	  many	  
universities	  and	  other	  interested	  parties,	  as	  they	  like.	  And	  while	  they	  lose	  the	  steady	  salary	  
and	  job	  security	  of	  the	  tenure	  system,	  they	  gain	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  their	  own	  earnings	  
by	  adjusting	  their	  efforts	  and	  qualifications	  accordingly.	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Secondly,	   professors	   would	   enjoy	   the	   same	   latitude	   in	   their	   choice	   of	   strategy	   as	  
universities.	   They	   face	   the	   first	   decision	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   to	   remain	   self-­‐employed	  
entrepreneurs	  or	  to	  join	  other	  academics	  in	  forming	  a	  partnership.	  They	  can	  choose,	  on	  an	  
individual	   or	   partnership	   basis,	   a	   generalist	   or	   a	   specialist	   strategy,	   offering	   teaching,	  
research	  or	  consulting	  services,	  or	  some	  combination	  thereof.	  Professors	  could	  furthermore	  
exploit	   the	   benefits	   of	   formal	   professionalization,	   by	   profiling	   themselves	   based	   on	   their	  
formally	  recognized	  and	  certified	  set	  of	  competencies.	  	  
	  
Thirdly,	   professors	   could	   exploit	   new	   revenue	   streams	   offered	   by	   recent	   technological	  
developments.	   Not	   only	   could	   they	   earn	   service	   fee	   revenues	   (for	   teaching	   and	   research	  
services	  rendered),	  but	  they	  could	  also	  earn	  merchandise	  revenues,	  for	  example	  through	  the	  
sale	   of	   textbooks	   or	   video	   recordings	   of	   lectures.	   Finally,	   since	   they	   (or	   their	   partnership)	  
would	   own	   any	   intellectual	   property	   they	   may	   develop,	   they	   could	   also	   earn	   royalty	  
revenues	  from	  licensing	  the	  use	  of	  it.	  
	  
In	   summary,	   the	   market	   model	   offers	   a	   number	   of	   critical	   advantages	   compared	   with	  
existing	   modes	   of	   governance,	   as	   well	   as	   over	   the	   with	   the	   hybrid	   mode	   of	   governance,	  
introduced	   above.	   It	   offers	   both	   the	   university	   as	   well	   as	   academics	   greater	   flexibility	   in	  
strategic,	   financial	   and	   operational	   management	   decisions,	   while	   maximizing	   governance	  
benefits	  to	  all	  parties	  involved.	  
4.3.7 Funding	  	  
	  
In	   the	   following	   paragraphs,	   some	   recommendations	   for	   reform	   of	   university	   finance	   are	  
sketched	  out	   that	  are	  seen	  as	  complementing	   the	  proposed	  governance	  reform.	  However,	  
since	  it	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  author	  and	  therefore	  not	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  current	  paper	  
to	  delve	  deeply	  into	  the	  issue	  of	  public	  university	  finance	  reform,	  the	  recommendations	  will	  
only	  be	  briefly	  explained	  and	  discussed.	  
	  
Although	  ownership	  of	  universities	  may	   remain	   largely	   in	  public	  hands,	  both	  models	  allow	  
for	   increased	   funding	   from	   other	   sources,	   including	   private	   parties50.	   While	   both	   models	  
allow	   for	   continued	   state	   funding,	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   funds	   	   -­‐	   and,	   in	   particular,	   state	  
funds	   -­‐	   flow	   to	   the	   university	   would	   differ	   substantially	   from	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   it	   is	  
currently	   and	   has	   traditionally	   been	   done.	   These	   two	   fundamental	   changes	   in	   university	  
funding	   will	   be	   discussed	   below	   and	   their	   consistency	   with	   the	   partnership	   model	   of	  
university	  governance	  discussed.	  
	  
The	   first	   fundamental	   change	   involves	   the	   sources	   of	   funding.	   In	   order	   to	   provide	   greater	  
incentives	  for	   improved	  capital	  budgeting,	  universities	  should	  be	  encouraged	  to	  seek	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  As	  was	  briefly	  mentioned	  above	  and	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  this	  section,	  the	  option	  of	  
raising	   capital	   for	   long-­‐term	   investments	   in	   buildings,	   facilities	   and	   equipment	   buy	   selling	   equity	  
interests	  will	  also	  have	  implications	  for	  ownership	  and	  control.	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funding	  from	  private	  parties.	  This	  would	  include,	  but	  not	  be	  limited	  to,	  the	  sale	  of	  bonds	  and	  
equity,	   fundraising	   from	   alumni,	   and	   philanthropic	   endowments.	   Starting	  with	   bonds,	   the	  
sale	  of	  bonds	  to	  private	  investors	  will	  make	  central	  university	  management	  accountable	  to	  a	  
broader	  and	  more	   inclusive	  group	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  will	  also	  require	  them	  to	  cooperate	  
more	   closely	   with	   internal	   stakeholders	   (i.e.,	   professors)	   in	   the	   planning	   of	   capital	  
investments.	  Next,	   equity	  may	  be	   considered,	  but	   is	   foreseen	  as	  being	   limited	   to	   the	  REIT	  
vehicle	   discussed	   above.	   The	   third	   and	   final	   fundamental	   change	   concerning	   funding	   is	  
reflected	   in	   the	   raising	   of	   capital	   via	   fundraising.	   Here,	   two	   options	   come	   immediately	   to	  
mind:	   fundraising	   from	   alumni,	   and	   philanthropic	   endowments.	   The	   increased	   need	   for	  
universities	  to	  rely	  on	  fundraising	  in	  the	  future	  was	  mentioned	  by	  a	  number	  of	  panelists	  and	  
keynote	   speakers	   at	   the	   Hanns	   Martin	   Schleyer-­‐Stiftung	   symposium	   on	   higher	   education	  
reform	  held	  in	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main	  on	  November	  28,	  2013.	  The	  chief	  strength	  of	  this	  source	  
of	   funding	   is	   that	   it	  most-­‐closely	   links	   education	  and	   research	  quality	  with	   funding.	   In	   the	  
case	  of	  alumni	  donations,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  connection	  between	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  that	  
students	   receive	   and	   their	   ability	   and	   inclination	   to	  donate.	   Specifically,	   this	   assumes	   that	  
well-­‐educated	  graduates	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  employed	  and	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  earn	  more,	  
on	   average,	   than	   non-­‐graduates	   or	   graduates	   of	   a	   lower	   quality	   program.	   Consequently,	  
such	  graduates	  are	  better	  able	  to	  make	  charitable	  contributions	  to	  their	  alma	  mater	  and	  will	  
likely	   feel	  more	   inclined	  to	  “give	  something	  back”	  to	  the	  university	  that	  has	  given	  them	  so	  
much.	   Concerning	   philanthropic	   endowments,	   it	   is	   often	   the	   case	   in	   the	  US,	   for	   example,	  
that	  when	  wealthy	  alumni	  die,	  they	  leave	  an	  endowment	  to	  the	  university	  from	  which	  they	  
graduated.	   Corporations	   may	   also	   endow	   a	   university	   with	   which	   it	   often	   cooperates	   on	  
research	  or	  other	  endeavors.	  
	  
The	   second	   fundamental	   change	   will	   be	   reflected	   in	   the	   flow	   of	   funds.	   Concerning	   state	  
funding,	  funds	  are	  foreseen	  to	  flow	  to	  universities	  in	  an	  indirect	  manner,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  
direct,	  “global”	  budgets	  that	  universities	  now	  receive.	  Specifically,	   the	   largest	  pool	  of	  state	  
funds	   would	   be	   set	   aside	   for	   student	   loans	   and	   vouchers.	   In	   keeping	   with	   the	   German	  
tradition	   of	   (largely)	   free	   access	   to	   education,	   students	   would	   receive	   a	   voucher	   of	   a	  
standardized	   amount	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   pay	   tuition	   fees	   at	   any	   university	   of	   their	  
choosing.	  Should	  the	  student	  attend	  a	  degree	  program	  that	  charges	  a	  tuition	  fee	  in	  excess	  of	  
the	  standard	  amount,	  additional	   funds	  could	  be	  borrowed	   to	  cover	   these	  additional	   costs.	  
Concerning	   alumni	   donations	   and	   endowments,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   contributions	   are	  
targeted	  to	  a	  specific	  purpose	  or	  not	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  university	  itself	  and	  will	  likely	  
reflect	   the	  wishes	  of	  major	  donors.	   This	   is	   generally	   the	  approach	   taken	  by	  well-­‐endowed	  
private	  universities	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  
	  
4.4 Summary	  and	  Conclusion	  
	  
The	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   was	   to	   offer	   a	   roadmap	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  
partnership	   concept	   in	   the	   context	   of	  German	   public	   university	   reform.	   As	   a	   prerequisite,	  
the	  formal	  professionalization	  of	  academics	  was	  recommended	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  both	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of	   the	   proposed	   approaches	   to	   implementation	   of	   the	   partnership	   model,	   regardless	   of	  
which	   one	   might	   ultimately	   be	   selected.	   The	   discussion	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  
partnership	   concept	   was	   structured	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   implications	   for	   university	   ownership,	  
control	   and	   funding.	   Special	   consideration	   was	   given	   to	   the	   management	   functions	   of	  
financial	  and	  strategic	  planning.	  
	  
On	   balance,	   both	  models	   promise	   improvements	   over	   the	   traditional	  model	   of	   the	   public	  
bureaucracy	   as	   well	   as	   the	   newer	   corporate-­‐based	   approaches	   to	   management	   and	  
governance.	   The	   hybrid	   approach	   to	   implementation	   is	  more	   consistent	  with	   the	  German	  
institution	  of	   labor	  relations;	  namely,	  co-­‐determination.	   It	  also	  requires	  fewer	  and	   less	  far-­‐
reaching	  adjustments	   to	  existing	  university	  structures.	  Overall,	   the	  market-­‐based	  approach	  
was	   demonstrated	   to	   offer	   the	   most	   advantages	   for	   both	   universities	   and	   academics	   in	  
comparison	  to	  all	  other	  management	  and	  governance	  regimes.	  	  
	  
While	   historically	   the	   professional	   partnership	   has	   proven	   to	   be	   the	  most	  widely	   adopted	  
organizational	  form	  among	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  firms	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  
seen	   whether	   or	   not	   it	   will	   gain	   sufficient	   institutional	   legitimacy	   within	   the	   academic	  






















	   81	  
5 Conclusion	  
	  
As	   already	  mentioned,	   a	   chief	   aim	  of	   the	  dissertation	  was	   to	   stimulate	   reformers	   to	   think	  
beyond	  the	  limited	  scope	  of	  the	  corporate	  model	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  discourse	  on	  public	  
university	   reform	   in	   Germany.	   In	   this	   vein,	   questions	   were	   posed,	   such	   as	   “Does	   it	  make	  
sense	   to	   run	  a	  university	   like	  a	   firm?”	  and	  “Are	   there	  alternative,	  private-­‐sector	  models	  of	  
management	  and	  governance	  more	  appropriate	  and	  effective	  for	  the	  university	  context	  than	  
the	   corporate	   model?”,	   questions	   to	   which	   answers	   were	   sought.	   To	   this	   end,	   the	   chief	  
contribution	  of	  the	  dissertation	  was	  threefold.	  Firstly,	  starting	  at	  the	  broader,	  abstract	  level	  
of	  knowledge	  work	  and	  knowledge	  workers,	  arguments	  drawn	  from	  transaction	  cost	  theory	  
were	   systematically	   and	   coherently	  made	   that	   lay	   the	   foundation	   for	   two	   alternative,	   yet	  
complementary,	   modes	   of	   governance	   borrowed	   from	   the	   private	   sector:	   the	  
professionalization	   of	   certain	   knowledge	   workers	   (based	   on	   a	   proposed	   typology	   of	   the	  
knowledge	   dimension	   of	   human	   assets)	   and	   the	   partnership	   as	   an	   organizational	   form.	  	  
Namely,	   the	   argument	   was	  made	   that	   partnerships	   contribute	   to	   lower	   transaction	   costs	  
than	   can	   be	   achieved	   by	   either	   markets	   or	   hierarchies	   in	   the	   governance	   of	   knowledge-­‐
intensive	   service	   transactions	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   lower	   information	  
asymmetries	   between	   expert-­‐partners	   reduce	   the	   probability	   that	   opportunistic	   behavior	  
can	   be	   successfully	   pursued.	   Secondly,	   the	   unification	   of	   ownership,	   management	   and	  
operations	  in	  the	  persons	  of	  the	  partners	  contributes	  to	  a	  highly	  effective	  system	  of	  internal	  
mutual	  peer	  monitoring.	  A	  chief	  outcome	  are	  lower	  transaction	  costs,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  
more	   costly	   and	   less	   effective	   option	   of	   market-­‐based	   contracting,	   due	   to	   the	   inherent	  
difficulty	   faced	   by	   non-­‐experts	   in	   monitoring	   and	   controlling	   transactions	   in	   knowledge-­‐
intensive,	   expert	   services.	   Internal	   governance	   of	   experts	   by	   experts	   should	   also	   be	   less	  
costly	   and	   more	   effective	   than	   traditional,	   hierarchical	   internal	   firm	   governance	   by	   non-­‐
expert	   “professional”	   managers,	   particularly	   where	   operations	   are	   characterized	   by	   the	  
provision	  of	  non-­‐standardized,	  non-­‐routine	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services.	   In	   summary,	   it	   is	  
argued	   that	   the	   partnership	   is	   an	   organizational	   form	   that	   is	   more	   consistent	   with	  
institutional	   features	  and	  governance	  mechanisms	  of	  professionalization.	  When	  combined,	  
complementarities	   in	   the	   two	  modes	  of	   governance	  are	  expected	   to	   create	   synergies	   that	  
optimize	  the	  governance	  effects	  of	  each	  and	  minimize	  total	  transaction	  costs.	  
	  
Secondly,	   an	   agency	   theoretic	   approach	  was	   taken	   in	  making	   a	   critical	   assessment	   of	   the	  
corporate	   governance	   and	   its	   application	   in	   the	   university	   context.	   In	   response,	   the	  
professional	  partnership	  was	  proposed	  as	  a	  superior	  alternative,	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  require	  
the	   construction	  of	   an	  artificial	   agency	   relationship	   in	  order	   to	  apply	   the	   corporate	  model	  
and	   that	   it	   is	   more	   robust	   and	   institutionally	   consistent	   with	   the	   academic	   context.	  
Concerning	   the	   latter,	   it	   has	   been	   shown	   that	   the	   key	   governance	   characteristics	   of	   the	  
professional	  partnership	  are	  far	  more	  consistent	  with	  the	  academic	  work	  environment	  and	  
the	  nature	  of	  academic	  workers	   than	   is	   the	  corporate	  model	  of	  governance.	  Secondly,	   the	  
decentralization	  and	  devolution	  of	   key	  decision	  making	  authority	   to	   the	   level	  of	   individual	  
university	  faculties	  that	  the	  model	  advocates	  is	  much	  more	  in	  line	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  NPM	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reform	   initiative	   and	   with	   historical	   university	   tradition	   in	   Germany	   than	   the	   corporate	  
model.	  In	  addition,	  such	  an	  approach	  to	  university	  reform	  restores	  the	  historical	  trust	  in	  and	  
freedom	   accorded	   to	   the	   academic	   profession	   and	   avoids	   controversial	   corporate	  
governance	  instruments,	  such	  as	  performance-­‐based	  pay,	  which,	  as	  research	  suggests,	  may	  
prove	   ineffective	   in	   the	   university	   context.	   In	   this	   last	   respect,	   is	  much	  more	   likely	   to	   be	  
accepted	  by	  both	  academics	  and	  the	  broader	  public	  than	  the	  corporate	  model.	  
	  
Lastly,	  a	  roadmap	  for	  implementation	  of	  the	  partnership	  concept	  in	  the	  context	  of	  German	  
public	   university	   reform	   was	   offered.	   As	   a	   prerequisite,	   the	   formal	   professionalization	   of	  
academics	   is	   recommended	   in	   order	   to	   strengthen	   both	   of	   the	   proposed	   approaches	   to	  
implementation	   of	   the	   partnership	   model,	   regardless	   of	   which	   one	   might	   ultimately	   be	  
selected.	   The	   discussion	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   partnership	   concept	   has	   been	  
structured	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  implications	  for	  university	  ownership,	  control	  and	  funding.	  Special	  
consideration	   has	   been	   given	   to	   the	   management	   functions	   of	   financial	   and	   strategic	  
planning.	  
	  
On	   balance,	   both	  models	   promise	   improvements	   over	   the	   traditional	  model	   of	   the	   public	  
bureaucracy	   as	   well	   as	   the	   newer	   corporate-­‐based	   approaches	   to	   management	   and	  
governance.	   The	   hybrid	   approach	   to	   implementation	   is	  more	   consistent	  with	   the	  German	  
institution	  of	   labor	  relations;	  namely,	  co-­‐determination.	   It	  also	  requires	  fewer	  and	   less	  far-­‐
reaching	  adjustments	   to	  existing	  university	  structures.	  Overall,	   the	  market-­‐based	  approach	  
was	   demonstrated	   to	   offer	   the	   most	   advantages	   for	   both	   universities	   and	   academics	   in	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